On Monday 16 September 2013 23:00:22 Peter Lebbing wrote: > On 16/09/13 22:37, Philip Jägenstedt wrote: > > Too bad. I guess one could do it by starting at the destination and > > following signatures back using a shortest path algorithm and a lot > > of requests to the keyserver, though. > > Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm would amount to a breadth first > search. Keyserver operators might not like that, I dunno. > > > How would an attacker create n independent paths without deceiving n > > people? > > Errrrr..... by creating n keys and uploading them to the keyserver?
I thought the same, but that won't work. The independent paths need to be completely disjoint (except for start and end point) _and_ they all need to start with Philip's key. The attacker would have to trick Philip into signing all n keys. Or he would have to trick n people whose keys Philip has signed (directly or indirectly) into signing his n keys. Regards, Ingo
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