India’s election isn’t as historic as people think

   - BY ADAM ZIEGFELD


After an election that took a month and a half to complete, the BJP — a 
party usually described as right-of-center and Hindu nationalist— looks to 
have won a majority of seats in India’s lower house of parliament. (Votes 
are still being counted, so all seat and vote totals are tentative). 
Opinion polls had predicted a BJP win, but not one of this magnitude. Even 
before the results were in, many were calling this a historic election. The 
ruling party, Congress, was beset with corruption scandals, while the BJP 
appeared to be riding high on the popularity of its prime ministerial 
candidate, Narendra Modi. Since the news analysis in the days and weeks to 
come is almost certain to emphasize the historic proportions of this 
election, here are a few reasons why this election might not be as historic 
as it is likely going to be made out to be.

First, as of the most recent counting, almost 70 percent of Indians did not 
vote for the BJP. Commentators such as Max Fisher at 
Vox<http://www.vox.com/2014/5/16/5723664/indias-election-in-one-stunning-map> 
claim 
that the BJP “dramatically … swept the vote.” In fact, the BJP won about 31 
percent of the vote, a new high for the party. Although this is the first 
national election in which the BJP has ever won more votes than any other 
party, less than a third of Indians voted for it. The BJP’s legislative 
majority is largely a function of India’s single-member district (SMD) 
electoral system, the same system used in American, British, and Canadian 
legislative elections. In an SMD system, votes rarely translate 
proportionally into seats. This system rewards parties that are the largest 
in each electoral district. The BJP’s vote is patchily distributed across 
India, which works to its advantage. In a number of states where it is 
disproportionately strong, the BJP was, in district after district, the 
largest party, even if not always by a very large margin. For example, in 
India’s largest state, Uttar Pradesh, the BJP won about 42 percent of the 
vote. However, it is likely to win 71 of Uttar Pradesh’s 80 seats (almost 
90 percent) because the remaining 58 percent of the vote was split across a 
number of different parties.

Meanwhile, in states where the BJP won few seats, it did quite poorly. 
Thus, relatively few of the BJP’s votes were wasted—that is, cast in 
electoral districts where the party ultimately failed to win a legislative 
seat. As a result, the party won a legislative majority on a fairly small 
vote share. Previously, no party had won a legislative majority with less 
than 40 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, Congress suffered an ignominious 
defeat in part because its vote was fairly evenly distributed across the 
country. Coming in second or third place across many electoral districts 
brings no electoral reward. In this election, Congress looks a lot like the 
Liberal Democrats in Britain—a party that typically wins respectable vote 
shares in lots of districts but fails to win many seats.

Second, with a few exceptions, this election did not change the basic 
geography of elections in India. Thanks in large part to dozens of small 
regional parties that each wins support in only one or two states, 
political competition in India varies tremendously from state to state. 
Across the board, the BJP improved its performance (see Figure 1). However, 
its performance improved most in states where it was already fairly 
competitive. In states where the party has never been strong, it remains 
the third, fourth, or even fifth most popular party. The BJP remains 
relatively uncompetitive across a large swathe of southern and eastern 
India. Until the BJP can significantly improve its performance in these 
areas, the party is unlikely to be able to win much more than a third of 
the national vote, which will make it difficult for the party to reliably 
replicate a similar election result in the future. That being said, if the 
BJP can retain its following in the populous northern states of Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh and the northeastern state of Assam, then this election could 
mark an important turning point for the party. However, that is a big “if.” 
The BJP has previously experienced noticeable electoral declines in Uttar 
Pradesh following big election wins.

[image: Indian election results by state]

Third, this election probably does not herald a major realignment in Indian 
politics. This was a great election for the BJP. By the same token, this 
was — far and away — Congress’ worst ever showing. But, 2014 represents 
little more than a role reversal for the country’s two main parties from 
2009. In the last election, Congress won about 29 percent of the vote to 
the BJP’s 18 percent. This year, those numbers are 31 percent for the BJP 
and 19 percent for Congress. The gap in seat shares between the largest and 
second largest parties widened significantly in this election, but that is 
a function of where votes were won. In terms of popular support, the BJP 
largely accomplished in 2014 what Congress achieved five years earlier. The 
fact that the tables have turned is noteworthy, but probably not a sign of 
a fundamental shift in the nature of political competition.

Fourth, regional parties remain an important part of Indian politics. For 
the past 20 years, regional parties—parties active mainly in only one or 
two of India’s states—have been critical ingredients in governing 
coalitions at the national-level. Having won a majority of seats, the BJP 
can likely govern without any regional allies. In that sense, regional 
parties’ influence in national politics is almost certain to decline in the 
near-term. But, the 2014 verdict does not herald a nationalization of 
politics. India’s two main national parties won only about 50 percent of 
the vote. The other half went to these tiny, most regional, parties, just 
as in the past four national elections. Several states held state-level 
elections simultaneously with the national elections, and in each one, the 
victors were regional parties. Although their voices may be quieter in 
national-level politics for the next five years, 2014 was not actually a 
bad year for regional parties.

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