On Sun, Aug 20, 2023, at 6:13 AM, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> On Fri 18/Aug/2023 12:21:31 +0200 Emanuel Schorsch wrote:
> >>
> >>> For example, we have seen very large DKIM Replay attacks of youtube.com 
> >>> Terms of Service emails. There is no malicious content in these emails, 
> >>> but spammers still send very large volumes (perhaps using them to 
> >>> generate affinity with victims or warm up their sending 
> >>> infrastructure). >>
> >> That points to a bug in the I-D.  Section 3.1 says:
> >>
> >>      A spammer will find a mailbox provider with a high reputation and that
> >>      signs their message with DKIM. The spammer sends a message with spam
> >>      content from there to a mailbox the spammer controls.
> >>
> >> Youtube.com Terms of Service emails don't seem to have been sent by the 
> >> spammer.
> >
> > I agree, for completeness we should update that section to include both 
> > types of DKIM replay. I can work on sending a tweak to that section.
> 
> 
> Please do!  Without it, Section 5.3, "Strip DKIM signatures on mailbox 
> delivery" makes little sense.
> 
> 
> > But, to be clear this type of replay is definitely much less common than 
> > the spammer generated content. I just wanted to provide that it does also  
> > happen.
> 
> If there is a large difference, then the idea of segmenting authentication 
> domains might actually belong to countering replay attacks, for spammers 
> looking for high reputation signatures.  Some time ago I proposed 
> d=bullshit.example.com, but after thinking a bit more, the I-D could set up a 
> register for that.
> 
> For a strawman:
> 
>    5.6. Use segmented signature domains
> 
>       Domains that host mailboxes for widely different categories of users,
>       typically free-mail domains, can differentiate the signature they affix
>       on messages by using subdomains.  IANA maintains a register of 
> subdomains
>       used for this purpose (See Section 7.)
> 
>       *  Messages written by spammers who get categorized as such will be
>          signed by subdomains with low reputation, which lowers the incentive
>          to obtain the very signature.
> 
>       *  Careful users, who don't spam and don't have their accounts often
>          compromised, can use domains whose reputation won't be ruined by
>          replay attacks.
> 
> And
> 
>    7. IANA Consideration
> 
>       This document proposes the use of subdomain to categorize email message
>       categories for which IANA is to create and maintain a new registry
>       entitled "DKIM Semantic Subdomain Names".
> 
>       New registrations are published in accordance with the "First Come First
>       Served" guidelines as described in [RFC8126].  They are to contain the
>       following information:
> 
>       1.  Subdomain name to be used in the category.  The name MUST exist as a
>           direct subdomain for the domain referred by the proponent, and MUST
>           contain a non-empty _domainkey subdomain at the time or 
> registration.
> 
>       2.  Short description of the category, and criteria for assigning 
> messages
>           to this category, possibly containing a link to extended 
> description.
> 
>       3.  Trust that recipients are invited to assign to messages signed by 
> such
>           subdomain.  This MUST be one of the key words "none", "low", 
> "medium"
>           and "high".
> 
>       4.  Date of the registration.
> 
>       Note: Domains are invited to re-use existing names rather than 
> registering
>       new ones, if the intent matches the description.  These names are not
>       visible by users, so there is no reason to use IDNs.  Names and
>       descriptions MUST be in English.

I just want to say +1 to all of this. I believe that adding more d= signatures 
to convey context is the solution to allow ESPs/intermediaries to express 
enough information to allow receivers to make a mail handling decision in a way 
that minimizes collateral damage.

Jesse
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