I don't have an answer to your question, Todd, but I have to second your frustration with not being able to paste to the pinentry. I've never really seen a good justification as to why paste has been disallowed either so I'd love to see it implemented.
Anthony On 4/16/11, Todd A. Jacobs <codegnome.consulting+gnupg....@gmail.com> wrote: > Currently, it looks like pinentry-gtk-2 (I'm using 0.8.0) doesn't allow > pasting from the clipboard. This is annoying, because a truly long, > randomized password is not practical to type into a hidden dialog box. It > really seems like pinentry forces one to use short, insecure passwords. One > supposes there is a trade-off in security here, but I'm more concerned about > brute-force attacks on the passphrase than I am about someone sniffing the > clipboard--it seems that if they have access to my clipboard, they can > probably log my keystrokes, anyway, right? So offline attacks against the > key's passphrase seem more likely. > > So, I really have two questions. First, is it possible to force pinentry > dialogs to allow pasting from the clipboard? Secondly, is it possible to > force the CLI to use an alternate pinentry (say, pinentry-curses) or some > other method to populate an existing gpg-agent with a cached passphrase? > -- Sent from my mobile device Anthony Papillion Lead Developer / Owner Get real about your software/web development and IT Services (918) 919-4624 Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/cajuntechie My Blog: http://www.cajuntechie.com _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
