On 05/09/18 15:50, Fiedler Roman wrote: > The "--pinentry-mode" is here only to make gpg-agent/gpg2 happy to get rid > of tty-related errors. The batch commands do not request any passphrase > to be set, so it should never be read
Can you point to the documentation where it says so? Because the passphrase is correctly set to "my_passphrase", pinentry-mode should only ever become relevant when a pinentry is about to invoked, and in general I just don't see why this should be the case. Additionally, it makes no sense that there is a "%no-protection" option if this is always the case anyway. I think that GnuPG 1.4 defaulted to no passphrase if not supplied with a "Passphrase" option, but this is not GnuPG 1.4; the "Passphrase" option is a no-op, included only for backwards compatibility. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter>
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