On Mon, Aug 25, 2025 at 04:38:39PM +0530, Sudhakar Kuppusamy wrote:
> Introducing the following db and dbx commands
>
>   1. append_list_db:
>       Show the list of trusted certificates and binary hashes
>       from the db list.
>   2. append_list_dbx:
>       Show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate
>       hashes from the dbx list.
>   3. append_add_db_cert:
>       Add the trusted certificate to the db list.
>   4. append_add_db_hash:
>       Add the trusted binary hash to the db list.
>   5. append_add_dbx_cert:
>       Add the distrusted certificate to the dbx list.
>   6. append_add_dbx_hash:
>       Add the distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list.
>
> Note that if signature verification (check_appended_signature) is set to 
> enforce,
> 1. When append_add_db_cert or append_add_dbx_cert executes,
>    then the certificate file must be signed with an appended signature.
> 2. When append_add_db_hash executes, then the binary hash file
>    must be signed with an appended signature.
> 3. When append_add_dbx_hash executes, then the certificate/binary
>    hash file must be signed with an appended signature.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudha...@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Avnish Chouhan <avn...@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
>  grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 319 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  include/grub/file.h                          |   2 +
>  2 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c 
> b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> index 5da603eb6..ea1937a7e 100644
> --- a/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> +++ b/grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
> @@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
>  #define SIG_MAGIC          "~Module signature appended~\n"
>  #define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE     ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1))
>
> +#define OPTION_BINARY_HASH 0
> +#define OPTION_CERT_HASH   1
> +
>  /*
>   * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel
>   * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
> @@ -110,6 +113,13 @@ static bool check_sigs = false;
>  /* Appended signature size. */
>  static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
>
> +static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
> +{
> +  {"binary-hash", 'b', 0, N_("hash file of the binary."), 0, 
> ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME},
> +  {"cert-hash", 'c', 1, N_("hash file of the certificate."), 0, 
> ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME},
> +  {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
> +};
> +
>  static void
>  register_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
>  static void
> @@ -593,6 +603,53 @@ remove_cert_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *data, const 
> grub_size_t data_size)
>    return rc;
>  }
>
> +static bool
> +is_cert_fingerprint_match (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t 
> hash_data_size,
> +                           const struct x509_certificate *cert)

s/is_cert_fingerprint_match/cert_fingerprint_match/

> +{
> +  if (grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[0], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0
> +      || grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[1], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0
> +      || grub_memcmp (cert->fingerprint[2], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)

Why are you comparing all hashes instead of chosen one?

> +    return true;
> +
> +  return false;
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +remove_hash_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t 
> hash_data_size,
> +                     const bool is_binary_hash)

s/is_binary_hash/bin_hash/

> +{
> +  grub_uint32_t i;
> +  struct x509_certificate *cert;
> +
> +  if (is_binary_hash == true)
> +    {
> +      for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
> +        {
> +          if (grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
> +            {
> +              grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "removed distrusted hash 
> %02x%02x%02x%02x.. from the db list\n",
> +                            db.hashes[i][0], db.hashes[i][1], 
> db.hashes[i][2], db.hashes[i][3]);
> +              grub_free (db.hashes[i]);
> +              db.hashes[i] = NULL;
> +              db.hash_size[i] = 0;
> +              break;
> +            }
> +        }
> +    }
> +  else
> +    {
> +      for (cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next)
> +        {
> +          if (is_cert_fingerprint_match (hash_data, hash_data_size, cert) == 
> true)
> +            {
> +              _remove_cert_from_db (cert);
> +              break;
> +            }
> +        }
> +    }
> +}
> +
>  static grub_err_t
>  file_read_whole (grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t **buf, grub_size_t *len)
>  {
> @@ -913,6 +970,8 @@ grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd 
> __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc
>
>  /*
>   * Add the trusted certificate to the db list if it is not already present.
> + * Checks the trusted certificate against dbx list if dynamic key management 
> is enabled.
> + * And add it to the db list if it is not already present.
>   * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts 
> the
>   * trusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
>   * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification 
> succeeds,
> @@ -970,6 +1029,8 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ 
> ((unused)), int argc, char **
>
>  /*
>   * Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list if it is already 
> present.
> + * And add it to the dbx list if not present when dynamic key management is
> + * enabled.
>   * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts 
> the
>   * distrusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
>   * The signature is verified by the appended sig module. If verification 
> succeeds,
> @@ -979,7 +1040,9 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ 
> ((unused)), int argc, char **
>   * without an appended signature and removes it from the db list.
>   *
>   * Also, note that the removal of the distrusted certificate using this 
> command
> - * does not persist across reboots.
> + * does not persist across reboots. If static key management is enabled, the
> + * append_rm_dbx_cert command is only available in the GRUB console. Else the
> + * append_add_dbx_cert command is available in the GRUB console.
>   */
>  static grub_err_t
>  grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, 
> char **args)
> @@ -991,8 +1054,10 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ 
> ((unused)), int argc, char *
>
>    if (argc != 1)
>      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> -                       "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in 
> DER format\n"
> -                       "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert 
> <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n");
> +                       "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in 
> DER format\n%s",
> +                       ((grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true) ?
> +                       "Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_cert 
> <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" :
> +                       "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert 
> <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n"));
>
>    if (!grub_strlen (args[0]))
>      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted X.509 
> certificate file");
> @@ -1019,9 +1084,21 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ 
> ((unused)), int argc, char *
>
>    /* Remove distrusted certificate from the db list if present. */
>    err = remove_cert_from_db (cert_data, cert_data_size);
> -  grub_free (cert_data);
>    if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> -    return err;
> +    {
> +      grub_free (cert_data);
> +      return err;
> +    }
> +
> +  /* Only add the certificate to the dbx list if dynamic key management is 
> enabled. */
> +  if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> +    {
> +      err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &dbx, false);
> +      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> +        return err;
> +    }
> +
> +  grub_free (cert_data);
>
>    return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
>  }
> @@ -1036,9 +1113,196 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ 
> ((unused)), int argc __attrib
>    for (cert = db.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)
>      print_certificate (cert, cert_num);
>
> +  /* Only list the binary hash if dynamic key management is enabled. */

