On Tue, Oct 16, 2018 at 1:55 PM Matthias Schmidt <matthias.schm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > And here it is: > > https://github.com/ms140569/loki/releases/tag/1.2.0
Thanks for sharing this. I find this interesting because I've been working on a very similar idea for an OIDC token manager CLI, and came up with almost the same scheme regarding how you used the domain sockets and the agent. I used rpc instead of a raw protocol though, and the agent times out after a while in my case. You can take a look at https://github.com/bserdar/took the crypto rpc stuff is under crypta package. It does suffer from the same problems mentioned in this thread: if you can scan the memory, the master key is there. I'll add memory locking to mine. > > Thanks to your guy's input the key-agent should be now way more secure. > > cheers, > > Matthias > > Am Dienstag, 16. Oktober 2018 20:31:42 UTC+2 schrieb Matthias Schmidt: >> >> Hi Christopher + Eric, >> >> thanks for your feedback. You are right, i really underestimated the risk of >> such attacks. >> >> I will lock the key-holding memory in the next release. >> >> cheers, >> >> Matthias >> >> >> Am Montag, 15. Oktober 2018 23:13:32 UTC+2 schrieb Christopher Nielsen: >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 1:28 PM Matthias Schmidt >>> <matthias...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> > >>> > Hi Eric, >>> > >>> > thanks *a lot* for your valuable feedback! I really appreciate it. See >>> > comments inline: >>> > >>> > Am Montag, 15. Oktober 2018 12:09:32 UTC+2 schrieb EricR: >>> >> >>> >> Since you're looking for opinions on the security concept, two questions >>> >> spring immediately to my mind: >>> >> >>> >> 1. Does the daemon keep the sensitive data in locked memory that cannot >>> >> be paged out? If so, how cross-platform is this? >>> > >>> > >>> > No it doesn't. As of now i consider the root-user a good guy ;-) >>> > He's the only one who could access the pagefiles anyway. >>> > >>> > So is this really an issue? If yes i could use this cross-platform >>> > solution to pin the key: >>> > >>> > https://github.com/awnumar/memguard >>> > >>> > >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> 2. How does the client communicate securely with the daemon? Which >>> >> encryption protocol/handshake is used for this? (If it just uses a >>> >> socket, what would prevent another process from reading out the master >>> >> password?) >>> > >>> > >>> > It's in fact a unix domain socket file which is only accessible for the >>> > owner of the key. ( Thanks for bringing this up, i forgot to flag the >>> > file correctly - it's now fixed). >>> > Relying on the file permissions in unix shouldn't be a problem, right? >>> > >>> > cheers & again - many thanks, >>> > >>> > Matthias >>> >>> You seem to be putting a lot of trust in facilities that are trivially >>> exploitable to a determined attacker. For software like a password >>> manager, assuming the kernel is secure is a poor security model. In >>> addition to the existing attack surface, we live in a world where >>> side-channel attacks are becoming more common, e.g., Spectre and >>> Meltdown, so it isn't safe to assume the kernel or hardware are >>> secure. A password manager needs to have a robust security model that >>> has a minimal trust model if it is to be more than a toy. >>> >>> Just my $0.02 >>> >>> -- >>> Christopher Nielsen >>> "They who can give up essential liberty for temporary safety, deserve >>> neither liberty nor safety." --Benjamin Franklin >>> "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the >>> blood of patriots & tyrants." --Thomas Jefferson > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "golang-nuts" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to golang-nuts+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "golang-nuts" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to golang-nuts+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
