This is necessary to avoid exposing valid kernel data to any
malicious device.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <h...@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu...@linux.intel.com>
---
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
index 89066efa3840..04bea5a87462 100644
--- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
+++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#endif
@@ -458,6 +459,8 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *hwdev,
unsigned long offset_slots;
unsigned long max_slots;
unsigned long tmp_io_tlb_used;
+ void *zero_addr;
+ size_t zero_size;
if (no_iotlb_memory)
panic("Can not allocate SWIOTLB buffer earlier and can't now
provide you with the DMA bounce buffer");
@@ -565,9 +568,20 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *hwdev,
*/
for (i = 0; i < nslots; i++)
io_tlb_orig_addr[index+i] = orig_addr + (i << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
+
+ zero_addr = phys_to_virt(tlb_addr);
+ zero_size = alloc_size;
+
if (!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC) &&
- (dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE || dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL))
+ (dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE || dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL)) {
swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, mapping_size,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ zero_addr += mapping_size;
+ zero_size -= mapping_size;
+ }
+
+ /* Zero out the bounce buffer if the consumer is untrusted. */
+ if (dev_is_untrusted(hwdev) && zero_size)
+ memset(zero_addr, 0, zero_size);
return tlb_addr;
}
--
2.17.1
_______________________________________________
iommu mailing list
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
