On Sun, Aug 03, 2008 at 02:08:33PM +0200, Robert Millan wrote: > > This line of thinking is what is commonly used to justify draconian measures > (i.e. Treacherous Computing) but it doesn't make any sense. If your security > policy is such that you don't trust users with physical access, try any of > the following: > > - Crypt your whole disk. Have your /boot in a usb drive you carry with you. > > - Remove your CD drive and unexpose USB slots (use locks or if really > paranoid > sink your board in concrete).
Or use a crypto module where you load a key from a secure environment and use that to implement measurement during boot. The TPM could have become such module, but they decided to cripple it by: a) Loading the key themselves. b) Not giving you a copy of the key. I still hope sooner or later a sane company (that is, one that understands basic rights like ownership) will manufacture modules for this purpose. -- Robert Millan The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all." _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list Grub-devel@gnu.org http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
