commit: 6091199db63b6a242df8c64d9354179c68bdf442 Author: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo <DOT> org> AuthorDate: Sun Jul 14 15:51:59 2019 +0000 Commit: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo <DOT> org> CommitDate: Sun Jul 14 15:51:59 2019 +0000 URL: https://gitweb.gentoo.org/proj/linux-patches.git/commit/?id=6091199d
Linux patch 5.2.1 Signed-off-by: Mike Pagano <mpagano <AT> gentoo.org> 0000_README | 4 + 1000_linux-5.2.1.patch | 3923 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 3927 insertions(+) diff --git a/0000_README b/0000_README index f86fe5e..3d37d29 100644 --- a/0000_README +++ b/0000_README @@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ EXPERIMENTAL Individual Patch Descriptions: -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Patch: 1000_linux-5.2.1.patch +From: https://www.kernel.org +Desc: Linux 5.2.1 + Patch: 1500_XATTR_USER_PREFIX.patch From: https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=470644 Desc: Support for namespace user.pax.* on tmpfs. diff --git a/1000_linux-5.2.1.patch b/1000_linux-5.2.1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..03bdab7 --- /dev/null +++ b/1000_linux-5.2.1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,3923 @@ +diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +index ffc064c1ec68..49311f3da6f2 100644 +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. + .. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + ++ spectre + l1tf + mds +diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000000..25f3b2532198 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,697 @@ ++.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 ++ ++Spectre Side Channels ++===================== ++ ++Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction ++and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly ++bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits ++do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory. ++ ++This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2. ++ ++Affected processors ++------------------- ++ ++Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern ++high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors ++use branch prediction and speculative execution. ++ ++The following CPUs are vulnerable: ++ ++ - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors ++ ++ - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors ++ ++ - IBM POWER and zSeries processors ++ ++ - Higher end ARM processors ++ ++ - Apple CPUs ++ ++ - Higher end MIPS CPUs ++ ++ - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details. ++ ++Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre ++vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`. ++ ++Related CVEs ++------------ ++ ++The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants: ++ ++ ============= ======================= ================= ++ CVE-2017-5753 Bounds check bypass Spectre variant 1 ++ CVE-2017-5715 Branch target injection Spectre variant 2 ++ ============= ======================= ================= ++ ++Problem ++------- ++ ++CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave ++traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches, ++buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to ++influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects ++of the speculative execution in the CPUs' caches and buffers to infer ++privileged data touched during the speculative execution. ++ ++Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of ++conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative ++execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory. ++See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` ++:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`. ++ ++Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass) ++--------------------------------------- ++ ++The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>` takes advantage ++of speculative execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions ++used for memory access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an ++array results in memory access within a valid range). This results in ++memory accesses to invalid memory (with out-of-bound index) that are ++done speculatively before validation checks resolve. Such speculative ++memory accesses can leave side effects, creating side channels which ++leak information to the attacker. ++ ++There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data ++over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks ++are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk. ++ ++Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection) ++------------------------------------------- ++ ++The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative ++execution of indirect branches :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>`. The indirect ++branch predictors inside the processor used to guess the target of ++indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code ++to be speculatively executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by ++the victim. The side effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative ++execution can be measured to infer data values. ++ ++.. _poison_btb: ++ ++In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect ++branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target ++buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such ++poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code, ++with the address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's ++control. Since the branch prediction on impacted hardware does not ++fully disambiguate branch address and uses the offset for prediction, ++this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget ++code with the same offset. ++ ++The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such ++as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets ++without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have ++very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of ++the attack revealing useful data. ++ ++One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the ++return stack buffer (RSB) :ref:`[13] <spec_ref13>` to cause speculative ++subroutine return instruction execution to go to a gadget. An attacker's ++imbalanced subroutine call instructions might "poison" entries in the ++return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's subroutine ++return instructions. This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return ++stack buffer on context switch, or virtual machine (VM) exit. ++ ++On systems with simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), attacks are possible ++from the sibling thread, as level 1 cache and branch target buffer ++(BTB) may be shared between hardware threads in a CPU core. A malicious ++program running on the sibling thread may influence its peer's BTB to ++steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the ++speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the ++victim's data. ++ ++Attack scenarios ++---------------- ++ ++The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may ++not cover all possible attack vectors. ++ ++1. A user process attacking the kernel ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or ++ via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may ++ be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive ++ a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack. The index or pointer ++ is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken ++ for speculative execution. This could cause privileged memory to be ++ accessed and leaked. ++ ++ For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could ++ potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor ++ macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data. ++ ++ Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch ++ target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack. ++ After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch ++ target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative ++ execution. ++ ++ If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during ++ speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the ++ gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After ++ the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect. ++ ++ The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch ++ target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as ++ "retpoline") :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` for all ++ indirect branches. Return trampolines trap speculative execution paths ++ to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution. ++ x86 CPUs with Enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation ++ (Enhanced IBRS) available in hardware should use the feature to ++ mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is ++ more efficient than retpoline. ++ ++ There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with ++ Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such ++ attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) feature ++ is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code. ++ ++2. A user process attacking another user process ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ A malicious user process can try to attack another user process, ++ either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the ++ sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous ++ multi-threading (SMT) system. ++ ++ Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters ++ between the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such ++ as remote procedure calls (RPC). Those parameters are used in gadget ++ code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in ++ the attacked process. ++ ++ Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by ++ :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer. This can ++ influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either ++ runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on ++ a sibling hardware thread sharing the same physical core. ++ ++ A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks ++ by using the prctl() syscall to disable indirect branch speculation ++ for itself. An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process ++ from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's ++ indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost ++ from not using indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch ++ target buffer. When SMT is enabled on x86, for a process that has ++ indirect branch speculation disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch ++ Predictors (STIBP) :ref:`[4] <spec_ref4>` are turned on to prevent the ++ sibling thread from controlling branch target buffer. In addition, ++ the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) is issued to