Why?

> +  if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> +    {
> +      for (i = 0; i < db.hash_entries; i++)
> +        {
> +          if (db.hashes[i] != NULL)
> +            {
> +              grub_printf ("\nBinary hash: %u\n", i + 1);
> +              grub_printf ("    Hash: sha%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n         ", 
> db.hash_size[i] * 8);
> +              dump_data_to_hex (db.hashes[i], db.hash_size[i]);
> +            }
> +        }
> +    }

This change does not seem to belong to this patch...

> +
>    return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
>  }
>
> +static grub_err_t
> +grub_cmd_list_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
> +                   int argc __attribute__((unused)), char **args 
> __attribute__((unused)))
> +{
> +  struct x509_certificate *cert;
> +  grub_uint32_t i, cert_num = 1;
> +
> +  for (cert = dbx.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)
> +    print_certificate (cert, cert_num);
> +
> +  for (i = 0; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++)
> +    {
> +      if (dbx.hashes[i] != NULL)
> +        {
> +          grub_printf ("\nCertificate/Binary hash: %u\n", i + 1);
> +          grub_printf ("    Hash: sha%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n         ", 
> dbx.hash_size[i] * 8);
> +          dump_data_to_hex (dbx.hashes[i], dbx.hash_size[i]);
> +        }
> +    }
> +
> +  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Remove the trusted binary hash from the dbx list if present.
> + * And add them to the db list if it is not already present.
> + * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts
> + * the binary hash file that is signed with an appended signature.
> + * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification 
> succeeds,
> + * the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
> + * the binary hash is not added.
> + * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary hash file 
> without
> + * an appended signature and adds it to the db list.
> + *
> + * Also, note that the adding of the trusted binary hash using this command 
> does
> + * not persist across reboots.
> + */
> +static grub_err_t
> +grub_cmd_db_hash (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)), int argc, 
> char**args)
> +{
> +  grub_err_t rc;
> +  grub_file_t hash_file;
> +  grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
> +  grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
> +
> +  if (argc != 1)
> +    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> +                       "a trusted binary hash file is expected in ASCII text 
> format\n"
> +                       "Example:\n\tappend_add_db_hash <BINARY HASH 
> FILE>\n");
> +
> +  if (!grub_strlen (args[0]))
> +    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing trusted binary hash 
> file");
> +
> +  hash_file = grub_file_open (args[0], GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST | 
> GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
> +  if (hash_file == NULL)
> +    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "unable to open %s file", 
> args[0]);
> +
> +  rc = file_read_whole (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
> +  grub_file_close (hash_file);
> +  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> +    return rc;
> +
> +  /*
> +   * If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down,
> +   * obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended
> +   * signature size from the hash data size because
> +   * the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is
> +   * used to get the hash data.
> +   */
> +  if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
> +    hash_data_size -= append_sig_len;
> +
> +  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
> +                "adding a trusted binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with 
> size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n",
> +                hash_data[0], hash_data[1], hash_data[2], hash_data[3], 
> hash_data_size);
> +
> +  /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 binary hash */
> +  if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
> +    {
> +      grub_free (hash_data);
> +      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "unacceptable trusted 
> binary hash type");
> +    }
> +
> +  rc = add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &db, true);
> +  grub_free (hash_data);
> +
> +  return rc;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Remove the distrusted binary/certificate hash from the db list if present.
> + * And add them to the dbx list if it is not already present.
> + * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts
> + * the binary/certificate hash file that is signed with an appended 
> signature.
> + * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification 
> succeeds,
> + * the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error 
> is posted and
> + * the binary/certificate hash is not added.
> + * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the 
> binary/certificate hash file without
> + * an appended signature and adds it to the dbx list.
> + *
> + * Also, note that the adding of the distrusted binary/certificate hash 
> using this command does
> + * not persist across reboots.
> + */
> +static grub_err_t
> +grub_cmd_dbx_hash (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc __attribute__ 
> ((unused)),
> +                   char **args __attribute__ ((unused)))
> +{
> +  grub_err_t rc;
> +  grub_file_t hash_file;
> +  grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
> +  grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
> +  char *file_path;
> +
> +  if (!ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set && 
> !ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
> +    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
> +                       "a distrusted certificate/binary hash file is 
> expected in ASCII text format\n"
> +                       "Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_hash [option] <FILE>\n"
> +                       "option:\n[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH 
> FILE]\n"
> +                       "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]\n");
> +
> +  if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg == NULL && 
> ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].arg == NULL)
> +    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted 
> certificate/binary hash file");
> +
> +  if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg != NULL)
> +    file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg;
> +  else
> +    file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].arg;
> +
> +  hash_file = grub_file_open (file_path, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST | 
> GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
> +  if (hash_file == NULL)
