Am Dienstag 12 Oktober 2010 06:34:48 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
> If my attack gives me unprivileged access I'm going to escalate it to root. "going to", yes. > This is straight out of the malware > playbook, and malware authors have a great many ways to achieve it. I think that it is not useful to equalize unpriviledged and root access. This seems to me a bit ignorant of people trying to get their systems secure. :-) > Heck, this doesn't even defend against an *unprivileged* attack. Give > me unprivileged access to your user account I'll edit your .profile to > put a .malware/ subdirectory on your PATH and drop my trojaned GnuPG in > there. There are ways to prevent this. E.g. I protect important and hardly ever changed files like ~/.gnupg/options with root priviledge (chattr immutable on ext3). My most threatened processes (browser, IM) are covered by AppArmor profiles which hevily restrict access to $HOME but not to /tmp. These cannot access the secret keys, of course. But due to the new design of GnuPG 2.1 this may change. > This seems like an niche solution to a problem which, as of right now, > is nonexistent. As Daniel already pointed out: Few people do but there are possibilities to harden your system. It would seem strange if of all things a security software put a limit to such efforts. Thus gpg should offer improvements even if these do not make much sense ALONE (which should be mentioned in the documentation). Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814
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