clear the ++ branch target buffer when context switching to and from such process. ++ ++ On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch. ++ This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch ++ prediction when the return stack buffer underflows while switching to ++ a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer ++ left by the previous process will also be cleared. ++ ++ User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks ++ more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2). ++ ++3. A virtualized guest attacking the host ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the ++ kernel. The kernel is entered via hyper-calls or other virtualization ++ exit paths. ++ ++ For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters ++ (e.g. in registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to ++ speculate into privileged memory after entering the kernel. For places ++ where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros ++ are used to stop speculative memory access. ++ ++ For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison ++ <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing ++ the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths. ++ ++ To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines ++ for indirect branches to bypass the poisoned branch target buffer, ++ and flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit. This prevents rogue ++ guests from affecting indirect branching in the host kernel. ++ ++ To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have ++ indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl(). The branch target ++ buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes. ++ ++4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the ++ other guest. ++ ++ Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed ++ between guests. This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory ++ or message passing. Such parameters could be used to derive data ++ pointers to privileged data in guest. The privileged data could be ++ accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths. ++ ++ Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by ++ :ref:`poisoning <poison_btb>` the branch target buffer or the return ++ stack buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence ++ speculation execution paths in the victim guest. ++ ++ Linux kernel mitigates attacks to other guests running in the same ++ CPU hardware thread by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit, ++ and clearing the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest. ++ ++ If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest ++ in the sibling hyperthread can be mitigated by the administrator, ++ by turning off the unsafe guest's indirect branch speculation via ++ prctl(). A guest can also protect itself by turning on microcode ++ based mitigations (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) within the guest. ++ ++.. _spectre_sys_info: ++ ++Spectre system information ++-------------------------- ++ ++The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current ++mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is ++vulnerable, and which mitigations are active. ++ ++The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is: ++ ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 ++ ++The possible values in this file are: ++ ++ ======================================= ================================= ++ 'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation' Protection in kernel on a case by ++ case base with explicit pointer ++ sanitation. ++ ======================================= ================================= ++ ++However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis, ++and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre ++variant 1 are covered. ++ ++The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with ++retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the ++CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation. ++ ++This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate ++attack between user processes: ++ ++1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional ++ isolation between processes of different users. ++2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional ++ isolation between CPU threads running on the same core. ++ ++These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled ++per process on a case-by-case base. ++ ++The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is: ++ ++ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 ++ ++The possible values in this file are: ++ ++ - Kernel status: ++ ++ ==================================== ================================= ++ 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable ++ 'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation ++ 'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation ++ 'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation ++ 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation ++ ==================================== ================================= ++ ++ - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is ++ used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only). ++ ++ ========== ============================================================= ++ 'IBRS_FW' Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware ++ ========== ============================================================= ++ ++ - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between ++ processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through ++ prctl() per process, or through kernel command line options. This is ++ an x86 only feature. For more details see below. ++ ++ =================== ======================================================== ++ 'IBPB: disabled' IBPB unused ++ 'IBPB: always-on' Use IBPB on all tasks ++ 'IBPB: conditional' Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks ++ =================== ======================================================== ++ ++ - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection ++ between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through ++ prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86 ++ only feature. For more details see below. ++ ++ ==================== ======================================================== ++ 'STIBP: disabled' STIBP unused ++ 'STIBP: forced' Use STIBP on all tasks ++ 'STIBP: conditional' Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks ++ ==================== ======================================================== ++ ++ - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status: ++ ++ ============= =========================================== ++ 'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled ++ ============= =========================================== ++ ++Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU ++vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will ++report vulnerability. ++ ++Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2 ++----------------------------------------------------------------- ++ ++1. Kernel mitigation ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined ++ by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case ++ basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2] ++ <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may ++ not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1. ++ ++ For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or ++ jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines) ++ :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target ++ addresses. Speculative execution paths under retpolines are trapped ++ in an infinite loop to prevent any speculative execution jumping to ++ a gadget. ++ ++ To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel ++ needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the ++ -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options. ++ If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs ++ to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option. The kernel config ++ CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with ++ the latest updated microcode. ++ ++ On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all, ++ cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details. ++ ++ On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced ++ IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time. ++ ++ The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable ++ CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator ++ via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See ++ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`. ++ ++ On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default ++ before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits ++ using the firmware. ++ ++ Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y ++ and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes ++ attacks on the kernel generally more difficult. ++ ++2. User program mitigation ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds ++ clipping". For more details see :ref:`[2] <spec_ref2>`. ++ ++ For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs ++ can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches. ++ This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch ++ target buffer left by malicious software. Alternatively, the ++ programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl() ++ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`). ++ On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the ++ sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to ++ flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program. ++ ++ Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will ++ also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack ++ on x86. All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch ++ speculation restricted by default. Administrators can change ++ that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. ++ See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`. ++ ++ Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have ++ more overhead and run slower. ++ ++ User programs should use address space randomization ++ (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more ++ difficult. ++ ++3. VM mitigation ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are ++ mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code ++ uses nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any ++ usable disclosure gadgets. However, this may not cover all variant ++ 1 attack vectors. ++ ++ For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the ++ Linux kernel uses retpoline or Enhanced IBRS to prevent consumption of ++ poisoned entries in branch target buffer left by rogue guests. It also ++ flushes the return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent