"Hell is paved with good intention."
GDPR came from the laudable intention of limiting the power of GAFAMs and other data brokers, inside our private lives.
But the text maintains a confusion between personal data and private data. Some personal data is not and should not be private. Email could be one of them, if everyone used a web of trust, which would allow us to know more precisely who is the sender, and to fight more effectively against SPAM.
(NB: In addition, the text annoys small organizations more than large groups which have the means to circumvent it, via internationalization and lobbying)
I have a public email, and i would like to have a email service or client which may delete automatically unsigned messages, and give me the feature to order received email depending from a "proximity" regarding the WOT, or a "confidence" regarding my trustdb.
About the keystore, I imagined 9 years ago that a key server receiving a certificate update, not signed by its owner, could send a message to the owner (by default 1 time per day), in order to ask it to validate, or not, the modifications, before synchronizing the updated certificate, signed by its owner, on other key servers.
So I had to write a draft and start implementing a new MIME type for HTTP for these purposes, to upgrade HKP protocol :
https://github.com/Open-UDC/open-udc/blob/master/docs/rfc/HTTP_OpenPGP_Authentication.draft.txt https://github.com/Open-UDC/thttpgpdBut unfortunately I was perhaps too shy to talk about these ideas on an international mailing list, and they received little echo in my French environment :
https://linuxfr.org/users/jbar/journaux/thttpgpd-ou-comment-openudc-a-ressuscite-le-bon-vieux-thttpdToday WKD / WKS seems to me a good compromise for the trilemma keystore, and probably the best way to get the last version of "first-party-attested" certificates, which fresh uid / sub-keys updates and revocations.
But it's only today that I discovered your git repository https://gitlab.com/openpgp-wg/rfc4880bis and your idea of "first-party-attested third-party certifications" (1pa3pc).
I therefore apologize if I do not add anything new or interesting to the debate today.
---- Jean-Jacques B. Le 28/06/2021 à 01:41, Jason Harris via Gnupg-devel a écrit :
There are still SKS servers running, but several are unsynchronized, including, apparently, pgp.mit.edu. Of course, they have the same key import/poisoning problems already mentioned on these lists…Here are the hockeypuck servers I could find, all synchronizing properly and apparently exchanging data (minus the unwanted packets) with the SKS servers that are synchronized:* http://keys.andreas-puls.de/pks/lookup?op=stats * http://keys2.andreas-puls.de/pks/lookup?op=stats * http://keys3.andreas-puls.de/pks/lookup?op=stats * http://pgp.cyberbits.eu/pks/lookup?op=stats * http://pgp.re:11371/pks/lookup?op=stats * https://pgpkeys.eu/pks/lookup?op=stats * https://keybath.trifence.ch/pks/lookup?op=stats * https://keyserver.trifence.ch/pks/lookup?op=stats HTH. (Please excuse the HTML.) Sent from my iPadOn Jun 24, 2021, at 7:19 PM, deloptes via Gnupg-devel <gnupg-de...@gnupg.org> wrote:Hi, we heard that sks-keyservers.net <http://sks-keyservers.net> will be depreciated so we were wondering what service we should use in the application default settingsWe I mean TDE devs where do we go from here? thank you in advance BR _______________________________________________ Gnupg-devel mailing list gnupg-de...@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel_______________________________________________ Gnupg-devel mailing list gnupg-de...@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel
OpenPGP_0xA3983A40D1458443.asc
Description: OpenPGP public key
OpenPGP_signature
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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