Since it looks as if I'm going to be out of contact for the next few days (traveling), I figured I'd share the degradation a little early --
Alice and Bob are communicating. Bob insists on using extremely large keyspaces: his certificate is RSA-16384 and his preference list is AES256 CAMELLIA256. Alice does not. She's not naive or clueless: she's a competent user who understands that Bob insists everything be encrypted with an RSA-16384 certificate. Charlene wants to degrade Bob to 112 bits of effective keyspace. (Why? Beats me. Let's say she's working for the Zarbnulaxian Intelligence Service, and ZIS has tasked her with preparing the Earth for its eventual domination. To further this goal, ZIS has given her a quantum computer one of them got from their kid's breakfast cereal box. It doesn't provide enough qubits to break RSA, but can attack 3DES.) Charlene can't do anything to Bob. She *can* do something to Alice. The next conference Alice goes to, the next OpenPGP Birds of a Feather, Charlene makes sure people there are talking about how 3DES is "really the most-trusted cipher in all of OpenPGP."[*] Charlene makes sure a few well-written webpages get put up talking about how 3DES is really a superior choice to AES256 because Cortois[**]. Ultimately, Charlene arranges for Alice to meet someone else who's privacy-paranoid and insists that Alice only use 3DES to communicate, because "that's the only MUST algorithm in OpenPGP, it's the most interoperable, and because it's been turning brilliant young cryptanalysts into burned-out alcoholic wrecks for 30 years" [***]. When faced with that, it's only a matter of time until Alice decides to put 3DES first in her own preference list. And then all her communications to Bob have 112 bits of keyspace, not the 256 Bob demands. And unless Bob is paranoid enough to check the symmetric algorithm used on every single encrypted message, Bob will never know that Alice's communications to him have been degraded. Werner and others are absolutely right: there is no *technical* way to degrade things to 3DES. But given that cipher preference lists are fundamentally a *human* decision, well... the human being is always exploitable. [*] ... which is probably true. [**] ... of which I've seen several. [***] ... okay, yes, Charlene paid me to hook up with Alice. YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW CRUSHING GRADUATE STUDENT DEBT IS, OKAY? _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users