I'm being pedantic here, but: You don't decrypt anything. You're going 
"forward": both ends generate a keyed hash (a one-way operation!) using the 
same inputs, one known and one secret. Those hashes must match. This is a 
common cryptographic construction.

-----Original Message-----
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <[email protected]> On Behalf Of 
Brian Westerman
Sent: Wednesday, August 26, 2026 2:25 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Odd idea?

I will look into this, and on the surface it seems fairly easy to code.  It's 
likely not needed, but having it and not needing it is probably a good thing.

SO, the "secret" is generated by the client sending the email, and I decrypt 
that secret in my code.  That is pretty similar to just giving them a password 
that they send to me, but in a format that is unreadable to everyone but me on 
the other end.  I'm not sure about the macro on the client side, but I could 
easily give them a small program that would generate the protected secret which 
they could just paste into their email sort of like AUTH=1./(sjsu88aps==4$3%#  
and then the rest of their commands.  The program could use the local time/date 
as part of the key so that when I get the email, so long as the key was created 
within the past xx minutes it would be okay.    There is probably a better way 
to configure it, and I still think it isn't necessary but I suppose it can't 
hurt as an extra level of security for some users.

Thanks,

Brian

On Tue, 25 Aug 2026 08:48:11 -0400, Phil Smith III <[email protected]> wrote:

>There's no decryption here: it's an HMAC. Think of it as a magic token that's 
>irrevocably bound to the content. Since its creation involves a secret, nobody 
>else can forge it. It's almost sorta kinda like a cleartext password, only 
>not, since obviously a cleartext password would be useless.
>
>Is it better than what you provide? Not sure, quite possibly not. What it 
>would definitely provide is something that crypto-types would understand and 
>trust more than "Really, honestly, we're sure you can't forge email headers". 
>Nobody trusts email much (well, everybody does because have to, but we don't 
>WANT to) and so crypto types aren't likely to be thrilled with "Sure, just 
>send email in this format to this address and lo! it will execute the embedded 
>command(s)".
>
>OpenSSL will generate HMACs easily:
>echo -n "the command" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "the secret"
>(pipe that to wherever as appropriate).
>
>Admittedly this adds an extra step, although, as noted earlier, an Outlook 
>macro could probably automate it. But end-users would need at least OpenSSL 
>and that macro. 
>
>One thing we don't know (not blaming ya, it hasn't been particularly relevant) 
>is what the footprint of this facility is: is there software installed on the 
>endpoints already? Or is the idea that Joe Sysprog is at a BBQ and needs to 
>hup some STC or submit some job and wants to do it via a quick email from his 
>phone? That latter capability would be way cool when needed--but only if it's 
>provably secure. Otherwise any security person worth their salt will say "No 
>way are we enabling that!" There's a lot of appeal to making such things 
>lightweight, of course; I'm a big fan of "As few parts as is practical". Or as 
>Einstein may or may not have said, "As simple as possible, but no simpler"!
>
>
>ObAnecdote, only peripherally related: over 40 years ago, we had a service 
>virtual machine on the University of Waterloo VM system called PRIV. You could 
>send it an SMSG with a command and it would look up your userid and the 
>command and see if you were allowed to execute that command. This gave us the 
>ability to provide VERY granular PRIVileged command execution: "BOB can FORCE 
>BOBSVM but can't FORCE any other IDs", for example.
>
>One day I was updating PRIV with a new version. I logged onto the SVM and 
>there I was in CP READ. "Hmm", thinks I, "how do I shut this thing down?" So I 
>did: 
>SMSG * SHUTDOWN
>
>You've guessed where this is going...about 20 seconds later, one of the 
>operators comes running out of the Red Room (the main UofW data center; I was 
>in a sysprog terminal room adjacent) yelling "System A just shut itself down!" 
>and I said "Oops".
>
>Ever since then, I've been very sensitive to control of privileged 
>commands, and have never created a service that used the same syntax to 
>shut it down as the system. (Although the problem that solves is 
>actually fractionally different: had SHUTDOWN been the command to tell 
>PRIV to end, it would have been fine; of course nobody could have been 
>authorized to issue the real system SHUTDOWN via PRIV. But the point is 
>to not train users to issue that command, lest they issue it in the 
>wrong environment and it go to the system instead of the service.)
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <[email protected]> On 
>Behalf Of Brian Westerman
>Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2026 1:24 AM
>To: [email protected]
>Subject: Re: Odd idea?
>
>So, when the original email was sent to the email address, I should include 
>some encrypted code package, that they would have to combine with something 
>(like maybe their mainframe password) which, when received could be decrypted 
>and passed to SAF to verify them?   I don't see how that would be any more 
>secure than what I already provide.  Now, if they had some software on their 
>end that would generate some variable key then I think that would add some 
>security, but that would mean they would have to have that generator.  
>Although I could probably code it so that they would need a passkey that they 
>would need to touch to validate them.     
>
>I still don't think it would be necessary, but I suppose it would be fairly 
>simple to code.
>
>On Mon, 24 Aug 2026 12:19:49 -0400, Phil Smith III <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>You're NOT encrypting the email--I thought I made that clear. You're adding a 
>>keyed hash that lets you validate the command (and also prevents tampering in 
>>flight).
>>
>>So if QUIESCE + <secret> = HMAC x, then the receiving end takes QUIESCE + 
>><secret> and regenerates the same HMAC. If they don't compare, then either 
>>the sender doesn't know the secret, doesn't know how to generate an HMAC, or 
>>the command was altered after creation.
>>
>>Of course you have to share that secret somehow initially, but that's 
>>presumably a one-time (or at least infrequent) operation, performed 
>>out-of-band.
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <[email protected]> On 
>>Behalf Of Brian Westerman
>>Sent: Monday, August 24, 2026 2:19 AM
>>To: [email protected]
>>Subject: Re: Odd idea?
>>
>>I don't trust things either, but encrypting the email is requiring a lot that 
>>the user might not have access to or really even need to understand to use 
>>the interface, and if things are set up correctly they would be largely 
>>unnecessary.  If the site did not set things up correctly, that would show up 
>>in the authentication processing and the email would be discarded anyway.  
>>Encrypting it just adds another layer of complexity that doesn't actually 
>>seem to make it any more secure. 
>>
>>Brian
>>
>>On Sun, 23 Aug 2026 14:11:35 -0400, Phil Smith III <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>>Well, it sounds like you're thinking this is "just" email, which is fine and 
>>>certainly easy. The messageID is a thing, but can almost certainly be 
>>>forged. The point of an HMAC isn't that you encrypt the whole email: you'd 
>>>have a tool that knows a secret (password) and takes the command itself and 
>>>creates the HMAC. So if the command in the email body looked like (say):
>>>
>>>command: submit some.library.jcl(member)
>>>
>>>then the user would past THAT into the tool, enter the password, and the 
>>>tool would produce a string such as ABCDEF12345678 (the HMAC), which would 
>>>be pasted into the body, perhaps:
>>>
>>>command: ABCDEF12345678 submit some.library.jcl(member)
>>>
>>>Extra steps for sure. A clever Outlook macro could automate this so it's a 
>>>keystroke, though--user enters the command, hits keystroke, HMAC gets 
>>>generated and inserted.
>>>
>>>Agreed, not clear it's necessary. Depends how well you can trust the 
>>>environment, of course. With my security hat on, I *don't* trust things...
>>>
