On Tue, Mar 17, 2009 at 12:24 PM, Bo Berglund <bo.bergl...@agiusa.com> wrote: > ... > The idea is to have the PC program encrypt a fairly large chunk of data using > the embedded unit's public key and then send the result over the channel into > the embedded application. > > Inside this (protected) hardware the secret key would be used to decode the > data, then some processing would be done whereupon the resulting data is > again GPG encrypted now with the public key of the PC program and sent back > over the channel. > Finally the PC program would decode the data and further process it. >
I am trying to understand your threat model: If the attacker has access only to the channel but not to the two communicating devices, a simpler, symmetrical-cipher-only solution would suffice. If, on the other hand, the attacher has access to either device, isn't it reasonable to assume he'd be able to pry the decryption (private) key and decrypt the data (flowing in at least one direction)? Nik N. _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
