I'm being pedantic here, but: You don't decrypt anything. You're going "forward": both ends generate a keyed hash (a one-way operation!) using the same inputs, one known and one secret. Those hashes must match. This is a common cryptographic construction.
-----Original Message----- From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Brian Westerman Sent: Wednesday, August 26, 2026 2:25 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Odd idea? I will look into this, and on the surface it seems fairly easy to code. It's likely not needed, but having it and not needing it is probably a good thing. SO, the "secret" is generated by the client sending the email, and I decrypt that secret in my code. That is pretty similar to just giving them a password that they send to me, but in a format that is unreadable to everyone but me on the other end. I'm not sure about the macro on the client side, but I could easily give them a small program that would generate the protected secret which they could just paste into their email sort of like AUTH=1./(sjsu88aps==4$3%# and then the rest of their commands. The program could use the local time/date as part of the key so that when I get the email, so long as the key was created within the past xx minutes it would be okay. There is probably a better way to configure it, and I still think it isn't necessary but I suppose it can't hurt as an extra level of security for some users. Thanks, Brian On Tue, 25 Aug 2026 08:48:11 -0400, Phil Smith III <[email protected]> wrote: >There's no decryption here: it's an HMAC. Think of it as a magic token that's >irrevocably bound to the content. Since its creation involves a secret, nobody >else can forge it. It's almost sorta kinda like a cleartext password, only >not, since obviously a cleartext password would be useless. > >Is it better than what you provide? Not sure, quite possibly not. What it >would definitely provide is something that crypto-types would understand and >trust more than "Really, honestly, we're sure you can't forge email headers". >Nobody trusts email much (well, everybody does because have to, but we don't >WANT to) and so crypto types aren't likely to be thrilled with "Sure, just >send email in this format to this address and lo! it will execute the embedded >command(s)". > >OpenSSL will generate HMACs easily: >echo -n "the command" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "the secret" >(pipe that to wherever as appropriate). > >Admittedly this adds an extra step, although, as noted earlier, an Outlook >macro could probably automate it. But end-users would need at least OpenSSL >and that macro. > >One thing we don't know (not blaming ya, it hasn't been particularly relevant) >is what the footprint of this facility is: is there software installed on the >endpoints already? Or is the idea that Joe Sysprog is at a BBQ and needs to >hup some STC or submit some job and wants to do it via a quick email from his >phone? That latter capability would be way cool when needed--but only if it's >provably secure. Otherwise any security person worth their salt will say "No >way are we enabling that!" There's a lot of appeal to making such things >lightweight, of course; I'm a big fan of "As few parts as is practical". Or as >Einstein may or may not have said, "As simple as possible, but no simpler"! > > >ObAnecdote, only peripherally related: over 40 years ago, we had a service >virtual machine on the University of Waterloo VM system called PRIV. You could >send it an SMSG with a command and it would look up your userid and the >command and see if you were allowed to execute that command. This gave us the >ability to provide VERY granular PRIVileged command execution: "BOB can FORCE >BOBSVM but can't FORCE any other IDs", for example. > >One day I was updating PRIV with a new version. I logged onto the SVM and >there I was in CP READ. "Hmm", thinks I, "how do I shut this thing down?" So I >did: >SMSG * SHUTDOWN > >You've guessed where this is going...about 20 seconds later, one of the >operators comes running out of the Red Room (the main UofW data center; I was >in a sysprog terminal room adjacent) yelling "System A just shut itself down!" >and I said "Oops". > >Ever since then, I've been very sensitive to control of privileged >commands, and have never created a service that used the same syntax to >shut it down as the system. (Although the problem that solves is >actually fractionally different: had SHUTDOWN been the command to tell >PRIV to end, it would have been fine; of course nobody could have been >authorized to issue the real system SHUTDOWN via PRIV. But the point is >to not train users to issue that command, lest they issue it in the >wrong environment and it go to the system instead of the service.) > >-----Original Message----- >From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <[email protected]> On >Behalf Of Brian Westerman >Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2026 1:24 AM >To: [email protected] >Subject: Re: Odd idea? > >So, when the original email was sent to the email address, I should include >some encrypted code package, that they would have to combine with something >(like maybe their mainframe password) which, when received could be decrypted >and passed to SAF to verify them? I don't see how that would be any more >secure than what I already provide. Now, if they had some software on their >end that would generate some variable key then I think that would add some >security, but that would mean they would have to have that generator. >Although I could probably code it so that they would need a passkey that they >would need to touch to validate them. > >I still don't think it would