a return ++ stack buffer underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used, ++ or attacker guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer. ++ ++ To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks in the same CPU hardware thread, ++ the branch target buffer is sanitized by flushing before switching ++ to a new guest on a CPU. ++ ++ The above mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs. ++ ++ To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks from sibling thread when SMT is ++ in use, an untrusted guest running in the sibling thread can have ++ its indirect branch speculation disabled by administrator via prctl(). ++ ++ The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation ++ they choose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) to protect themselves. ++ ++.. _spectre_mitigation_control_command_line: ++ ++Mitigation control on the kernel command line ++--------------------------------------------- ++ ++Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the ++kernel command line. ++ ++ nospectre_v2 ++ ++ [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 ++ (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may ++ allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent ++ to spectre_v2=off. ++ ++ ++ spectre_v2= ++ ++ [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 ++ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. ++ The default operation protects the kernel from ++ user space attacks. ++ ++ on ++ unconditionally enable, implies ++ spectre_v2_user=on ++ off ++ unconditionally disable, implies ++ spectre_v2_user=off ++ auto ++ kernel detects whether your CPU model is ++ vulnerable ++ ++ Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a ++ mitigation method at run time according to the ++ CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the ++ CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the ++ compiler with which the kernel was built. ++ ++ Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation ++ against user space to user space task attacks. ++ ++ Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and ++ the user space protections. ++ ++ Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: ++ ++ retpoline ++ replace indirect branches ++ retpoline,generic ++ google's original retpoline ++ retpoline,amd ++ AMD-specific minimal thunk ++ ++ Not specifying this option is equivalent to ++ spectre_v2=auto. ++ ++For user space mitigation: ++ ++ spectre_v2_user= ++ ++ [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 ++ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between ++ user space tasks ++ ++ on ++ Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is ++ enforced by spectre_v2=on ++ ++ off ++ Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is ++ enforced by spectre_v2=off ++ ++ prctl ++ Indirect branch speculation is enabled, ++ but mitigation can be enabled via prctl ++ per thread. The mitigation control state ++ is inherited on fork. ++ ++ prctl,ibpb ++ Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is ++ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued ++ always when switching between different user ++ space processes. ++ ++ seccomp ++ Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp ++ threads will enable the mitigation unless ++ they explicitly opt out. ++ ++ seccomp,ibpb ++ Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is ++ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued ++ always when switching between different ++ user space processes. ++ ++ auto ++ Kernel selects the mitigation depending on ++ the available CPU features and vulnerability. ++ ++ Default mitigation: ++ If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl" ++ ++ Not specifying this option is equivalent to ++ spectre_v2_user=auto. ++ ++ In general the kernel by default selects ++ reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To ++ disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with ++ spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations ++ cannot be disabled. ++ ++Mitigation selection guide ++-------------------------- ++ ++1. Trusted userspace ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not ++ execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can ++ be disabled. ++ ++2. Protect sensitive programs ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto ++ keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by ++ disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running ++ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`). ++ ++3. Sandbox untrusted programs ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned ++ off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run ++ (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`). ++ This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target ++ buffer. All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect ++ branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be ++ changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See ++ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`. ++ ++3. High security mode ++^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ++ ++ All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on ++ at boot time for all programs (See the "on" option in ++ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`). This will add ++ overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs will be ++ restricted. ++ ++ On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching ++ to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs ++ against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on ++ sibling threads. ++ ++ Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs ++ whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled, ++ while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new ++ program to clear the branch target buffer (See "ibpb" option in ++ :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`). This "ibpb" option ++ has less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP ++ on all the time. ++ ++References on Spectre ++--------------------- ++ ++Intel white papers: ++ ++.. _spec_ref1: ++ ++[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_. ++ ++.. _spec_ref2: ++ ++[2] `Bounds check bypass <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/bounds-check-bypass>`_. ++ ++.. _spec_ref3: ++ ++[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-retpoline-branch-target-injection-mitigation>`_. ++ ++.. _spec_ref4: ++ ++[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-single-thread-indirect-branch-predictors>`_. ++ ++AMD white papers: ++ ++.. _spec_ref5: ++ ++[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_. ++ ++.. _spec_ref6: ++ ++[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_. ++ ++ARM white papers: ++ ++.. _spec_ref7: ++ ++[7] `Cache speculation side-channels <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/download-the-whitepaper>`_. ++ ++.. _spec_ref8: ++ ++[8] `Cache speculation issues update <https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/latest-updates/cache-speculation-issues-update>`_. ++ ++Google white paper: ++ ++.. _spec_ref9: ++ ++[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>`_. ++ ++MIPS white paper: ++ ++.. _spec_ref10: ++ ++[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_. ++ ++Academic papers: ++ ++.. _spec_ref11: ++ ++[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>`_. ++ ++.. _spec_ref12: ++ ++[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10535>`_. ++ ++.. _spec_ref13: ++ ++[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot18/woot18-paper-koruyeh.pdf>`_. +diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +index 138f6664b2e2..0082d1e56999 100644 +--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt ++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +@@ -5102,12 +5102,6 @@ + emulate [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are + emulated reasonably safely. + +- native Vsyscalls are native syscall instructions. +- This is a little bit faster than trapping +- and makes a few dynamic recompilers work +- better than they would in emulation mode. +- It also makes exploits much easier to write. +- + none Vsyscalls don't work at all. This makes + them quite hard to use for exploits but + might break your system. +diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +index 1129c7550a48..7ddd8f667459 100644 +--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst ++++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is + available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation + misfeature will fail. + ++.. _set_spec_ctrl: ++ + PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL + ----------------------- + +diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile +index 3e4868a6498b..d8f5dbfd6b76 100644 +--- a/Makefile ++++ b/Makefile +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + VERSION = 5 + PATCHLEVEL = 2 +-SUBLEVEL = 0 ++SUBLEVEL = 1 + EXTRAVERSION = + NAME = Bobtail Squid + +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +index a166c960bc9e..e9d0bc3a5e88 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include <linux/rcupdate.h> + #include <linux/export.h> + #include <linux/context_tracking.h> ++#include <linux/nospec.h> + + #include <linux/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/pgtable.h> +@@ -643,9 +644,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n) + { + struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread; + unsigned long val = 0; ++ int index = n; + + if (n < HBP_NUM) { +- struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n]; ++ struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index]; ++ index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM); + + if (bp) + val = bp->hw.info.address; +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c +index a5b802a12212..71d3fef1edc9 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c +@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ + #include <linux/user.h> + #include <linux/regset.h> + #include <linux/syscalls.h> ++#include <linux/nospec.h> + + #include <linux/uaccess.h> + #include <asm/desc.h> +@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx, + struct user_desc __user *u_info) + { + struct user_desc info; ++ int index; + + if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number)) + return -EFAULT; +@@ -227,8 +229,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx, + if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + +- fill_user_desc(&info, idx, +- &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]); ++ index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN; ++ index = array_index_nospec(index, ++ GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1); ++ ++ fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]); + + if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info))) + return -EFAULT; +diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +index 0850b5149345..4d1517022a14 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S ++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +@@ -141,10 +141,10 @@ SECTIONS + *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk) + __indirect_thunk_end = .; + #endif +- } :text = 0x9090 + +- /* End of text section */ +- _etext = .; ++ /* End of text section */ ++ _etext = .; ++ } :text = 0x9090 + + NOTES :text :note + +diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c +index f9269ae6da9c..e5db3856b194 100644 +--- a/block/bfq-iosched.c ++++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c +@@ -4584,6 +4584,7 @@ static void bfq_exit_icq_bfqq(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, bool is_sync) + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&bfqd->lock, flags); ++ bfqq->bic = NULL; + bfq_exit_bfqq(bfqd, bfqq); + bic_set_bfqq(bic, NULL, is_sync); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bfqd->lock, flags); +diff --git a/block/bio.c b/block/bio.c +index ce797d73bb43..67bba12d273b 100644 +--- a/block/bio.c ++++ b/block/bio.c +@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ static int __bio_add_pc_page(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio, + } + } + +- if (bio_full(bio)) ++ if (bio_full(bio, len)) + return 0; + + if (bio->bi_phys_segments >= queue_max_segments(q)) +@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ void __bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, struct page *page, + struct bio_vec *bv = &bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt]; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_flagged(bio, BIO_CLONED)); +- WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio)); ++ WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio, len)); + + bv->bv_page = page; + bv->bv_offset = off; +@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ int bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, struct page *page, + bool same_page = false; + + if (!__bio_try_merge_page(bio, page, len, offset, &same_page)) { +- if (bio_full(bio)) ++ if (bio_full(bio, len)) + return 0; + __bio_add_page(bio, page, len, offset); + } +@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static int __bio_iov_iter_get_pages(struct bio *bio, struct iov_iter *iter) + if (same_page) + put_page(page); + } else { +- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio))) ++ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_full(bio, len))) + return -EINVAL; + __bio_add_page(bio, page, len, offset); + } +@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ int bio_iov_iter_get_pages(struct bio *bio, struct iov_iter *iter) + ret = __bio_iov_bvec_add_pages(bio, iter); + else + ret = __bio_iov_iter_get_pages(bio, iter); +- } while (!ret && iov_iter_count(iter) && !bio_full(bio)); ++ } while (!ret && iov_iter_count(iter) && !bio_full(bio, 0)); + + if (iov_iter_bvec_no_ref(iter)) + bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_NO_PAGE_REF); +diff --git a/crypto/lrw.c b/crypto/lrw.c +index 58009cf63a6e..be829f6afc8e 100644 +--- a/crypto/lrw.c ++++ b/crypto/lrw.c +@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) + inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->base.cra_priority; + inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE; + inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->base.cra_alignmask | +- (__alignof__(__be32) - 1); ++ (__alignof__(be128) - 1); + + inst->alg.ivsize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE; + inst->alg.min_keysize = crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(alg) + +diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c +index bc26b5511f0a..38a59a630cd4 100644 +--- a/drivers/android/binder.c ++++ b/drivers/android/binder.c +@@ -2059,10 +2059,9 @@ static size_t binder_get_object(struct binder_proc *proc, + + read_size = min_t(size_t, sizeof(*object), buffer->data_size - offset); + if (offset > buffer->data_size || read_size < sizeof(*hdr) || +- !IS_ALIGNED(offset, sizeof(u32))) ++ binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, object, buffer, ++ offset, read_size)) + return 0; +- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, object, buffer, +- offset, read_size); + + /* Ok, now see if we read a complete object. */ + hdr = &object->hdr; +@@ -2131,8 +2130,10 @@ static struct binder_buffer_object *binder_validate_ptr( + return NULL; + + buffer_offset = start_offset + sizeof(binder_size_t) * index; +- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset, +- b, buffer_offset, sizeof(object_offset)); ++ if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset, ++ b, buffer_offset, ++ sizeof(object_offset))) ++ return NULL; + object_size = binder_get_object(proc, b, object_offset, object); + if (!object_size || object->hdr.type != BINDER_TYPE_PTR) + return NULL; +@@ -2212,10 +2213,12 @@ static bool binder_validate_fixup(struct binder_proc *proc, + return false; + last_min_offset = last_bbo->parent_offset + sizeof(uintptr_t); + buffer_offset = objects_start_offset + +- sizeof(binder_size_t) * last_bbo->parent, +- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &last_obj_offset, +- b, buffer_offset, +- sizeof(last_obj_offset)); ++ sizeof(binder_size_t) * last_bbo->parent; ++ if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, ++ &last_obj_offset, ++ b, buffer_offset, ++ sizeof(last_obj_offset))) ++ return false; + } + return (fixup_offset >= last_min_offset); + } +@@ -2301,15 +2304,15 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc, + for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset; + buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) { + struct binder_object_header *hdr; +- size_t object_size; ++ size_t object_size = 0; + struct binder_object object; + binder_size_t object_offset; + +- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset, +- buffer, buffer_offset, +- sizeof(object_offset)); +- object_size = binder_get_object(proc, buffer, +- object_offset, &object); ++ if (!binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &object_offset, ++ buffer, buffer_offset, ++ sizeof(object_offset))) ++ object_size = binder_get_object(proc, buffer, ++ object_offset, &object); + if (object_size == 0) { + pr_err("transaction release %d bad object at offset %lld, size %zd\n", + debug_id, (u64)object_offset, buffer->data_size); +@@ -2432,15 +2435,16 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc, + for (fd_index = 0; fd_index < fda->num_fds; + fd_index++) { + u32 fd; ++ int err; + binder_size_t offset = fda_offset + + fd_index * sizeof(fd); + +- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, +- &fd, +- buffer, +- offset, +- sizeof(fd)); +- binder_deferred_fd_close(fd); ++ err = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer( ++ &proc->alloc, &fd, buffer, ++ offset, sizeof(fd)); ++ WARN_ON(err); ++ if (!err) ++ binder_deferred_fd_close(fd); + } + } break; + default: +@@ -2683,11 +2687,12 @@ static int binder_translate_fd_array(struct binder_fd_array_object *fda, + int ret; + binder_size_t offset = fda_offset + fdi * sizeof(fd); + +- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, +- &fd, t->buffer, +- offset, sizeof(fd)); +- ret = binder_translate_fd(fd, offset, t, thread, +- in_reply_to); ++ ret = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, ++ &fd, t->buffer, ++ offset, sizeof(fd)); ++ if (!ret) ++ ret = binder_translate_fd(fd, offset, t, thread, ++ in_reply_to); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } +@@ -2740,8 +2745,12 @@ static int binder_fixup_parent(struct binder_transaction *t, + } + buffer_offset = bp->parent_offset + + (uintptr_t)parent->buffer - (uintptr_t)b->user_data; +- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, b, buffer_offset, +- &bp->buffer, sizeof(bp->buffer)); ++ if (binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, b, buffer_offset, ++ &bp->buffer, sizeof(bp->buffer))) { ++ binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction with invalid parent offset\n", ++ proc->pid, thread->pid); ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -3160,15 +3169,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, + goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed; + } + if (secctx) { ++ int err; + size_t buf_offset = ALIGN(tr->data_size, sizeof(void *)) + + ALIGN(tr->offsets_size, sizeof(void *)) + + ALIGN(extra_buffers_size, sizeof(void *)) - + ALIGN(secctx_sz, sizeof(u64)); + + t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t)t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset; +- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, +- t->buffer, buf_offset, +- secctx, secctx_sz); ++ err = binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, ++ t->buffer, buf_offset, ++ secctx, secctx_sz); ++ if (err) { ++ t->security_ctx = 0; ++ WARN_ON(1); ++ } + security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_sz); + secctx = NULL; + } +@@ -3234,11 +3248,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, + struct binder_object object; + binder_size_t object_offset; + +- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, +- &object_offset, +- t->buffer, +- buffer_offset, +- sizeof(object_offset)); ++ if (binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, ++ &object_offset, ++ t->buffer, ++ buffer_offset, ++ sizeof(object_offset))) { ++ return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; ++ return_error_param = -EINVAL; ++ return_error_line = __LINE__; ++ goto err_bad_offset; ++ } + object_size = binder_get_object(target_proc, t->buffer, + object_offset, &object); + if (object_size == 0 || object_offset < off_min) { +@@ -3262,15 +3281,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, + + fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr); + ret = binder_translate_binder(fp, t, thread); +- if (ret < 0) { ++ ++ if (ret < 0 || ++ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, ++ t->buffer, ++ object_offset, ++ fp, sizeof(*fp))) { + return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; + return_error_param = ret; + return_error_line = __LINE__; + goto err_translate_failed; + } +- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, +- t->buffer, object_offset, +- fp, sizeof(*fp)); + } break; + case BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE: + case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE: { +@@ -3278,15 +3299,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, + + fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr); + ret = binder_translate_handle(fp, t, thread); +- if (ret < 0) { ++ if (ret < 0 || ++ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, ++ t->buffer, ++ object_offset, ++ fp, sizeof(*fp))) { + return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; + return_error_param = ret; + return_error_line = __LINE__; + goto err_translate_failed; + } +- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, +- t->buffer, object_offset, +- fp, sizeof(*fp)); + } break; + + case BINDER_TYPE_FD: { +@@ -3296,16 +3318,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, + int ret = binder_translate_fd(fp->fd, fd_offset, t, + thread, in_reply_to); + +- if (ret < 0) { ++ fp->pad_binder = 0; ++ if (ret < 0 || ++ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, ++ t->buffer, ++ object_offset, ++ fp, sizeof(*fp))) { + return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; + return_error_param = ret; + return_error_line = __LINE__; + goto err_translate_failed; + } +- fp->pad_binder = 0; +- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, +- t->buffer, object_offset, +- fp, sizeof(*fp)); + } break; + case BINDER_TYPE_FDA: { + struct binder_object ptr_object; +@@ -3393,15 +3416,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, + num_valid, + last_fixup_obj_off, + last_fixup_min_off); +- if (ret < 0) { ++ if (ret < 0 || ++ binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, ++ t->buffer, ++ object_offset, ++ bp, sizeof(*bp))) { + return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; + return_error_param = ret; + return_error_line = __LINE__; + goto err_translate_failed; + } +- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&target_proc->alloc, +- t->buffer, object_offset, +- bp, sizeof(*bp)); + last_fixup_obj_off = object_offset; + last_fixup_min_off = 0; + } break; +@@ -4140,20 +4164,27 @@ static int binder_apply_fd_fixups(struct binder_proc *proc, + trace_binder_transaction_fd_recv(t, fd, fixup->offset); + fd_install(fd, fixup->file); + fixup->file = NULL; +- binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&proc->alloc, t->buffer, +- fixup->offset, &fd, +- sizeof(u32)); ++ if (binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(&proc->alloc, t->buffer, ++ fixup->offset, &fd, ++ sizeof(u32))) { ++ ret = -EINVAL; ++ break; ++ } + } + list_for_each_entry_safe(fixup, tmp, &t->fd_fixups, fixup_entry) { + if (fixup->file) { + fput(fixup->file); + } else if (ret) { + u32 fd; +- +- binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &fd, +- t->buffer, fixup->offset, +- sizeof(fd)); +- binder_deferred_fd_close(fd); ++ int err; ++ ++ err = binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(&proc->alloc, &fd, ++ t->buffer, ++ fixup->offset, ++ sizeof(fd)); ++ WARN_ON(err); ++ if (!err) ++ binder_deferred_fd_close(fd); + } + list_del(&fixup->fixup_entry); + kfree(fixup); +@@ -4268,6 +4299,8 @@ retry: + case BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE: { + binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc); + cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE; ++ kfree(w); ++ binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE); + if (put_user(cmd, (uint32_t __user *)ptr)) + return -EFAULT; + ptr += sizeof(uint32_t); +@@ -4276,8 +4309,6 @@ retry: + binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE, + "%d:%d BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE\n", + proc->pid, thread->pid); +- kfree(w); +- binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE); + } break; + case BINDER_WORK_NODE: { + struct binder_node *node = container_of(w, struct binder_node, work); +diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c +index ce5603c2291c..6d79a1b0d446 100644 +--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c ++++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c +@@ -1119,15 +1119,16 @@ binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc, + return 0; + } + +-static void binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc, +- bool to_buffer, +- struct binder_buffer *buffer, +- binder_size_t buffer_offset, +- void *ptr, +- size_t bytes) ++static int binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc, ++ bool to_buffer, ++ struct binder_buffer *buffer, ++ binder_size_t buffer_offset, ++ void *ptr, ++ size_t bytes) + { + /* All copies must be 32-bit aligned and 32-bit size */ +- BUG_ON(!check_buffer(alloc, buffer, buffer_offset, bytes)); ++ if (!check_buffer(alloc, buffer, buffer_offset, bytes)) ++ return -EINVAL; + + while (bytes) { + unsigned long size; +@@ -1155,25 +1156,26 @@ static void binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(struct binder_alloc *alloc, + ptr = ptr + size; + buffer_offset += size; + } ++ return 0; + } + +-void binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc, +- struct binder_buffer *buffer, +- binder_size_t buffer_offset, +- void *src, +- size_t bytes) ++int binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc, ++ struct binder_buffer *buffer, ++ binder_size_t buffer_offset, ++ void *src, ++ size_t bytes) + { +- binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, true, buffer, buffer_offset, +- src, bytes); ++ return binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, true, buffer, buffer_offset, ++ src, bytes); + } + +-void binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc, +- void *dest, +- struct binder_buffer *buffer, +- binder_size_t buffer_offset, +- size_t bytes) ++int binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc, ++ void *dest, ++ struct binder_buffer *buffer, ++ binder_size_t buffer_offset, ++ size_t bytes) + { +- binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, false, buffer, buffer_offset, +- dest, bytes); ++ return binder_alloc_do_buffer_copy(alloc, false, buffer, buffer_offset, ++ dest, bytes); + } + +diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h +index 71bfa95f8e09..db9c1b984695 100644 +--- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h ++++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h +@@ -159,17 +159,17 @@ binder_alloc_copy_user_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc, + const void __user *from, + size_t bytes); + +-void binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc, +- struct binder_buffer *buffer, +- binder_size_t buffer_offset, +- void *src, +- size_t bytes); +- +-void binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc, +- void *dest, +- struct binder_buffer *buffer, +- binder_size_t buffer_offset, +- size_t bytes); ++int binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc, ++ struct binder_buffer *buffer, ++ binder_size_t buffer_offset, ++ void *src, ++ size_t bytes); ++ ++int binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer(struct binder_alloc *alloc, ++ void *dest, ++ struct binder_buffer *buffer, ++ binder_size_t buffer_offset, ++ size_t bytes); + + #endif /* _LINUX_BINDER_ALLOC_H */ + +diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +index 90325e1749fb..d47ad10a35fe 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c ++++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +@@ -289,15 +289,15 @@ static int tpm_class_shutdown(struct device *dev) + { + struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, dev); + ++ down_write(&chip->ops_sem); + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { +- down_write(&chip->ops_sem); + if (!tpm_chip_start(chip)) { + tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_CLEAR); + tpm_chip_stop(chip); + } +- chip->ops = NULL; +- up_write(&chip->ops_sem); + } ++ chip->ops = NULL; ++ up_write(&chip->ops_sem); + + return 0; + } +diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c +index 85dcf2654d11..faacbe1ffa1a 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c ++++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c +@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ struct tpm1_get_random_out { + * + * Return: + * * number of bytes read +- * * -errno or a TPM return code otherwise ++ * * -errno (positive TPM return codes are masked to -EIO) + */ + int tpm1_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) + { +@@ -531,8 +531,11 @@ int tpm1_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, sizeof(out->rng_data_len), + "attempting get random"); +- if (rc) ++ if (rc) { ++ if (rc > 0) ++ rc = -EIO; + goto out; ++ } + + out = (struct tpm1_get_random_out *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; + +diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +index 4de49924cfc4..d103545e4055 100644 +--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c ++++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ struct tpm2_get_random_out { + * + * Return: + * size of the buffer on success, +- * -errno otherwise ++ * -errno otherwise (positive TPM return codes are masked to -EIO) + */ + int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) + { +@@ -324,8 +324,11 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) + offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, + buffer), + "attempting get random"); +- if (err) ++ if (err) { ++ if (err > 0) ++ err = -EIO; + goto out; ++ } + + out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *) + &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; +diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +index fbc7bf9d7380..427c78d4d948 100644 +--- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c ++++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +@@ -2339,7 +2339,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { + .base = { + .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))", + .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-" +- "cbc-aes-talitos", ++ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna", + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, + }, +@@ -2384,7 +2384,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { + .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1)," + "cbc(des3_ede))", + .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-" +- "cbc-3des-talitos", ++ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna", + .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, + }, +@@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { + .base = { + .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes))", + .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-" +- "cbc-aes-talitos", ++ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna", + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, + }, +@@ -2472,7 +2472,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { + .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224)," + "cbc(des3_ede))", + .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-" +- "cbc-3des-talitos", ++ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna", + .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, + }, +@@ -2515,7 +2515,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { + .base = { + .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))", + .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-" +- "cbc-aes-talitos", ++ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna", + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, + }, +@@ -2560,7 +2560,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { + .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256)," + "cbc(des3_ede))", + .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-" +- "cbc-3des-talitos", ++ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna", + .