The Domain Keys Identified Mail (dkim) WG in the Applications and Real-Time Area of the IETF has been rechartered. For additional information, please contact the Area Directors or the WG Chairs.
Domain Keys Identified Mail (dkim) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Current status: Proposed WG Chairs: Tim Wicinski <tjw.i...@gmail.com> Laura A <la...@wordtothewise.com> Assigned Area Director: Murray Kucherawy <superu...@gmail.com> Applications and Real-Time Area Directors: Murray Kucherawy <superu...@gmail.com> Francesca Palombini <francesca.palomb...@ericsson.com> Mailing list: Address: ietf-dkim@ietf.org To subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim/ Archive: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ietf-dkim/ Group page: https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/dkim/ Charter: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-dkim/ Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM, RFC 6376) defines a method for using a digital signature to associate a domain identity with an email message using an appropriate cryptographic authentication mechanism, and to assure receiving domains that the message has not been altered since the signature was created. Receiving systems can use this information as part of their message-handling decision. This can help reduce spam, phishing, and other unwanted or malicious email. A DKIM-signed message can be re-posted, to additional recipients, in a fashion that retains the original signature. With an author and a recipient collaborating, this can "replay" the message, using the original signer's reputation to propagate email with problematic content -- spam, phishing, and the like. Generally, the technical characteristics of this form of abuse match those of legitimate mail, making its detection or prevention challenging. Timestamps and carefully-tailored message signing conventions are appealing approaches to replay mitigation. Each has significant limitations. The DKIM working group will first develop and publish a clear problem statement. Then, it will produce one or more technical specifications that propose replay-resistant mechanisms. The working group will prefer solutions compatible with DKIM's broad deployment, and there will be an expectation that these solutions will have been through implementation and interoperability testing before publication. If the working group decides that is unable to identify a consensus technical solution to this problem space, it may instead publish a report describing the problem and summarizing the reasons that none of the proposed approaches are acceptable. Finally, the working group may produce documents that update operational advice to reflect modern considerations, especially with respect to the replay problem described above. This should be done only if there is a consensus opinion that such advice would be based on experience rather than theory. Current proposals include the following drafts: - draft-bradshaw-envelope-validation-extension-dkim - draft-chuang-dkim-replay-problem - draft-chuang-replay-resistant-arc - draft-gondwana-email-mailpath - draft-kucherawy-dkim-anti-replay The working group may adopt or ignore these as it sees fit, and may consider or develop other proposals. Milestones: Apr 2023 - Post a consensus problem statement draft to the datatracker (may not go to the IESG) Jun 2023 - Proposal regarding plans for remaining document(s) presented to the AD Dec 2023 - Submit technical specifications for replay-resistant DKIM enhancement(s) to the IESG at Proposed Standard Dec 2023 - Submit revised operational advice for replay-resistant DKIM use to the IESG at Informational _______________________________________________ Ietf-dkim mailing list Ietf-dkim@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-dkim