be necessary, but I suppose it would be fairly >simple to code. > >On Mon, 24 Aug 2026 12:19:49 -0400, Phil Smith III <[email protected]> wrote: > >>You're NOT encrypting the email--I thought I made that clear. You're adding a >>keyed hash that lets you validate the command (and also prevents tampering in >>flight). >> >>So if QUIESCE + <secret> = HMAC x, then the receiving end takes QUIESCE + >><secret> and regenerates the same HMAC. If they don't compare, then either >>the sender doesn't know the secret, doesn't know how to generate an HMAC, or >>the command was altered after creation. >> >>Of course you have to share that secret somehow initially, but that's >>presumably a one-time (or at least infrequent) operation, performed >>out-of-band. >> >>-----Original Message----- >>From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <[email protected]> On >>Behalf Of Brian Westerman >>Sent: Monday, August 24, 2026 2:19 AM >>To: [email protected] >>Subject: Re: Odd idea? >> >>I don't trust things either, but encrypting the email is requiring a lot that >>the user might not have access to or really even need to understand to use >>the interface, and if things are set up correctly they would be largely >>unnecessary. If the site did not set things up correctly, that would show up >>in the authentication processing and the email would be discarded anyway. >>Encrypting it just adds another layer of complexity that doesn't actually >>seem to make it any more secure. >> >>Brian >> >>On Sun, 23 Aug 2026 14:11:35 -0400, Phil Smith III <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>>Well, it sounds like you're thinking this is "just" email, which is fine and >>>certainly easy. The messageID is a thing, but can almost certainly be >>>forged. The point of an HMAC isn't that you encrypt the whole email: you'd >>>have a tool that knows a secret (password) and takes the command itself and >>>creates the HMAC. So if the command in the email body looked like (say): >>> >>>command: submit some.library.jcl(member) >>> >>>then the user would past THAT into the tool, enter the password, and the >>>tool would produce a string such as ABCDEF12345678 (the HMAC), which would >>>be pasted into the body, perhaps: >>> >>>command: ABCDEF12345678 submit some.library.jcl(member) >>> >>>Extra steps for sure. A clever Outlook macro could automate this so it's a >>>keystroke, though--user enters the command, hits keystroke, HMAC gets >>>generated and inserted. >>> >>>Agreed, not clear it's necessary. Depends how well you can trust the >>>environment, of course. With my security hat on, I *don't* trust things... >>> >>>-----Original Message----- >>>From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <[email protected]> On >>>Behalf Of Brian Westerman >>>Sent: Sunday, August 23, 2026 1:01 AM >>>To: [email protected] >>>Subject: Re: Odd idea? >>> >>>Hmmm. I think that is probably overkill. That would mean that I would need >>>to make the user encrypt the command package and copy or attach it to the >>>email. I already check and keep the email messageid that looks like >>>[email protected], and it would be pretty hard >>>to spoof that and have it be valid. But I'm willing to listen to another >>>method if it would make things more secure, but encrypting the commands, >>>while easy to handle, would be hard on the user to remember to do it and get >>>it right. I suppose we could assign them a key, but then if they lose the >>>key, it would be just as bad as losing their password. >>> >>>I think that a lot of the use will be more on the order of: >>> >>>TASK A wants to do something, so an email gets sent to some user asking if >>>it's okay to do "something", what is your response (yes or no). The user >>>types "yes" or "no" and sends the email. >>> >>>I think there will be a lot of "user wants to know if a task executed yet, >>>or if its running or what the status is", so they send the query to >>>automation and it responds back with the status of the task or the output or >>>whatever it was that they asked about it. >>> >>>I think that systems programmers will probably want to use it to see parts >>>of syslog or check on things or start processes/tasks, etc. >>> >>>Brian >>> >>> >>> >>>On Sat, 22 Aug 2026 19:53:21 -0400, Phil Smith III <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>>RFCs. >>>> >>>>Really Clever(tm) spammers even fake some Received: headers, making >>>>it harder to validate. >>>> >>>>How about an HMAC of the command itself? Still DOS-attackable but at >>>>least you won't be executing bad commands. >>>> >>>>On August 22, 2026 7:41:59 PM Charles Mills <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Thanks for the link. Any umm, you know, documentation? >>>>> >>>>> CM >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, 22 Aug 2026 23:21:27 +0000, Seymour J Metz <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> The From: header field is worthless, and the envelope from can >>>>>> also be spoofed; include a sanity check on the Received header fields. >>>>>> See <https://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3/source/unobfuscate.zip> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz >>>>>> http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3 >>>>>> עַם יִשְׂרָאֵל חַי >>>>>> נֵ֣צַח יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל לֹ֥א יְשַׁקֵּ֖ר >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <[email protected]> on >>>>>> behalf of Charles Mills <[email protected]> >>>>>> Sent: Saturday, August 22, 2026 7:02 PM >>>>>> To: [email protected] <[email protected]> >>>>>> Subject: Re: Odd idea? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> External Message: Use Caution >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm not an expert oeee-mail but on the negative side isn't the "from" >>>>>> pretty easy to spoof? There are reality checks you can do on the >>>>>> IP addresses and so forth, but is it bulletproof enough? >>>>>> >>>>>> On the positive side, the email body is potentially a pretty rich >>>>>> interface. You could accept a "command" with a syntax that >>>>>> allowed all kinds of options: email always, or just on failure? >>>>>> Override job class and scheduling? Etc. >>>>>> >>>>>> Charles >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, 22 Aug 2026 18:46:09 +1000, Peter Vlss <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Brian, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A colple of quick thoughts: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 1. Security. How do you determint that the incoming email is >>>>>>> legitimate? >>>>>>> 2. Yes, tell the user whether it was successful or not, but >>>>>>> give them a choice, make it a keyword or flag? If you don't tell >>>>>>> them it was successful, how do they know it even executed? >>>>>>> 3. Same goes for the output; give the user a choice. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>> Peter >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, 22 Aug 2026, 17:09 BrianeWesterman, < >>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I was wondering. Since IBM is unlikely to ever change CSSMTP >>>>>>>> to create the ability to send email to the mainframe, what do >>>>>>>> you think about adding the ability for sending email to our >>>>>>>> automation system to have it execute functions and/or commands >>>>>>>> on the mainframe? We have supported using FTP to do that for >>>>>>>> many years, and have provided trigger commands, but this would >>>>>>>> be creating the ability to send an email to what would be the >>>>>>>> "inbox" for talking with the Syzygy automation system and >>>>>>>> having it confirm if the email sender was authorized to issue >>>>>>>> commands and of what type, and then pass them on to the automation >>>>>>>> system on the various LPARs that automation is executing on for >>>>>>>> processing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have a prototype created that I have been testing for a while >>>>>>>> and I am looking for volunteers to try it out. The only >>>>>>>> restriction is that you have to be running the Syzygy >>>>>>>> Automation package, (shame on you if you aren't :). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'm trying to decide if the process needs to reflect back to >>>>>>>> the user that the process was successful. I current tell them >>>>>>>> if it wasn't, and there is no reason that I couldn't tell them >>>>>>>> that it was as well, but can't decide if that's necessary. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I found that I could also ask automation to send the output of >>>>>>>> jobs in the queue, but didn't know if that's something that >>>>>>>> would be useful because the automation system already can send >>>>>>>> email when any job ends that contains the output already. So >>>>>>>> it could be a "feature" I keep to the side to add later. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Even if (for some odd reason) you don't run the Syzygy >>>>>>>> Automation system, I would be interested in your thoughts on this >>>>>>>> process. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Brian >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> ---- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access >>>>>>>> instructions, send email to [email protected] with the >>>>>>>> message: INFO IBM-MAIN >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> --- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access >>>>>>> instructions, send email to [email protected] with the >>>>>>> message: INFO IBM-MAIN >>>>>> >>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> - >>>>>> - >>>>>> - >>>>>> -- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access >>>>>> instructions, send email to [email protected] with the >>>>>> message: INFO IBM-MAIN >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>> - >>>>>> - >>>>>> - >>>>>> -- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access >>>>>> instructions, send email to [email protected] with the >>>>>> message: INFO IBM-MAIN >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> - >>>>> - >>>>> - >>>>> - For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, >>>>> send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO >>>>> IBM-MAIN >>>> >>>> >>>>-------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>- >>>>- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, >>>>send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO >>>>IBM-MAIN >>> >>>--------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, >>>send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO >>>IBM-MAIN >>> >>>--------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, >>>send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO >>>IBM-MAIN >> >>---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send >>email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN >> >>---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send >>email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN > >---------------------------------------------------------------------- >For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send >email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN > >---------------------------------------------------------------------- >For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send >email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
