On Wed, Aug 19, 2009 at 10:57 PM, Duboucher Thomas<tho...@duboucher.eu> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Michal Suchanek a écrit : >>>> Without threat model we're speaking placebo. >>>> >>> Stoned Bootkit? >> >> Coreboot can prevent that as well as TPM can. >> > > Coreboot can be "stoned" as easily as your MBR since you can easily > rewrite the MBR from the software. On MB that does not support online > overwriting, you may require physical access (but since you already have > to do some dirt work to replace your RO BIOS, that is not really difficult). You can remove TPM too > >> Any threat model which shows the advantage of TPM? >> >> Thanks >> >> Michal > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org > > iEYEARECAAYFAkqMZ04ACgkQBV7eXqefhqheswCgmq2li5PD64osiSJROj9Db1iI > ZYAAoK4bgTrOivSSjzHufIWvDlCzO/OF > =Smrd > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > _______________________________________________ > Grub-devel mailing list > Grub-devel@gnu.org > http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel >
-- Regards Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko Personal git repository: http://repo.or.cz/w/grub2/phcoder.git _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list Grub-devel@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
