Am So 01.06.2014, 12:54:30 schrieb Suspekt: > But I yet have to find someone recommending to use the offline mainkey > also for encryption/decryption of files, that are so important that > subkey encryption/decryption is not secure enough.
I do :-) http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/kurzinfo/schluesselqualitaet/#offline http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/scripte/keygeneration/key-generation.sh > Is there a reason for that? Am I missing something? There are certain risks using the same RSA key for encryption and signing. If you make a blind signature over data someone supplied then you unintentionally decrypt the data (and send it back). There are legal and organizational arguments, too: 1) If you are forced to give a decryption key to the authorities then it is an advantage if they cannot use this key to forge signatures. 2) If a signature key has expired then you may delete the private part. You should usually never throw away a decryption key, though, as it can happen that you have to decrypt data long after the public part has expired. I say: Everyone needs keys at different security levels (German): http://www.crypto-fuer-alle.de/wishlist/securitylevel/ E.g. the key which is going to sign this email is not suitable for handling really important data. But as long as hardly anybody has a complete high-security key it seems useful to have at least the mainkey as a last resort. Technically you could use other subkeys for higher security levels – but who would understand that? Seems very dangerous to me, more dangerous than using the mainkey. Hauke -- Crypto für alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/ http://userbase.kde.org/Concepts/OpenPGP_Help_Spread OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5
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