On Thu, 10 Aug 2017 10:50:45 +1000 "Sam Jorna (wraeth)" <wra...@gentoo.org> wrote:
> On 10/08/17 06:35, William L. Thomson Jr. wrote:
> > FYI binpkgs have no hash. If someone did something malicious within
> > the binhost to the binpkgs. You have no way of knowing. Yes the
> > same can happen with ebuilds and manifest. But easy to sync portage
> > and see if a manifest has changed.
>
> This isn't exactly true - see ${PKGDIR}/Packages on the binhost, which
> is a manifest of built packages and related metadata. Granted this is
> created by the binhost, it does exist and contains SHA1 and MD5
> hashes, as well as package size. In that sense it's no different to
> how a package Manifest file works within a repository.
You are correct. I meant to say no verifiable hash. You can hash
anything locally and claim it to be trustworthy. Thus mentioning
syncing portage to compare manifest of ebuild/SRC_URI.
Someone remakes a binpkg tarball, edits ${PKGDIR}/Packages with new
SHA1 and MD5. No way to know.
IMHO SRI_URI is more trustworthy than binhost, in the sense of
verification. If you have means to verify the binhost stuff it maybe
more trustworthy. That is left to the admin.
I see binpkg as a temporary convenience. I am doing updates across many
of the same systems. Less images, containers, etc. I made binaries on
one system. Immediately used as updated on others. Then discarded on
binhost. Also used for testing, reverting between slotted versions.
--
William L. Thomson Jr.
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