On Sat, Feb 21, 2009 at 06:58:58PM +0200, Alex Besogonov wrote: > On Sat, Feb 21, 2009 at 3:51 PM, Robert Millan <r...@aybabtu.com> wrote: > > - An override button that's physically accessible from the chip can be > > used to disable "hostile mode" and make the TPM sign everything. From > > that point physical access can be managed with traditional methods (e.g. > > locks). > > But they didn't. > And actually, they did. > ================================ > New flexibility in EKs. In the 1.1b specification, endorsement keys > were fixed in the > chip at manufacture. This allowed a certificate to be provided by the > manufacturer for the > key. However, some privacy advocates are worried about the EK becoming > a nonchangeable > identifier (in spite of all the privacy controls around it, which > would make doing > this very difficult). ***As a result, the specification allows a > manufacturer to allow the key to > be removed by the end user and regenerated.*** Of course the > certificate at that point would > become worthless, and it could be very expensive for the end user to > get a new certificate. > ================================ > https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/TSS/TSS_1_2_Errata_A-final.pdf
I would have to study this in detail, but I don't see the text saying that remote attestation is no longer supported. What this probably amounts to is that the coercion process can now be made anonymously, which I already knew: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_anonymous_attestation and which is not the core of the problem. -- Robert Millan The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all." _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list Grub-devel@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
