Hi. Am 27.07.2019 um 00:24 schrieb Jim Freeman: > For outgoing TLS connections, might haproxy be taught to use a reasonable > default/implicit value 'sni' [1] expression/behavior that would 'first do no > harm'[2], and usually be correct, in the absence of an explicit expression ? > (Understood that haproxy depends on an SSL lib) > > E.g.; req.hdr(host) if it is set, else server(-template) <address> (if it is > cfg'd as name, not IP), else ssl_fc_sni for bridged HTTPS, else ... ? > > If SNI [3] is used vs. an endpoint that doesn't require/utilize it, is it > always > innocuous ? > > Are increasing demands by service providers that clients (e.g.; haproxy vs. an > SSL endoint) send SNI inevitable? Or is some alternative pending?
I think this is similar Ideas as the vhost patch intend to solve. https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg34532.html I think the patch should be adopted for `mode tcp` also, jm2c. > Just wondering, > ...jfree Best Regards Aleks > [1] http://cbonte.github.io/haproxy-dconv/1.9/configuration.html#sni > [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primum_non_nocere > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustness_principle > [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication > >
