I share the curiosity about why TSO gets quarantined like a contagious 
pit-bull. If I can run PGM=ABC in a batch job with no more authorization that 
SAF READ to the load library, then why are there extra hurdles to run the exact 
same program under TSO? I don't mean technically why; I mean architecturally 
why.  

This is speculation tempered by anecdotal history. Despite being an old fart, I 
got into this biz pretty late, 1978. By that time my first employer--ancestor 
of Experian--was just rolling out TSO to the unwashed masses. It rapidly 
replaced a nearly universal industry protocol of writing out a program, JCL, 
etc. on coding sheets; submitting them to the keypunch department; then waiting 
a day (or more) for a computer turnaround. After the results came back, you 
either did a rinse-and-repeat or progressed to whatever you perceived the next 
step to be. That was development. 

'Foreground execution' presented a huge boon to productivity, but also a cause 
for anxiety among the powers that be. Background execution required a village. 
Foreground execution required only some taps on a keyboard in private. Who knew 
what you were doing or to what end? The cows that had been properly confined to 
the stockyard were suddenly allowed to run roughshod over an unfenced range. 
This anarchy could not be tolerated. 

So TSO was saddled with an additional layer of control not required for batch. 
The same program that could run unfettered in batch needed additional 
dispensation to run under TSO. It's not that you could do mischief under TSO 
that you could not do in batch. It's that you could do it unaided and 
unobserved. 

.
.
J.O.Skip Robinson
Southern California Edison Company
Electric Dragon Team Paddler 
SHARE MVS Program Co-Manager
323-715-0595 Mobile
626-543-6132 Office ⇐=== NEW
robin...@sce.com

-----Original Message-----
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU> On Behalf Of 
Seymour J Metz
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2019 11:59 AM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: (External):Re: AUTHPGM in IKJTSOxx

TSO normally runs authorized and attaches commands as unauthorized. It's true 
that the TMP was originally unauthorized, but that was long ago in a galaxy far 
away.


--
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3


________________________________________
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU> on behalf of 
Steve Smith <sasd...@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2019 6:05 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: AUTHPGM in IKJTSOxx

Well, it's been two hours, and no expert has come forth, so I'll take a shot.  
As TSO normally runs non-authorized, attempting to execute an authorized 
program would normally fail.  TSO can run authorized commands & programs, but 
it has to do considerable setup for them, to maintain integrity, and actually 
invoke them in an APF-authorized environment.  So the parms are how it knows 
what it needs to do that for.

There's also the mixed environment of TSO, and authorized programs might need 
to take extra care to avoid integrity issues that don't apply when running in 
its own address space.  So the AUTH* parms control what programs are 
(hopefully) known to be safe there.

Side note:  for this purpose, and most, by TSO I mean the IBM-supplied TMP.  
You can logon with any proc that executes anything (subject to different 
controls).  In that case none of this applies.

As implied above, I am not an expert on this, so it may not be complete or 
completely accurate.

sas


On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 2:48 PM Paul Gilmartin < 
0000000433f07816-dmarc-requ...@listserv.ua.edu> wrote:

> On Wed, 13 Nov 2019 08:55:39 -0600, Jeffrey Holst wrote:
>
> >Does AUTHPGM require that the specified program have a non-zero AC or
> that it be in an APF authorized library?
> >
> >I ask because it appears that a very clever user may have written a
> program whose name matches a program in the AUTHPGM list. The program 
> executes a macro instruction that requires APF authorization. It 
> appears that he was able to successfully call it from TSO.
> >
> What does AUTHPGM protect, or rather what security hazard does the 
> absence of a program from the AUTHPGM list specifically prevent?  Can 
> an expert outline a scenario?
>
> -- gil
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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--
sas


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