On 7/4/2018 6:38 AM, Rob Scott wrote:
Barbara,
 From the SDSF z/OS 2.3 Operation and Customization Guide :

"As of z/OS V2R3, SDSF requires the SDSF and SDSFAUX address spaces to be
active for full functionality. The SDSF address space manages connections,
processes ISFPRMxx statements, handles operator commands, and starts and
stops SDSFAUX. The SDSFAUX address space is used for data gathering
requests.

When a user accesses SDSF, the SDSF client program attempts to connect to the
SDSF address space. To connect to the SDSF server, the user must have READ
access to the ISF.CONNECT.system resource in the SDSF class."

SDSF for z/OS 2.3 relies more heavily on SDSF server provided functionality and services, whereas 
in z/OS 2.1 and 2.2 the SDSF client code was loosely coupled to the SDSFAUX address space for new 
functionality only (eg the "DEV" or "LNK" commands).

By granting READ access to ISF.CONNECT.system, a user or group is a valid user 
of SDSF server functionality however the user or group can still be restricted 
from SDSF commands using the normal ISFCMD profiles.

If you feel strongly that SDSF should have a customization option to suppress 
the ICH408I for ISF.CONNECT.system, please raise an RFE as this will help the 
development team prioritise the request.

Rob Scott
Rocket Software


Rob,

All due respect, you guys cheated on the migration actions required for this to happen. Just like when I reported the ISFTABL message that his now issued under V2R3. If you needed ISFTABL for SDSF to work, you should have had that as a migration item.
Regards,
Tom Conley

----------------------------------------------------------------------
For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions,
send email to lists...@listserv.ua.edu with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN

Reply via email to