> +    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "unable to open %s file", 
> file_path);
> +
> +  rc = file_read_whole (hash_file, &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
> +  grub_file_close (hash_file);
> +  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
> +    return rc;
> +
> +  /*
> +   * If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down,
> +   * obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended
> +   * signature size from the hash data size because
> +   * the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is
> +   * used to get the hash data.
> +   */
> +  if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
> +    hash_data_size -= append_sig_len;
> +
> +  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
> +                "adding a distrusted certificate/binary hash 
> %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n"
> +                " with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", hash_data[0], 
> hash_data[1],
> +                hash_data[2], hash_data[3], hash_data_size);
> +
> +  if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set || 
> ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
> +    {
> +      /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 certificate/binary hash */
> +      if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 
> 64)
> +        {
> +          grub_free (hash_data);
> +          return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
> +                             "unacceptable distrusted certificate/binary 
> hash type");
> +        }
> +    }
> +
> +  /* Remove distrusted binary hash/certificate from the db list if present. 
> */
> +  remove_hash_from_db (hash_data, hash_data_size,
> +                       ((ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set) ? true : 
> false));
> +
> +  rc = add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &dbx, false);
> +  grub_free (hash_data);
> +
> +  return rc;
> +}
> +
>  /* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */
>  static grub_err_t
>  create_db_list (void)
> @@ -1297,10 +1561,16 @@ grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var 
> __attribute__ ((unused)), cons
>        if (grub_pks_keystore.pks_supported == true && 
> grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == false)
>          build_pks_keystore ();
>
> +      unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
>        grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = true;
> +      register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
>      }
>    else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 's'))
> -    grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false;
> +    {
> +      unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
> +      grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore = false;
> +      register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
> +    }
>
>    ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
>    if (ret == NULL)
> @@ -1369,7 +1639,9 @@ struct grub_file_verifier grub_appendedsig_verifier = {
>    .write = appendedsig_write,
>  };
>
> -static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert;
> +static grub_extcmd_t cmd_dbx_hash;
> +static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_db_cert, cmd_db_hash,
> +                      cmd_list_dbx, cmd_dbx_cert;
>
>  /* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
>  static void
> @@ -1381,8 +1653,27 @@ register_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
>                                         N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 
> certificates from the db list"));
>    cmd_db_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", 
> grub_cmd_db_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
>                                         N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to 
> the db list"));
> -  cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", 
> grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> -                                        N_("Remove distrusted 
> X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
> +  /*
> +   * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
> +   * register dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.
> +   */
> +  if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> +    {
> +      cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_dbx_cert", 
> grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> +                                            N_("Add distrusted 
> X509_CERTIFICATE to the dbx list"));
> +      cmd_list_dbx = grub_register_command ("append_list_dbx", 
> grub_cmd_list_dbx, 0,
> +                                            N_("Show the list of distrusted 
> certificates and"
> +                                            " certificate/binary hashes from 
> the dbx list"));
> +      cmd_db_hash = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_hash", 
> grub_cmd_db_hash, N_("BINARY HASH FILE"),
> +                                           N_("Add trusted BINARY HASH to 
> the db list."));
> +      cmd_dbx_hash = grub_register_extcmd ("append_add_dbx_hash", 
> grub_cmd_dbx_hash, 0,
> +                                           N_("[-b|--binary-hash] FILE 
> [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
> +                                           "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE 
> [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]"),
> +                                           N_("Add distrusted 
> CERTFICATE/BINARY HASH to the dbx list."), options);
> +    }
> +  else
> +    cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", 
> grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
> +                                          N_("Remove distrusted 
> X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
>  }
>
>  /* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
> @@ -1393,6 +1684,16 @@ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
>    grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);
>    grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);
>    grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert);
> +  /*
> +   * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
> +   * unregister dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.

Why? I think these commands should be always enabled and do not print
anything if relevant databases are empty. It is also worth considering
a command which would print state of PKS and static keys.

> +   */
> +  if (grub_pks_keystore.use_keystore == true)
> +    {
> +      grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_dbx);
> +      grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_hash);
> +      grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd_dbx_hash);
> +    }
>  }

Daniel

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