-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 I believe our very own Rob discusses that here: <http://sixdemonbag.org/cryptofaq.xhtml#entropy>
- --Avi -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.76 Comment: Most recent key: Click show in box @ http://is.gd/4xJrs iF4EAREKAAYFAk0BpKwACgkQDWKwGfgOKfmFQAD+OOcvI8ZMsEEvhT+htzhhAdVj IDxpJF+PhUjolU+VRT4A/i18Js8aHAQRNzqO06/x48Zr9yohKeIx9/0D9se50Wve =TOR9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---- User:Avraham pub 3072D/F80E29F9 1/30/2009 Avi (Wikimedia-related key) <avi.w...@gmail.com > Primary key fingerprint: 167C 063F 7981 A1F6 71EC ABAA 0D62 B019 F80E 29F9 From: Faramir <faramir...@gmail.com> > To: "gnupg-users@gnupg.org" <gnupg-users@gnupg.org> > Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2010 23:21:20 -0300 > Subject: Re: multiple subkeys and key transition > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > El 09-12-2010 16:17, Robert J. Hansen escribió: > ... > > It is unlikely it ever will. 3K RSA keys are believed to be equivalent > > to a 128-bit symmetric key. If computational power ever develops to > > that point, the solution is going to involve moving to entirely > > different algorithms instead of just tacking on another couple of bits. > > I might be wrong, but I remember Bruce Schneier used thermodynamic to > show it is not feasible to brute-force a 256 bits key, because the > energy required to do it would be too much (like all the energy > generated by the sun for several years, or something like that), even > considering the computer used is fast enough, and doesn't lose energy as > heat. It was somewhere in "Applied Cryptography, 2nd Ed." (search by > "Thermodynamic Limitations" title). But of course, a flaw in AES would > be a very different problem. > >
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