On Thu, 2010-07-22 at 21:53 -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 7/22/2010 6:19 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > > This feature is also dubious, because there will be suspiciously > > high-entropy on the disk, and you are known to be using tools with this > > feature, you will simply be coerced until you've accounted for all > > the data. > > It's considerably worse than that. > > Thanks to the deniable encryption features of TrueCrypt, there is no way > to account for all the data. Is that empty space in your container, or > is there a small hidden container that you're not confessing? > Ultimately, you can't make the interrogation stop *even if you confess > all the information the interrogator wants* -- because the interrogator > might (reasonably!) think you're holding out. > > Deniable encryption is a useful tool, but it is not a universally good idea. >
An interrogator as described in this thread is a movie plot threat. In reality, nobody is going to torture you for your key, because there are much easier ways of obtaining your cleartext or figuring out if you have a hidden volume.
signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part
_______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
