> If using the clipboard is unsafe, then GPG would disallow its use in > password managers as well, would it not?
How would it do so? > If one is supposed to have long, complicated, > difficult-to-remember-and-type passwords (which one cannot even see > when they are being entered!), then one HAS to use a clipboard to get > them from where they are stored into where they are needed, Nonsense. A prior job literally *required* that I not only use completely random passwords, but 128 bits of them, and completely change them every six months, for four different networks. It was incredibly annoying but possible. If I can remember "ZECY17pJQo9PoeVqJ4S/lA==" and three others like it, and change them twice a year, then it's simply untrue that "one HAS to use a clipboard to get them from where they are stored into where they are needed". Convenient, absolutely. Good UI design, also. But not *required*. Further, I don't know who told you that your passphrase must be long, complicated, difficult to remember and difficult to type. The passphrase exists as a defense in the event someone's able to steal your private key: but if you think you've already defended against theft adequately, use a short passphrase or none at all. Like so many things, it all depends on your own risk model. > Again - this disallowing of any input but that of the passphrase > window is NEW. It did not happen until recently. Perhaps I missed something, but did the GnuPG team write your pinentry? If not, they're really not in a good position to offer help. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
