Just remember: "The only secure computer is the one which is powered down." And 
likely smashed up by a sledge hammer. 

John McKown 

Systems Engineer IV

IT

 

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List 
> [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of R.S.
> Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2012 4:14 PM
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: Malicious Software Protection
> 
> The problem is we don't believe. :-)
> 
> 
> -- 
> Radoslaw Skorupka
> Lodz, Poland
> 
> 
> 
> W dniu 2012-03-28 22:45, Ray Overby pisze:
> > Yes, I believe I have a way to attack a mainframe system 
> where I don't
> > have access.
> >
> >
> > Ray Overby
> > Key Resources, Inc.
> > Ensuring System Integrity for z/SeriesT
> > www.zassure.com
> > (312)574-0007
> >
> >
> > On 3/28/2012 02:03 AM, Elardus Engelbrecht wrote:
> >> Ray Overby wrote:
> >>
> >>> I am a vendor so take my post with a grain of salt. For those that
> >>> don't like vendors to respond stop reading now...... (flame on)
> >> I will take your post seriously. I have reviewed you webpage. Very
> >> interesting.
> >>
> >> You confirmed what I suspected, especially after those 
> threads about
> >> [mis]use of SVC.
> >>
> >> One question if you don't mind please:
> >>
> >> Can you use or prove your point (elevating TSO, suppress SMF, etc)
> >> without being given access to a system in the first place? 
> The idea is
> >> that you could enter a system and elevate yourself and 
> place somewhere
> >> a signature to prove that you could 'white hack' the target system.
> >>
> >> Just a yes or no, please, because I realize that due to 
> the nature not
> >> too much info can be divulged.
> >>
> >>
> >>> The ESM products did not stop the TSO user from exploiting this
> >>> vulnerability.
> >> Very true. ESM is just a database.
> >>
> >> As said many times on RACF-L, it is the caller which call 
> ESM, the ESM
> >> decides on what is found in its own database and report back with
> >> RC=0/4/8 plus reason codes.
> >>
> >> It is up to the whatever caller to honour the RC from an ESM.
> >>
> >>
> >>> If you are not concerned that your users can crash your 
> z/OS system
> >>> at any time (maliciously or accidentally)
> >> As I have said, it is the INSIDER who are probably the 
> greatest threat.
> 
> 
> --
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