On Sun, Jul 20, 2025 at 2:56 AM Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Sat 19/Jul/2025 21:41:27 +0200 Wei Chuang wrote: > > My sense is that over the lifetime of "DKIM2" there will be more > algorithm > > introductions than circumstances where there is an algorithm breakage, > and the > > algorithm introductions need to be supported and encouraged for > algorithm > > diversity. I suspect a MUST would discourage that. > > > Your wording is a bit obscure to me. Did you say a MUST would discourage > the > trend to support and encourage algorithm diversity? While some would have > hoped otherwise, that seems to be what happened with ed25519, as RFC 8463 > states: > > Signers SHOULD implement and verifiers MUST implement the > Ed25519-SHA256 algorithm. > My worry is that if receivers lack some latitude for applying local policy during new algorithm introductions it will introduce a denial of service scenario. A strict interpretation of the above MUST, is that even if the new signers or new verifiers are immature, and introduce false verification failures, is to use those results. Senders knowing this will be discouraged from introducing new algorithms due to the deliverability impact. I interpret Barry's proposal as providing some latitude for introducing those algorithms. -Wei
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