On Thu, Sep 04, 2008 at 11:40:32PM +0200, phcoder wrote: > Robert Millan wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 03, 2008 at 08:49:14PM +0300, Vesa Jääskeläinen wrote: > >> Possibilites are there, but basically they are limited to something like: > >> > >> (ata0) (pci-X-Y-Z:ata0) (usb-X-Y:scsi0) (pci-X-Y-Z:scsi0) > > > > I think this is overkill, and doesn't really address the root of the > > problem. > > > > The real security problem here is whether the executable code you're > > loading is > > trusted, NOT where you load the code from. > If the code is loaded from the same place as we do then we can trust it > (if attacker could modify the code, he could also modify us)
Right. I was assuming you mean when code is loaded from different places. Having untrusted code perform the verification of other untrusted code is useless, of course. -- Robert Millan The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all." _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list Grub-devel@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
