On 04/02/15 21:44, Matthias-Christian Ott wrote: > There are enough examples of vendors that introduced government backdoors in > their proprietary products to come to the conclusion that it is probably not > a good idea to use proprietary software or hardware if your threat model > includes government backdoors and you want to defend against them (of course > that doesn't mean that it is impossible to verify that a proprietary product > does not contain a backdoor but it is unarguably a lot harder). So I don't > know how speculating that a particular vendor of proprietary hardware and > software implants backdoors in its products does move the discussion > forward.
What about non-governmental attackers who are able to update your reader firmware through an evil maid attack or the like? You seem to imply that hacked reader firmware is necessarily by a government or the manufacturer. I don't think "it's easier to hack than comparable equipment from competitors" is a particularly compelling argument, though, to be honest. Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter> _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
