commit: 77d70745f41681d7b7f44649521e61ed397cb139
Author: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
AuthorDate: Sun May 2 15:59:51 2021 +0000
Commit: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo <DOT> org>
CommitDate: Sun May 2 15:59:51 2021 +0000
URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/proj/linux-patches.git/commit/?id=77d70745
Linux patch 5.4.116
Signed-off-by: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo.org>
1115_linux-5.4.116.patch | 611 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 611 insertions(+)
diff --git a/1115_linux-5.4.116.patch b/1115_linux-5.4.116.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3a8a82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/1115_linux-5.4.116.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
+index f473f4fe5a0c3..cb1a446f832c0 100644
+--- a/Makefile
++++ b/Makefile
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+ VERSION = 5
+ PATCHLEVEL = 4
+-SUBLEVEL = 115
++SUBLEVEL = 116
+ EXTRAVERSION =
+ NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
+
+diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+index ab2a4b7dfca57..bc439dcd438f1 100644
+--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
++++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+@@ -4263,40 +4263,51 @@ static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env)
+ return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
+ }
+
++enum {
++ REASON_BOUNDS = -1,
++ REASON_TYPE = -2,
++ REASON_PATHS = -3,
++ REASON_LIMIT = -4,
++ REASON_STACK = -5,
++};
++
+ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
+- u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode, bool off_is_neg)
++ const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
++ u32 *alu_limit, u8 opcode)
+ {
++ bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
+ bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) ||
+ (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
+- u32 off, max;
++ u32 max = 0, ptr_limit = 0;
++
++ if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) &&
++ (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0))
++ return REASON_BOUNDS;
+
+ switch (ptr_reg->type) {
+ case PTR_TO_STACK:
+ /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
+- * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP.
++ * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP. Also, unknown scalar
++ * offset where we would need to deal with min/max bounds is
++ * currently prohibited for unprivileged.
+ */
+ max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
+- /* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in
+- * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here.
+- */
+- off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
+- if (mask_to_left)
+- *ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
+- else
+- *ptr_limit = -off - 1;
+- return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0;
++ ptr_limit = -(ptr_reg->var_off.value + ptr_reg->off);
++ break;
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+ max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
+- if (mask_to_left) {
+- *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
+- } else {
+- off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
+- *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
+- }
+- return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0;
++ ptr_limit = (mask_to_left ?
++ ptr_reg->smin_value :
++ ptr_reg->umax_value) + ptr_reg->off;
++ break;
+ default:
+- return -EINVAL;
++ return REASON_TYPE;
+ }
++
++ if (ptr_limit >= max)
++ return REASON_LIMIT;
++ *alu_limit = ptr_limit;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+@@ -4314,7 +4325,7 @@ static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct
bpf_insn_aux_data *aux,
+ if (aux->alu_state &&
+ (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
+ aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
+- return -EACCES;
++ return REASON_PATHS;
+
+ /* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
+ aux->alu_state = alu_state;
+@@ -4333,14 +4344,22 @@ static int sanitize_val_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env
*env,
+ return update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER, 0);
+ }
+
++static bool sanitize_needed(u8 opcode)
++{
++ return opcode == BPF_ADD || opcode == BPF_SUB;
++}
++
+ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
++ const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
+ struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
+- bool off_is_neg)
++ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *tmp_aux,
++ const bool commit_window)
+ {
++ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = commit_window ? cur_aux(env) : tmp_aux;
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+- struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
++ bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0;
+ bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
+ u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
+ u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
+@@ -4358,18 +4377,33 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env
*env,
+ if (vstate->speculative)
+ goto do_sim;
+
+- alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
+- alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
+- BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
+-
+- err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg);
++ err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
++ if (commit_window) {
++ /* In commit phase we narrow the masking window based on
++ * the observed pointer move after the simulated operation.
++ */
++ alu_state = tmp_aux->alu_state;
++ alu_limit = abs(tmp_aux->alu_limit - alu_limit);
++ } else {
++ alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
++ alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
++ BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
++ }
++
+ err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ do_sim:
++ /* If we're in commit phase, we're done here given we already
++ * pushed the truncated dst_reg into the speculative verification
++ * stack.
++ */
++ if (commit_window)
++ return 0;
++
+ /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
+ * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
+ * masking when off was not within expected range. If off
+@@ -4386,7 +4420,81 @@ do_sim:
+ ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
+ if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
+ *dst_reg = tmp;
+- return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
++ return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
++}
++
++static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
++ const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
++ const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
++ const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
++{
++ static const char *err = "pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for
!root";
++ const char *op = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_ADD ? "add" : "sub";
++ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
++
++ switch (reason) {
++ case REASON_BOUNDS:
++ verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds,
%s\n",
++ off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src, err);
++ break;
++ case REASON_TYPE:
++ verbose(env, "R%d has pointer with unsupported alu operation,
%s\n",
++ off_reg == dst_reg ? src : dst, err);
++ break;
++ case REASON_PATHS:
++ verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s from different maps, paths or
scalars, %s\n",
++ dst, op, err);
++ break;
++ case REASON_LIMIT:
++ verbose(env, "R%d tried to %s beyond pointer bounds, %s\n",
++ dst, op, err);
++ break;
++ case REASON_STACK:
++ verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative
verification, %s\n",
++ dst, err);
++ break;
++ default:
++ verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n",
++ reason);
++ break;
++ }
++
++ return -EACCES;
++}
++
++static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
++ const struct bpf_insn *insn,
++ const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
++{
++ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
++
++ /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
++ * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
++ */
++ if (env->allow_ptr_leaks)
++ return 0;
++
++ switch (dst_reg->type) {
++ case PTR_TO_STACK:
++ if (check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
++ dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
++ verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of
range, "
++ "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++ break;
++ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
++ if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
++ verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes
out of range, "
++ "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++ break;
++ default:
++ break;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and
var_off.
