(Cross-posting to RACF-L)

Mark,

I have not worked with this APAR and PTF. Below is my interpretation of it. I 
agree this is a huge change. I think careful testing is needed to confirm this, 
and as I don't have access to a system with the change, I would be happy to 
help you with the test out of curiosity.

This 'enhancement' appears to address an oft heard desire to be able to grant 
access to an alias, as these tend to be permanent, as an alternative to having 
to granting access to the underlying dataset, which tends to change, with the 
goal of simplify security administration. With this change, one will now be 
able to permit access to alias PRODUCT.LINKLIB instead of the related dataset 
PRODUCT.VERSION1.LINKLIB. Then, whenever a new version arrives, you simply 
point alias PRODUCT.LINKLIB at PRODUCT.VERSION2.LINKLIB and everyone will have 
access to the new version without you having to create a new profile for 
PRODUCT.VERSION2.LINKLIB. It might be possible to permit ordinary users access 
only to aliases and never permit them access to the underlying datasets. This 
might enable you to consolidate and streamline existing profiles.

As for 'required action 1.' , I believe what they are alluding to is that if 
your aliases are currently named something like PRODVER.PRODUCT.LINKLIB and 
there are no RACF profiles for PRODVER, you will experience denial of access if 
RACF's SETROPTS PROTECTALL is in FAILURE mode (as is generally the case). If 
your aliases use existing High Level Qualifiers, and most likely they use the 
same HLQ as the related datasets, then you may not experience access problems 
because they'll already be covered by a profile. However, even if the latter is 
true, an existing alias might be covered by a profile like PRODUCT.** while the 
real dataset might be protected by profile PRODUCT.V*.**, and they could have 
very different access permissions. An exhaustive analysis of profiles and 
permissions is in order to ensure that the sudden switch in access authority 
checking from the dataset to the alias doesn't result in a loss of access. When 
first applying this PTF, I'd also be tempted to temporarily change PROTECTALL 
from FAILURE to WARNING just in case I'd missed something.

If this works as per my interpretation, then I think the concerns raised by 
others are valid. If I can create an alias with a name to which I have access 
that points to a dataset to which I do not have access, I've now circumvented 
access controls for the latter. This is somewhat akin to having ALTER access to 
a catalog which lets you delete VSAM and SMS datasets without having ALTER to 
the dataset profiles. It appears, however, that IBM has addressed this concern. 
Googling APAR OA47269 (APAR OA49446 is essentially an addendum to this APAR) 
brings up links discussing new restrictions on DFSMSdfp DEFINE. To create an 
ALIAS, PATH, OR ALTERNATEINDEX, you will need ALTER access to the related 
dataset.

This is going to make protecting sensitive datasets more complicated. I wonder 
if IBM's Health Check for APF library protection will now include aliases as 
well.

Regards, Bob

Robert S. Hansel
Lead RACF Specialist
RSH Consulting, Inc.
617-969-8211
www.linkedin.com/in/roberthansel
http://twitter.com/RSH_RACF
www.rshconsulting.com
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-----Original Message-----
Date:    Thu, 28 Apr 2016 12:01:17 -0500
From:    Mark Zelden <[email protected]>
Subject: OA49446 on RSU1603 - RACF / DFSMS change

I'm applying z/OS 2.1 RSU1603 and came across this PTF.   Is anyone running with
it in production and has it caused you any grief?   This seems to change a 
behavior
that has been around "forever", so it concerns me a bit even though there 
is a work around by defining a special RACF profile in the Facility class.


++ HOLD(UA80146) SYS FMID(HDZ2210) REASON(ACTION) DATE(15356)              
   COMMENT                                                                 
    (****************************************************************      
     * FUNCTION AFFECTED: DFSMS                           (OA49446) *      
     ****************************************************************      
     * DESCRIPTION      : Update security definition                *      
     ****************************************************************      
     * TIMING           : Pre-APPLY                                 *      
     ****************************************************************      
                                                                           
     This service requires certain actions to be performed before the      
     PTF is applied. All the required actions appear in this PTF           
     cover letter.                                                         
                                                                           
     RACF authorization checking is changed by this PTF for ALIASes,       
     PATHs, and ALTERNATEINDEXes. Before, if the ALIAS was for a           
     generation data set or a nonVSAM data set, the generation data        
     set name or the nonVSAM name was used for the RACF authority          
     check; for PATH and ALTERNATEINDEX, the associated CLUSTER            
     name was used.                                                        
                                                                           
     Now, with this PTF, the RACF authority check is performed using       
     the ALIAS, PATH, or ALTERNATEINDEX name.                              
                                                                           
     The required actions are:                                             
                                                                           
     1. Review the RACF profiles for names involving ALIASes, PATHs        
        and ALTERNATEINDEXes. Depending on your naming conventions,        
        no change may be necessary. The likely outcome if your ALIAS,      
        PATH or ALTERNATEINDEX is not covered by an existing profile,      
        will be a RACF failure due to insufficient authority. If this      
        is the case, add or change RACF profiles for ALIASes, PATHs        
        and ALTERNATEINDEXes to grant appropriate RACF authority.          
                                                                           
     2. If your installation cannot immediately tolerate the change        
        in RACF authority checking, the old method of checking can be      
        reinstated by defining a facility class profile with the name      
        of STGADMIN.IGG.CATALOG.SECURITY.CHANGE and giving the user        
        READ authority to that facility class.).        


              
Best regards,

Mark
--
Mark Zelden - Zelden Consulting Services - z/OS, OS/390 and MVS
ITIL v3 Foundation Certified
mailto:[email protected]
Mark's MVS Utilities: http://www.mzelden.com/mvsutil.html
Systems Programming expert at http://search390.techtarget.com/ateExperts/

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