Am 03.06.19 um 22:45 schrieb Matthew DeVore:
> There is no reason to allow %00 to terminate a string, so do not allow it.
> Otherwise, we end up returning arbitrary content in the string (that which is
> after the %00) which is effectively hidden from callers and can escape sanity
> checks and validation, and possible be used in tandem with a security
> vulnerability to introduce a payload.
It's a bit hard to see with the (extended, but still) limited context,
but url_decode_internal() effectively returns a NUL-terminated string,
even though it does use a strbuf parameter named "out" for temporary
storage. So callers really have no use for decoded NULs, and this
change thus makes sense to me.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matv...@google.com>
> ---
> url.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/url.c b/url.c
> index c0bb4e23c3..cf791cb139 100644
> --- a/url.c
> +++ b/url.c
> @@ -41,21 +41,21 @@ static char *url_decode_internal(const char **query, int
> len,
> if (!c)
> break;
> if (stop_at && strchr(stop_at, c)) {
> q++;
> len--;
> break;
> }
>
> if (c == '%' && len >= 3) {
> int val = hex2chr(q + 1);
> - if (0 <= val) {
> + if (0 < val) {
> strbuf_addch(out, val);
> q += 3;
> len -= 3;
> continue;
> }
> }
>
> if (decode_plus && c == '+')
> strbuf_addch(out, ' ');
> else
>
