Lakshminath Dondeti writes:
> MOBIKE assumes that the other side has state, correct?

Yes. 

> Session resumption has to do with providing that state. How are they
> the same?

In this example given (handover from cellular to wlan, without
breaking existing phone call), I do not really see any point why the
IKE SA state needs to be removed from the server side, and as such I
think the much better solution is to use MOBIKE and keep IKE SA up all
the time.

As I do not have any idea where people want to use the resumption, I
have VERY HARD time to justify the different protocol options. But
anyways one of the things required is that it "shall not have negative
impact on IKEv2 security features", and I think 1 RT protocol will
have negative impact to security features.

> Under attack, the protocol stretches to 3 RTs.

3 RT + Diffie-Hellman + public key operation + user interaction to
type in password or securid token etc.

> So, you are saying that there is no noticeable difference between 1
> and 2 RTs, but there is between 2 and 3? Is your point that the DH
> computation will be noticed?

With group 18: yes... With typing in the passphase to do
reauthentication with RSA token card : yes. With digging out your
securid card and typing in pin, and typing in the next token to the
prompt: yes.

> My point is that we'd beyond the real-time budgets after 1 RT
> anyway.

You should not really do break-before-make style of transitions on
real-time environments, and if you keep the old connection while
making the new one, then this whole issue is non-issue.
-- 
kivi...@iki.fi
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