On Tue, Jun 1, 2021 at 11:29 PM Rich Freeman <ri...@gentoo.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 1, 2021 at 7:59 AM Adam Carter <adamcart...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > >> And another "wondering" - all the warnings about trusting self signed > >> certs seem a bit self serving. Yes, they are trying to certify who you > >> are, but at the expense of probably allowing access to your > >> communications by "authorised parties" (such as commercial entities > >> purchasing access for MITM access - e.g. certain router/firewall > >> companies doing deep inspection of SSL via resigning or owning both end > >> points). > > > > AFAIK in an enterprise MITM works by having a local CA added to the cert > stores of the workstation fleet, and having that CA auto generate the certs > for MITM. That didn't work with certificate pinning, but pinning has been > deprecated. > > So, I don't know all the ways that pinning is implemented, but if > you're talking about using MITM to snoop on enterprise devices on the > enterprise network I'd think that pinning wouldn't be an issue, > because you control the devices from cradle to grave. Just ensure the > pinned certificates are the ones that let you MITM the connections. > After seeing Grant's mention of CAA records I think I may have conflated pinning with them, or perhaps there were some special controls in Chrome to check that google certs were issued by the correct CA? Sorry i'm not clear on this now (and may have never been).
