FWIW I distrust encrypted drives using hardware encryption. This came out just a few days ago: https://thehackernews.com/2018/11/self-encrypting-ssd-hacking.html: Flaws in Popular Self-Encrypting SSDs Let Attackers Decrypt Data.
On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 10:15 PM Nicholas Papadonis < nick.papadonis...@gmail.com> wrote: > Interesting. How about this for a start? > > > http://nickpapadonis.com/images-share/summerian-ancient-mesopotamia-ancient-lock.jpg > http://nickpapadonis.com/images-share/anunnaki1.jpg > > http://nickpapadonis.com/images-share/summerian-Winged_Human-headed_Bulls.JPG > > On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:21 PM open...@foocrypt.net <open...@foocrypt.net> > wrote: > >> Hi Nick >> >> Have You tried The FooKey Method ? https://foocrypt.net/the-fookey-method >> >> Also, >> >> I will be sourcing public addendum's as addendum's to my submission into >> the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security [ >> https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018/Submissions >> ] regarding the committee’s review of the 'Telecommunication and Other >> Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Bill 2018' after the >> Melbourne Cup. It will be similar to the open request for the Defence Trade >> Control Act review performed by the former Inspector General of >> Intelligence, Dr Vivian Thom. >> >> >> https://foocrypt.net/independent-review-of-the-defence-trade-controls-act-2012-cth-call-for-information-for-submission-as-a-case-study-from-the-openssl-community >> >> >> -- >> >> Regards, >> >> Mark A. Lane >> >> Cryptopocalypse NOW 01 04 2016 >> >> Volumes 0.0 -> 10.0 Now available through iTunes - iBooks @ >> https://itunes.apple.com/au/author/mark-a.-lane/id1100062966?mt=11 >> >> Cryptopocalypse NOW is the story behind the trials and tribulations >> encountered in creating "FooCrypt, A Tale of Cynical Cyclical Encryption." >> >> "FooCrypt, A Tale of Cynical Cyclical Encryption." is aimed at hardening >> several commonly used Symmetric Open Source Encryption methods so that they >> are hardened to a standard that is commonly termed 'QUANTUM ENCRYPTION'. >> >> "FooCrypt, A Tale of Cynical Cyclical Encryption." is currently under >> export control by the Australian Department of Defence Defence Export >> Controls Office due to the listing of Cryptology as a ‘Dual Use’ Technology >> as per the ‘Wassenaar Arrangement’ >> >> A permit from Defence Export Control is expected within the next 2 months >> as the Australian Signals Directorate is currently assessing the associated >> application(s) for export approval of "FooCrypt, A Tale of Cynical Cyclical >> Encryption." >> >> Early releases of "Cryptopocalypse NOW" will be available in the period >> leading up to June, 2016. >> >> Limited Edition Collectors versions and Hard Back Editions are available >> via the store on http://www.foocrypt.net/ >> >> © Mark A. Lane 1980 - 2016, All Rights Reserved. >> © FooCrypt 1980 - 2016, All Rights Reserved. >> © FooCrypt, A Tale of Cynical Cyclical Encryption. 1980 - 2016, All >> Rights Reserved. >> © Cryptopocalypse 1980 - 2016, All Rights Reserved. >> >> >> >> On 5 Nov 2018, at 10:35, Nicholas Papadonis <nick.papadonis...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Comments >> >> On Sat, Nov 3, 2018 at 5:56 PM Bear Giles <bgi...@coyotesong.com> wrote: >> >>> > I'm considering encrypting a tar archive and optionally a block file >>> system (via FUSE) using either utility >>> >>> Linux has good support for encrypted filesystems. Google LUKS. >>> >> >> >>> BTW a tar file starts with the name of the first entry. The 'magic >>> numbers' are at offset 128 or so. However a compressed tar file will start >>> with a known value since gzip, b2zip, and 7zip?, all start with their magic >>> values. >>> >> >> Does tar placing known data at a certain offset increase the probability >> that someone can perform an attack easier? They may already know the data >> to decrypt at that offset and if the encrypted block overlaps, then the >> attack is easier. >> >> Thanks >> -- >> openssl-users mailing list >> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users >> >> >> -- > openssl-users mailing list > To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users >
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