On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 10:56:48PM +0100, Jan Alsenz wrote: > > Hi, > > > > The last stage is much simpler. Just put /boot/ in a crypted filesystem (we > > have a patch liing around which is pending to merge). > > Yes, that would also be an idea. > Then the filesystem needs the authentication.
I'm no crypto expert, but I was under the impression that when the data is encrypted, measurement comes "for free": if someone tampered it, you'd be unable to decrypt. Is this correct? > > I appreciate your interest in avoiding controversy. If you want that, then > > please don't refer to this as "trusted". It is implied that all the code in > > GRUB is already trusted by its user. The difference here is that our system > > would be hardened against physical attack, it doesn't change anything about > > who is able to "trust" your computer and who isn't. > > Alright, hardened then. Thank you -- Robert Millan The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all." _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list Grub-devel@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
