On Tue, Jul 13, 2021 at 10:26:07AM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote: > Quoting this proposal again: > > > 1) A successful binding call for the first device in the group creates > > the security context for the entire group, by: > > > > * Verifying group viability in a similar way as VFIO does; > > > > * Calling IOMMU-API to move the group into a block-dma state, > > which makes all devices in the group attached to an block-dma > > domain with an empty I/O page table; > > > > VFIO should not allow the user to mmap the MMIO bar of the bound > > device until the binding call succeeds. > > The attach step is irrelevant to my question, the bind step is where > the device/group gets into a secure state for device access.
Binding is similar to attach, it will need to indicate the drivers intention and a SW driver will not attach to the PCI device underneath it. > AIUI the operation of VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMU_FD looks like this: > > iommu_ctx = iommu_ctx_fdget(iommu_fd); > > mdev = mdev_from_dev(vdev->dev); > dev = mdev ? mdev_parent_dev(mdev) : vdev->dev; > > iommu_dev = iommu_register_device(iommu_ctx, dev, cookie); A default of binding to vdev->dev might turn out to be OK, but this needs to be an overridable op in vfio_device and the SW mdevs will have to do some 'iommu_register_sw_device()' and not pass in a dev at all. Jason _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