>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <[email protected]> On 
>>>Behalf Of Brian Westerman
>>>Sent: Sunday, August 23, 2026 1:01 AM
>>>To: [email protected]
>>>Subject: Re: Odd idea?
>>>
>>>Hmmm.  I think that is probably overkill.  That would mean that I would need 
>>>to make the user encrypt the command package and copy or attach it to the 
>>>email.  I already check and keep the email messageid that looks like 
>>>[email protected], and it would be pretty hard 
>>>to spoof that and have it be valid.  But I'm willing to listen to another 
>>>method if it would make things more secure, but encrypting the commands, 
>>>while easy to handle, would be hard on the user to remember to do it and get 
>>>it right.  I suppose we could assign them a key, but then if they lose the 
>>>key, it would be just as bad as losing their password.  
>>>
>>>I think that a lot of the use will be more on the order of: 
>>>
>>>TASK A wants to do something, so an email gets sent to some user asking if 
>>>it's okay to do "something", what is your response (yes or no).  The user 
>>>types "yes" or "no" and sends the email.  
>>>
>>>I think there will be a lot of "user wants to know if a task executed yet, 
>>>or if its running or what the status is", so they send the query to 
>>>automation and it responds back with the status of the task or the output or 
>>>whatever it was that they asked about it.
>>>
>>>I think that systems programmers will probably want to use it to see parts 
>>>of syslog or check on things or start processes/tasks, etc.
>>>
>>>Brian
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>On Sat, 22 Aug 2026 19:53:21 -0400, Phil Smith III <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>>RFCs.
>>>>
>>>>Really Clever(tm) spammers even fake some Received: headers, making 
>>>>it harder to validate.
>>>>
>>>>How about an HMAC of the command itself? Still DOS-attackable but at 
>>>>least you won't be executing bad commands.
>>>>
>>>>On August 22, 2026 7:41:59 PM Charles Mills <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for the link. Any umm, you know, documentation?
>>>>>
>>>>> CM
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, 22 Aug 2026 23:21:27 +0000, Seymour J Metz <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> The From: header field is worthless, and the envelope from can 
>>>>>> also be spoofed; include a sanity check on the Received header fields.
>>>>>> See <https://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3/source/unobfuscate.zip>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
>>>>>> http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3
>>>>>> עַם יִשְׂרָאֵל חַי
>>>>>> נֵ֣צַח יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל לֹ֥א יְשַׁקֵּ֖ר
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>>> From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List <[email protected]> on 
>>>>>> behalf of Charles Mills <[email protected]>
>>>>>> Sent: Saturday, August 22, 2026 7:02 PM
>>>>>> To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: Odd idea?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> External Message: Use Caution
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm not an expert oeee-mail but on the negative side isn't the "from"
>>>>>> pretty easy to spoof? There are reality checks you can do on the 
>>>>>> IP addresses and so forth, but is it bulletproof enough?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On the positive side, the email body is potentially a pretty rich 
>>>>>> interface. You could accept a "command" with a syntax that 
>>>>>> allowed all kinds of options: email always, or just on failure? 
>>>>>> Override job class and scheduling? Etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Charles
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, 22 Aug 2026 18:46:09 +1000, Peter Vlss <[email protected]> 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Brian,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A colple of quick thoughts:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. Security.  How do you determint that the incoming email is 
>>>>>>> legitimate?
>>>>>>> 2. Yes, tell the user whether it was successful or not,  but 
>>>>>>> give them a choice, make it a keyword or flag? If you don't tell 
>>>>>>> them it was successful,  how do they know it even executed?
>>>>>>> 3. Same goes for the output; give the user a choice.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>> Peter
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sat, 22 Aug 2026, 17:09 BrianeWesterman, < 
>>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I was wondering.  Since IBM is unlikely to ever change CSSMTP 
>>>>>>>> to create the ability to send email to the mainframe, what do 
>>>>>>>> you think about adding the ability for sending email to our 
>>>>>>>> automation system to have it execute functions and/or commands 
>>>>>>>> on the mainframe?  We have supported using FTP to do that for 
>>>>>>>> many years, and have provided trigger commands, but this would 
>>>>>>>> be creating the ability to send an email to what would be the 
>>>>>>>> "inbox" for talking with the Syzygy automation system and 
>>>>>>>> having it confirm if the email sender was authorized to issue 
>>>>>>>> commands and of what type, and then pass them on to the automation 
>>>>>>>> system on the various LPARs that automation is executing on for 
>>>>>>>> processing.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I have a prototype created that I have been testing for a while 
>>>>>>>> and I am looking for volunteers to try it out.  The only 
>>>>>>>> restriction is that you have to be running the Syzygy 
>>>>>>>> Automation package, (shame on you if you aren't :).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I'm trying to decide if the process needs to reflect back to 
>>>>>>>> the user that the process was successful.  I current tell them 
>>>>>>>> if it wasn't, and there is no reason that I couldn't tell them 
>>>>>>>> that it was as well, but can't decide if that's necessary.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I found that I could also ask automation to send the output of 
>>>>>>>> jobs in the queue, but didn't know if that's something that 
>>>>>>>> would be useful because the automation system already can send 
>>>>>>>> email when any job ends that contains the output already.  So 
>>>>>>>> it could be a "feature" I keep to the side to add later.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Even if (for some odd reason) you don't run the Syzygy 
>>>>>>>> Automation system, I would be interested in your thoughts on this 
>>>>>>>> process.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Brian
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------
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