On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 10:49 AM, Laurent Jumet <laurent.ju...@skynet.be> wrote: > > Hello Pete ! > > Pete Stephenson <p...@heypete.com> wrote: > >> The easiest and least-expensive solution to this situation is using >> smartcards: http://g10code.com/p-card.html -- the private key is kept >> securely on the smartcard. Any private-key operations (i.e. signing or >> decrypting) are handled on-card and the private key is not accessible >> to the computer. You could, of course, generate the key on an offline >> computer and then transfer it to the smartcard and keep an offline >> backup (that's what I do) rather than having the key generated >> entirely on-card with no backup (which is an option). > > This is only relevant (I mean existent backup) for keys that are used as > a tool: > you need a screwdriver for that caregory of screws. > But if smartcard identifys *you*, backup means that there is a second Pete > Stephenson on the Earth, that can sign, certify and so on. Forensic issues > can be hard > to break...
Hi Laurent, Yes, that's true. In my case, I use smartcards to prevent my private keys from being compromised during my normal, day-to-day use of my online computer. In my case, the private keys were generated offline and then transferred to the card and to offline backups. If someone is going to physically break into my apartment to compromise my private keys then I have some pretty major problems. In such a situation, I could easily revoke the keys. Personally, I'm more concerned about the smartcard breaking in some way over the years and thus leaving me unable to decrypt or sign messages, so I prefer to have backups. Your mileage may vary. :) If you or your organization have a requirement that there be a strict one-key-per-person policy with no backups, then you can of course generate the keys on the card. Cheers! -Pete _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
