Werner Koch wrote:
> On Mon, 16 Sep 2019 23:49, gnupg-users@gnupg.org said:
>
> > speak, with a specially crafted software, when using an online computer
> > with a SmardCard? I have read that the secret key can not been copied from
> > the card, but what about the 'bits and pieces' in memory when decrypting?
>
> Side-channel attacks on smartcards are an pretty old thing dating back
> to the late 80ies. Current smartcards are hardened against most such
> attacks. Unless you have physical access to the card the secrets and
> their use on the card/token are well protected against any sniffing by
> the host.
Unfortunately I am no programmer but I was thinking about the following:
I assume that in order to decrypt a message the secret key data must be
unlocked and loaded for a very short time into the computers RAM, in order
to perform the decryption, or am I wrong with my assumption?
And if I am not wrong, would that be very difficult to get the parameters
from the secret key or does GnuPG somehow (tries to) prevent this?
Sorry for this question but I like to learn more about how this works
and if I should invest in a smardcard in the future, for online usage.
Regards
Stefan
--
box: 4a64758de9e8ceded2c481ee526440687fe2f3a828e3a813f87753ad30847b56
certified OpenPGP key blocks available on keybase.io/stefan_claas
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