+@@ -4407,8 +4515,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
+ u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
+ umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
+- u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
++ struct bpf_insn_aux_data tmp_aux = {};
+ u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
++ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+ int ret;
+
+ dst_reg = ®s[dst];
+@@ -4451,13 +4560,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
+ dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
+ return -EACCES;
+- case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+- if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) !=
(smax_val < 0)) {
+- verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed
bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n",
+- off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src);
+- return -EACCES;
+- }
+- /* fall-through */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -4472,13 +4574,15 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
++ ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
++ &tmp_aux, false);
++ if (ret < 0)
++ return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
++ }
++
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case BPF_ADD:
+- ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val <
0);
+- if (ret < 0) {
+- verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different maps,
paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
+- return ret;
+- }
+ /* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
+ * the s32 'off' field
+ */
+@@ -4529,11 +4633,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ }
+ break;
+ case BPF_SUB:
+- ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val <
0);
+- if (ret < 0) {
+- verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different maps,
paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
+- return ret;
+- }
+ if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
+ /* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
+ verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from
scalar\n",
+@@ -4614,22 +4713,13 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
+ __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
+
+- /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
+- * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
+- */
+- if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
+- if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
+- check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
+- verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes
out of range, "
+- "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+- return -EACCES;
+- } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
+- check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
+- dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
+- verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of
range, "
+- "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+- return -EACCES;
+- }
++ if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0)
++ return -EACCES;
++ if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
++ ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg,
++ &tmp_aux, true);
++ if (ret < 0)
++ return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -4650,7 +4740,6 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ s64 smin_val, smax_val;
+ u64 umin_val, umax_val;
+ u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
+- u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (insn_bitness == 32) {
+@@ -4684,13 +4773,14 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++ if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) {
++ ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
++ if (ret < 0)
++ return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, NULL, NULL);
++ }
++
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case BPF_ADD:
+- ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
+- if (ret < 0) {
+- verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different pointers
or scalars\n", dst);
+- return ret;
+- }
+ if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
+ signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
+ dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
+@@ -4710,11 +4800,6 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct
bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
+ break;
+ case BPF_SUB:
+- ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
+- if (ret < 0) {
+- verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different pointers
or scalars\n", dst);
+- return ret;
+- }
+ if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
+ signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
+ /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
+diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c
b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c
+index c162498a64fc6..91869aea6d641 100644
+--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c
++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c
+@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
+ .errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .retval = 1,
+@@ -34,22 +34,23 @@
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
+ .errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+ "check deducing bounds from const, 4",
+ .insns = {
++ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSLE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+- BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
++ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R6 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ },
+@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
+ .errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
+ .errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+@@ -88,7 +89,7 @@
+ offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
+ .errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
+@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@
+ offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
+ .errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
+@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has pointer with unsupported alu operation",
+ .errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_mix_sign_unsign.c
b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_mix_sign_unsign.c
+index 9baca7a75c42a..c2aa6f26738b4 100644
+--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_mix_sign_unsign.c
++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_mix_sign_unsign.c
+@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -43,7 +42,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -69,7 +67,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R8 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -94,7 +91,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R8 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -141,7 +137,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -210,7 +205,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -260,7 +254,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -287,7 +280,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -313,7 +305,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -342,7 +333,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R7 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -372,7 +362,6 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 4 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -400,7 +389,5 @@
+ },
+ .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "unbounded min value",
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds",
+ .result = REJECT,
+- .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ },
+diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
+index 0d621c841db14..c3f6f650deb76 100644
+--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
+@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, -8),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ },
+diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c
b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c
+index 00b59d5d7a7f0..28d44e6aa0b7e 100644
+--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c
++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c
+@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
+ .fixup_map_hash_16b = { 5 },
+ .fixup_map_array_48b = { 8 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+- .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps",
+ .retval = 1,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -122,7 +120,7 @@
+ .fixup_map_array_48b = { 1 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different pointers or scalars",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different maps, paths or
scalars",
+ .retval = 0,
+ },
+ {
+@@ -169,7 +167,7 @@
+ .fixup_map_array_48b = { 1 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+- .errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different maps, paths, or
prohibited types",
++ .errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different maps, paths or
scalars",
+ .retval = 0,
+ },
+ {
