On Wed, 2006-01-11 at 00:03 -0700, Duncan wrote: > Remember, portage already has a decent amount of signed content > verification builtin, and is getting more. Just because it's not > currently used, as the debate on strength and keyring handling hasn't been > settled, doesn't mean the capacity doesn't exist.
One other advantage with this is we will be starting from a known portage version. This allows us to not have to worry about backwards compatibility. Want Manifest2 (and no Manifest/digests)? So long as the version of portage supports it, we can switch to it completely on these trees. > At this point it should be possible to develop a working enterprise > security model along with the enterprise proposal and tree. Spec it out, > put the keys in a special dir on a read-only mounted partition, and it'll > be pretty hard to fake it on the fly, at least. Again, please don't consider my tree proposal as anything "enterprise", at all. While it can be used as a *basis* for enterprise work, it does not need to be relegated to any specific usage. It is simply a release tree, with frozen package versions. -- Chris Gianelloni Release Engineering - Strategic Lead x86 Architecture Team Games - Developer Gentoo Linux
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