The Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps) WG in the Security Area of the IETF has been rechartered. For additional information, please contact the Area Directors or the WG Chairs.
Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Current status: Active WG Chairs: Russ Housley <[email protected]> Tim Hollebeek <[email protected]> Assigned Area Director: Deb Cooley <[email protected]> Security Area Directors: Paul Wouters <[email protected]> Deb Cooley <[email protected]> Mailing list: Address: [email protected] To subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm Archive: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/ Group page: https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/lamps/ Charter: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-lamps/ The PKIX and S/MIME Working Groups have been closed for some time. Some updates have been proposed to the X.509 certificate documents produced by the PKIX Working Group and the electronic mail security documents produced by the S/MIME Working Group. The LAMPS (Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME) Working Group is chartered to make updates where there is a known constituency interested in real deployment and there is at least one sufficiently well specified approach to the update so that the working group can sensibly evaluate whether to adopt a proposal. The LAMPS WG is now tackling these topics which will be published as Standards Track: 1. The LAMPS WG may investigate updates to documents produced by the PKIX and S/MIME WGs. This work will follow the guidelines listed above (real deployment, known constituency, etc). This includes maintenance of protocols such as Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), Certificate Management over Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) (CMC), Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST), S/MIME protocols, and PKIX protocols. These protocols continue to be used in many different environments and they continue to evolve. 2. Recent progress in the development of quantum computers poses a threat to widely deployed public key algorithms. As a result, there is a need to prepare for a day when cryptosystems such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDSA, ECDH, and EdDSA cannot be depended upon in the PKIX and S/MIME protocols. 2.a. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has produced quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithm standards. In addition, CFRG may vet other quantum-resistant public key cryptographic algorithms. The LAMPS WG will specify the use of these new Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) public key algorithms with the PKIX certificates and the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). These specifications will use object identifiers for the new algorithms that are assigned by NIST or by IANA. 2.b. A lengthy transition from today's public key algorithms to PQC public key algorithms is expected. Time will be needed to gain full confidence in the new PQC public key algorithms. 2.b.i. The LAMPS WG will specify formats, identifiers, enrollment, and operational practices for "hybrid key establishment" that combines the shared secret values one or more traditional key-establishment algorithm and one or more NIST PQC key-establishment algorithm or a PQC key-establishment algorithm vetted by the CFRG. The shared secret values will be combined using HKDF (see RFC 5869), one of the key derivation functions in NIST SP 800-56C, or a key derivation function vetted by the CFRG. 2.b.ii. The LAMPS WG will specify formats, identifiers, enrollment, and operational practices for "dual signatures" that combines one or more traditional signature algorithm with one or more NIST PQC signature algorithm or a PQC algorithm vetted by the CFRG. 2.c. Specify the use of techniques that allow streamlined processing for PQC certificates and exchanges. One example of such use is unsigned X.509 Certificates to convey information about the subject. Currently, Trust Anchors use self-signed certificates for this purpose, using bandwidth that could prohibit constrained devices from being able to utilize the larger signature sized quantum resistant algorithms. Milestones: Dec 2025 - PKCS#8 content types (Standards Track RFCs) Jan 2026 - Composite KEM in PKIX and CMS (Standards Track RFCs) Jan 2026 - Unsigned Trust Anchors (Standards Track RFCs) Mar 2026 - Composite Signatures in PKIX and CMS (Standards Track RFCs) Jun 2026 - Adopt drafts for PQC KEM public keys in PKIX certificates (Standards Track RFCs) Jun 2026 - Adopt drafts for PQC KEM algorithms in CMS (Standards Track RFCs) Jun 2026 - CAA Security (Standards Track RFC) _______________________________________________ IETF-Announce mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