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, + }, +@@ -2689,7 +2689,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { + .base = { + .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(aes))", + .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-" +- "cbc-aes-talitos", ++ "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna", + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, + }, +@@ -2732,7 +2732,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { + .base = { + .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede))", + .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-" +- "cbc-3des-talitos", ++ "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna", + .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, + }, +diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +index b032d3899fa3..bfc584ada4eb 100644 +--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h ++++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +@@ -1241,6 +1241,7 @@ + #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_KEYBOARD 0x4e05 + #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_REZEL 0x4e72 + #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D0F 0x4d0f ++#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D65 0x4d65 + #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4E22 0x4e22 + + +diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c b/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c +index 671a285724f9..1549c7a2f04c 100644 +--- a/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c ++++ b/drivers/hid/hid-quirks.c +@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static const struct hid_device_id hid_quirks[] = { + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PIXART, USB_DEVICE_ID_PIXART_USB_OPTICAL_MOUSE), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_MOUSE_4D22), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D0F), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL }, ++ { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4D65), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRIMAX, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRIMAX_PIXART_MOUSE_4E22), HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PRODIGE, USB_DEVICE_ID_PRODIGE_CORDLESS), HID_QUIRK_NOGET }, + { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_QUANTA, USB_DEVICE_ID_QUANTA_OPTICAL_TOUCH_3001), HID_QUIRK_NOGET }, +diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c +index 4ee4c80a4354..543cc3d36e1d 100644 +--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c ++++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c +@@ -373,12 +373,10 @@ static void *etb_alloc_buffer(struct coresight_device *csdev, + struct perf_event *event, void **pages, + int nr_pages, bool overwrite) + { +- int node, cpu = event->cpu; ++ int node; + struct cs_buffers *buf; + +- if (cpu == -1) +- cpu = smp_processor_id(); +- node = cpu_to_node(cpu); ++ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu); + + buf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct cs_buffers), GFP_KERNEL, node); + if (!buf) +diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c +index 16b0c0e1e43a..ad6e16c96263 100644 +--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c ++++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-funnel.c +@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ static int funnel_probe(struct device *dev, struct resource *res) + } + + pm_runtime_put(dev); ++ ret = 0; + + out_disable_clk: + if (ret && !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drvdata->atclk)) +diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c +index 2527b5d3b65e..8de109de171f 100644 +--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c ++++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c +@@ -378,12 +378,10 @@ static void *tmc_alloc_etf_buffer(struct coresight_device *csdev, + struct perf_event *event, void **pages, + int nr_pages, bool overwrite) + { +- int node, cpu = event->cpu; ++ int node; + struct cs_buffers *buf; + +- if (cpu == -1) +- cpu = smp_processor_id(); +- node = cpu_to_node(cpu); ++ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu); + + /* Allocate memory structure for interaction with Perf */ + buf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct cs_buffers), GFP_KERNEL, node); +diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c +index df6e4b0b84e9..9f293b9dce8c 100644 +--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c ++++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c +@@ -1178,14 +1178,11 @@ static struct etr_buf * + alloc_etr_buf(struct tmc_drvdata *drvdata, struct perf_event *event, + int nr_pages, void **pages, bool snapshot) + { +- int node, cpu = event->cpu; ++ int node; + struct etr_buf *etr_buf; + unsigned long size; + +- if (cpu == -1) +- cpu = smp_processor_id(); +- node = cpu_to_node(cpu); +- ++ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu); + /* + * Try to match the perf ring buffer size if it is larger + * than the size requested via sysfs. +@@ -1317,13 +1314,11 @@ static struct etr_perf_buffer * + tmc_etr_setup_perf_buf(struct tmc_drvdata *drvdata, struct perf_event *event, + int nr_pages, void **pages, bool snapshot) + { +- int node, cpu = event->cpu; ++ int node; + struct etr_buf *etr_buf; + struct etr_perf_buffer *etr_perf; + +- if (cpu == -1) +- cpu = smp_processor_id(); +- node = cpu_to_node(cpu); ++ node = (event->cpu == -1) ? NUMA_NO_NODE : cpu_to_node(event->cpu); + + etr_perf = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*etr_perf), GFP_KERNEL, node); + if (!etr_perf) +diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c +index 2327ec18b40c..1f7ce5186dfc 100644 +--- a/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c ++++ b/drivers/iio/adc/stm32-adc-core.c +@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg { + * @domain: irq domain reference + * @aclk: clock reference for the analog circuitry + * @bclk: bus clock common for all ADCs, depends on part used ++ * @vdda: vdda analog supply reference + * @vref: regulator reference + * @cfg: compatible configuration data + * @common: common data for all ADC instances +@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ struct stm32_adc_priv { + struct irq_domain *domain; + struct clk *aclk; + struct clk *bclk; ++ struct regulator *vdda; + struct regulator *vref; + const struct stm32_adc_priv_cfg *cfg; + struct stm32_adc_common common; +@@ -394,10 +396,16 @@ static int stm32_adc_core_hw_start(struct device *dev) + struct stm32_adc_priv *priv = to_stm32_adc_priv(common); + int ret; + ++ ret = regulator_enable(priv->vdda); ++ if (ret < 0) { ++ dev_err(dev, "vdda enable failed %d\n", ret); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ + ret = regulator_enable(priv->vref); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "vref enable failed\n"); +- return ret; ++ goto err_vdda_disable; + } + + if (priv->bclk) { +@@ -425,6 +433,8 @@ err_bclk_disable: + clk_disable_unprepare(priv->bclk); + err_regulator_disable: + regulator_disable(priv->vref); ++err_vdda_disable: ++ regulator_disable(priv->vdda); + + return ret; + } +@@ -441,6 +451,7 @@ static void stm32_adc_core_hw_stop(struct device *dev) + if (priv->bclk) + clk_disable_unprepare(priv->bclk); + regulator_disable(priv->vref); ++ regulator_disable(priv->vdda); + } + + static int stm32_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +@@ -468,6 +479,14 @@ static int stm32_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) + return PTR_ERR(priv->common.base); + priv->common.phys_base = res->start; + ++ priv->vdda = devm_regulator_get(&pdev->dev, "vdda"); ++ if (IS_ERR(priv->vdda)) { ++ ret = PTR_ERR(priv->vdda); ++ if (ret != -EPROBE_DEFER) ++ dev_err(&pdev->dev, "vdda get failed, %d\n", ret); ++ return ret; ++ } ++ + priv->vref = devm_regulator_get(&pdev->dev, "vref"); + if (IS_ERR(priv->vref)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(priv->vref); +diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c +index dac396c95a59..6d5962d5697a 100644 +--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c ++++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0297.c +@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static const struct dvb_frontend_ops stv0297_ops = { + .delsys = { SYS_DVBC_ANNEX_A }, + .info = { + .name = "ST STV0297 DVB-C", +- .frequency_min_hz = 470 * MHz, ++ .frequency_min_hz = 47 * MHz, + .frequency_max_hz = 862 * MHz, + .frequency_stepsize_hz = 62500, + .symbol_rate_min = 870000, +diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile +index 951c984de61a..fb10eafe9bde 100644 +--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile ++++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/Makefile +@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_rodata.o := n + + OBJCOPYFLAGS := + OBJCOPYFLAGS_rodata_objcopy.o := \ +- --set-section-flags .text=alloc,readonly \ +- --rename-section .text=.rodata ++ --rename-section .text=.rodata,alloc,readonly,load + targets += rodata.o rodata_objcopy.o + $(obj)/rodata_objcopy.o: $(obj)/rodata.o FORCE + $(call if_changed,objcopy) +diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c +index 300ed69fe2c7..16695366ec92 100644 +--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c ++++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c +@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ + #include "vmci_driver.h" + #include "vmci_event.h" + ++/* Use a wide upper bound for the maximum contexts. */ ++#define VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS 2000 ++ + /* + * List of current VMCI contexts. Contexts can be added by + * vmci_ctx_create() and removed via vmci_ctx_destroy(). +@@ -117,19 +120,22 @@ struct vmci_ctx *vmci_ctx_create(u32 cid, u32 priv_flags, + /* Initialize host-specific VMCI context. */ + init_waitqueue_head(&context->host_context.wait_queue); + +- context->queue_pair_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0); ++ context->queue_pair_array = ++ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT); + if (!context->queue_pair_array) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto err_free_ctx; + } + +- context->doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0); ++ context->doorbell_array = ++ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT); + if (!context->doorbell_array) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto err_free_qp_array; + } + +- context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0); ++ context->pending_doorbell_array = ++ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT); + if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto err_free_db_array; +@@ -204,7 +210,7 @@ static int ctx_fire_notification(u32 context_id, u32 priv_flags) + * We create an array to hold the subscribers we find when + * scanning through all contexts. + */ +- subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0); ++ subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS); + if (subscriber_array == NULL) + return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM; + +@@ -623,20 +629,26 @@ int vmci_ctx_add_notification(u32 context_id, u32 remote_cid) + + spin_lock(&context->lock); + +- list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) { +- if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) { +- exists = true; +- break; ++ if (context->n_notifiers < VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS) { ++ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) { ++ if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) { ++ exists = true; ++ break; ++ } + } +- } + +- if (exists) { +- kfree(notifier); +- result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS; ++ if (exists) { ++ kfree(notifier); ++ result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS; ++ } else { ++ list_add_tail_rcu(¬ifier->node, ++ &context->notifier_list); ++ context->n_notifiers++; ++ result = VMCI_SUCCESS; ++ } + } else { +- list_add_tail_rcu(¬ifier->node, &context->notifier_list); +- context->n_notifiers++; +- result = VMCI_SUCCESS; ++ kfree(notifier); ++ result = VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM; + } + + spin_unlock(&context->lock); +@@ -721,8 +733,7 @@ static int vmci_ctx_get_chkpt_doorbells(struct vmci_ctx *context, + u32 *buf_size, void **pbuf) + { + struct dbell_cpt_state *dbells; +- size_t n_doorbells; +- int i; ++ u32 i, n_doorbells; + + n_doorbells = vmci_handle_arr_get_size(context->doorbell_array); + if (n_doorbells > 0) { +@@ -860,7 +871,8 @@ int vmci_ctx_rcv_notifications_get(u32 context_id, + spin_lock(&context->lock); + + *db_handle_array = context->pending_doorbell_array; +- context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0); ++ context->pending_doorbell_array = ++ vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT); + if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) { + context->pending_doorbell_array = *db_handle_array; + *db_handle_array = NULL; +@@ -942,12 +954,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_dbell_create(u32 context_id, struct vmci_handle handle) + return VMCI_ERROR_NOT_FOUND; + + spin_lock(&context->lock); +- if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle)) { +- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array, handle); +- result = VMCI_SUCCESS; +- } else { ++ if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle)) ++ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array, ++ handle); ++ else + result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY; +- } + + spin_unlock(&context->lock); + vmci_ctx_put(context); +@@ -1083,15 +1094,16 @@ int vmci_ctx_notify_dbell(u32 src_cid, + if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry( + dst_context->pending_doorbell_array, + handle)) { +- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry( ++ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry( + &dst_context->pending_doorbell_array, + handle); +- +- ctx_signal_notify(dst_context); +- wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue); +- ++ if (result == VMCI_SUCCESS) { ++ ctx_signal_notify(dst_context); ++ wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue); ++ } ++ } else { ++ result = VMCI_SUCCESS; + } +- result = VMCI_SUCCESS; + } + spin_unlock(&dst_context->lock); + } +@@ -1118,13 +1130,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_qp_create(struct vmci_ctx *context, struct vmci_handle handle) + if (context == NULL || vmci_handle_is_invalid(handle)) + return VMCI_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS; + +- if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle)) { +- vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->queue_pair_array, +- handle); +- result = VMCI_SUCCESS; +- } else { ++ if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle)) ++ result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry( ++ &context->queue_pair_array, handle); ++ else + result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY; +- } + + return result; + } +diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c +index c527388f5d7b..de7fee7ead1b 100644 +--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c ++++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c +@@ -8,24 +8,29 @@ + #include <linux/slab.h> + #include "vmci_handle_array.h" + +-static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(size_t capacity) ++static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(u32 capacity) + { +- return sizeof(struct vmci_handle_arr) + ++ return VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE + + capacity * sizeof(struct vmci_handle); + } + +-struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity) ++struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity) + { + struct vmci_handle_arr *array; + ++ if (max_capacity == 0 || capacity > max_capacity) ++ return NULL; ++ + if (capacity == 0) +- capacity = VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE; ++ capacity = min((u32)VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY, ++ max_capacity); + + array = kmalloc(handle_arr_calc_size(capacity), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!array) + return NULL; + + array->capacity = capacity; ++ array->max_capacity = max_capacity; + array->size = 0; + + return array; +@@ -36,27 +41,34 @@ void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array) + kfree(array); + } + +-void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr, +- struct vmci_handle handle) ++int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr, ++ struct vmci_handle handle) + { + struct vmci_handle_arr *array = *array_ptr; + + if (unlikely(array->size >= array->capacity)) { + /* reallocate. */ + struct vmci_handle_arr *new_array; +- size_t new_capacity = array->capacity * VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT; +- size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(new_capacity); ++ u32 capacity_bump = min(array->max_capacity - array->capacity, ++ array->capacity); ++ size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(array->capacity + ++ capacity_bump); ++ ++ if (array->size >= array->max_capacity) ++ return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM; + + new_array = krealloc(array, new_size, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!new_array) +- return; ++ return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM; + +- new_array->capacity = new_capacity; ++ new_array->capacity += capacity_bump; + *array_ptr = array = new_array; + } + + array->entries[array->size] = handle; + array->size++; ++ ++ return VMCI_SUCCESS; + } + + /* +@@ -66,7 +78,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array, + struct vmci_handle entry_handle) + { + struct vmci_handle handle = VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE; +- size_t i; ++ u32 i; + + for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++) { + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle)) { +@@ -101,7 +113,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array) + * Handle at given index, VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE if invalid index. + */ + struct vmci_handle +-vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index) ++vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index) + { + if (unlikely(index >= array->size)) + return VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE; +@@ -112,7 +124,7 @@ vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index) + bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, + struct vmci_handle entry_handle) + { +- size_t i; ++ u32 i; + + for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++) + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle)) +diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h +index bd1559a548e9..96193f85be5b 100644 +--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h ++++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h +@@ -9,32 +9,41 @@ + #define _VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_H_ + + #include <linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h> ++#include <linux/limits.h> + #include <linux/types.h> + +-#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE 4 +-#define VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT 2 /* Array capacity multiplier */ +- + struct vmci_handle_arr { +- size_t capacity; +- size_t size; ++ u32 capacity; ++ u32 max_capacity; ++ u32 size; ++ u32 pad; + struct vmci_handle entries[]; + }; + +-struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity); ++#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE \ ++ offsetof(struct vmci_handle_arr, entries) ++/* Select a default capacity that results in a 64 byte sized array */ ++#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY 6 ++/* Make sure that the max array size can be expressed by a u32 */ ++#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_MAX_CAPACITY \ ++ ((U32_MAX - VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE - 1) / \ ++ sizeof(struct vmci_handle)) ++ ++struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity); + void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array); +-void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr, +- struct vmci_handle handle); ++int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr, ++ struct vmci_handle handle); + struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array, + struct vmci_handle + entry_handle); + struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array); + struct vmci_handle +-vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index); ++vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index); + bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, + struct vmci_handle entry_handle); + struct vmci_handle *vmci_handle_arr_get_handles(struct vmci_handle_arr *array); + +-static inline size_t vmci_handle_arr_get_size( ++static inline u32 vmci_handle_arr_get_size( + const struct vmci_handle_arr *array) + { + return array->size; +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c +index e7c3f3b8457d..99f1897a775d 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c +@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id carl9170_usb_ids[] = { + }; + MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, carl9170_usb_ids); + ++static struct usb_driver carl9170_driver; ++ + static void carl9170_usb_submit_data_urb(struct ar9170 *ar) + { + struct urb *urb; +@@ -966,32 +968,28 @@ err_out: + + static void carl9170_usb_firmware_failed(struct ar9170 *ar) + { +- struct device *parent = ar->udev->dev.parent; +- struct usb_device *udev; +- +- /* +- * Store a copy of the usb_device pointer locally. +- * This is because device_release_driver initiates +- * carl9170_usb_disconnect, which in turn frees our +- * driver context (ar). ++ /* Store a copies of the usb_interface and usb_device pointer locally. ++ * This is because release_driver initiates carl9170_usb_disconnect, ++ * which in turn frees our driver context (ar). + */ +- udev = ar->udev; ++ struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf; ++ struct usb_device *udev = ar->udev; + + complete(&ar->fw_load_wait); ++ /* at this point 'ar' could be already freed. Don't use it anymore */ ++ ar = NULL; + + /* unbind anything failed */ +- if (parent) +- device_lock(parent); +- +- device_release_driver(&udev->dev); +- if (parent) +- device_unlock(parent); ++ usb_lock_device(udev); ++ usb_driver_release_interface(&carl9170_driver, intf); ++ usb_unlock_device(udev); + +- usb_put_dev(udev); ++ usb_put_intf(intf); + } + + static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar) + { ++ struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf; + int err; + + err = carl9170_parse_firmware(ar); +@@ -1009,7 +1007,7 @@ static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar) + goto err_unrx; + + complete(&ar->fw_load_wait); +- usb_put_dev(ar->udev); ++ usb_put_intf(intf); + return; + + err_unrx: +@@ -1052,7 +1050,6 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, + return PTR_ERR(ar); + + udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf); +- usb_get_dev(udev); + ar->udev = udev; + ar->intf = intf; + ar->features = id->driver_info; +@@ -1094,15 +1091,14 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, + atomic_set(&ar->rx_anch_urbs, 0); + atomic_set(&ar->rx_pool_urbs, 0); + +- usb_get_dev(ar->udev); ++ usb_get_intf(intf); + + carl9170_set_state(ar, CARL9170_STOPPED); + + err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, CARL9170FW_NAME, + &ar->udev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, ar, carl9170_usb_firmware_step2); + if (err) { +- usb_put_dev(udev); +- usb_put_dev(udev); ++ usb_put_intf(intf); + carl9170_free(ar); + } + return err; +@@ -1131,7 +1127,6 @@ static void carl9170_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) + + carl9170_release_firmware(ar); + carl9170_free(ar); +- usb_put_dev(udev); + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_PM +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c +index f937815f0f2c..b94764c88750 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c +@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("prism54usb"); + MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3886usb"); + MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3887usb"); + ++static struct usb_driver p54u_driver; ++ + /* + * Note: + * +@@ -918,9 +920,9 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware, + { + struct p54u_priv *priv = context; + struct usb_device *udev = priv->udev; ++ struct usb_interface *intf = priv->intf; + int err; + +- complete(&priv->fw_wait_load); + if (firmware) { + priv->fw = firmware; + err = p54u_start_ops(priv); +@@ -929,26 +931,22 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware, + dev_err(&udev->dev, "Firmware not found.\n"); + } + +- if (err) { +- struct device *parent = priv->udev->dev.parent; +- +- dev_err(&udev->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err); +- +- if (parent) +- device_lock(parent); ++ complete(&priv->fw_wait_load); ++ /* ++ * At this point p54u_disconnect may have already freed ++ * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore! ++ */ ++ priv = NULL; + +- device_release_driver(&udev->dev); +- /* +- * At this point p54u_disconnect has already freed +- * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore! +- */ +- priv = NULL; ++ if (err) { ++ dev_err(&intf->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err); + +- if (parent) +- device_unlock(parent); ++ usb_lock_device(udev); ++ usb_driver_release_interface(&p54u_driver, intf); ++ usb_unlock_device(udev); + } + +- usb_put_dev(udev); ++ usb_put_intf(intf); + } + + static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, +@@ -969,14 +967,14 @@ static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, + dev_info(&priv->udev->dev, "Loading firmware file %s\n", + p54u_fwlist[i].fw); + +- usb_get_dev(udev); ++ usb_get_intf(intf); + err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, p54u_fwlist[i].fw, + device, GFP_KERNEL, priv, + p54u_load_firmware_cb); + if (err) { + dev_err(&priv->udev->dev, "(p54usb) cannot load firmware %s " + "(%d)!\n", p54u_fwlist[i].fw, err); +- usb_put_dev(udev); ++ usb_put_intf(intf); + } + + return err; +@@ -1008,8 +1006,6 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, + skb_queue_head_init(&priv->rx_queue); + init_usb_anchor(&priv->submitted); + +- usb_get_dev(udev); +- + /* really lazy and simple way of figuring out if we're a 3887 */ + /* TODO: should just stick the identification in the device table */ + i = intf->altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints; +@@ -1050,10 +1046,8 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, + priv->upload_fw = p54u_upload_firmware_net2280; + } + err = p54u_load_firmware(dev, intf); +- if (err) { +- usb_put_dev(udev); ++ if (err) + p54_free_common(dev); +- } + return err; + } + +@@ -1069,7 +1063,6 @@ static void p54u_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) + wait_for_completion(&priv->fw_wait_load); + p54_unregister_common(dev); + +- usb_put_dev(interface_to_usbdev(intf)); + release_firmware(priv->fw); + p54_free_common(dev); + } +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c +index ff9acd1563f4..5892898f8853 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/txrx.c +@@ -139,7 +139,10 @@ static int p54_assign_address(struct p54_common *priv, struct sk_buff *skb) + unlikely(GET_HW_QUEUE(skb) == P54_QUEUE_BEACON)) + priv->beacon_req_id = data->req_id; + +- __skb_queue_after(&priv->tx_queue, target_skb, skb); ++ if (target_skb) ++ __skb_queue_after(&priv->tx_queue, target_skb, skb); ++ else ++ __skb_queue_head(&priv->tx_queue, skb); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->tx_queue.lock, flags); + return 0; + } +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h +index b73f99dc5a72..1fb76d2f5d3f 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h +@@ -1759,9 +1759,10 @@ struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmm_queue_status { + struct ieee_types_vendor_header { + u8 element_id; + u8 len; +- u8 oui[4]; /* 0~2: oui, 3: oui_type */ +- u8 oui_subtype; +- u8 version; ++ struct { ++ u8 oui[3]; ++ u8 oui_type; ++ } __packed oui; + } __packed; + + struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter { +@@ -1775,6 +1776,9 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter { + * Version [1] + */ + struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr; ++ u8 oui_subtype; ++ u8 version; ++ + u8 qos_info_bitmap; + u8 reserved; + struct ieee_types_wmm_ac_parameters ac_params[IEEE80211_NUM_ACS]; +@@ -1792,6 +1796,8 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_info { + * Version [1] + */ + struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr; ++ u8 oui_subtype; ++ u8 version; + + u8 qos_info_bitmap; + } __packed; +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +index c269a0de9413..e2786ab612ca 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +@@ -1361,21 +1361,25 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, + break; + + case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: +- if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr)) +- return -EINVAL; +- + vendor_ie = (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *) + current_ptr; + +- if (!memcmp +- (vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui, +- sizeof(wpa_oui))) { ++ /* 802.11 requires at least 3-byte OUI. */ ++ if (element_len < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui.oui)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ /* Not long enough for a match? Skip it. */ ++ if (element_len < sizeof(wpa_oui)) ++ break; ++ ++ if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui, ++ sizeof(wpa_oui))) { + bss_entry->bcn_wpa_ie = + (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *) + current_ptr; + bss_entry->wpa_offset = (u16) + (current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf); +- } else if (!memcmp(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui, ++ } else if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui, + sizeof(wmm_oui))) { + if (total_ie_len == + sizeof(struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter) || +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c +index ebc0e41e5d3b..74e50566db1f 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c +@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr, + /* Test to see if it is a WPA IE, if not, then + * it is a gen IE + */ +- if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui, ++ if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui, + sizeof(wpa_oui))) { + /* IE is a WPA/WPA2 IE so call set_wpa function + */ +@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr, + goto next_ie; + } + +- if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui, ++ if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui, + sizeof(wps_oui))) { + /* Test to see if it is a WPS IE, + * if so, enable wps session flag +diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c +index 407b9932ca4d..64916ba15df5 100644 +--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c ++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c +@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ mwifiex_wmm_setup_queue_priorities(struct mwifiex_private *priv, + mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, INFO, + "info: WMM Parameter IE: version=%d,\t" + "qos_info Parameter Set Count=%d, Reserved=%#x\n", +- wmm_ie->vend_hdr.version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap & ++ wmm_ie->version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap & + IEEE80211_WMM_IE_AP_QOSINFO_PARAM_SET_CNT_MASK, + wmm_ie->reserved); + +diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c +index 65f60c2b702a..f7e673121864 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c +@@ -2330,7 +2330,8 @@ static irqreturn_t pci230_interrupt(int irq, void *d) + devpriv->intr_running = false; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devpriv->isr_spinlock, irqflags); + +- comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao); ++ if (s_ao) ++ comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao); + comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ai); + + return IRQ_HANDLED; +diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c +index 3be927f1d3a9..e15e33ed94ae 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c +@@ -557,7 +557,8 @@ static irqreturn_t dt282x_interrupt(int irq, void *d) + } + #endif + comedi_handle_events(dev, s); +- comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao); ++ if (s_ao) ++ comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao); + + return IRQ_RETVAL(handled); + } +diff --git a/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c b/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c +index e3c3e427309a..f73edaf6ce87 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/fsl-dpaa2/ethsw/ethsw.c +@@ -1086,6 +1086,7 @@ static int port_switchdev_event(struct notifier_block *unused, + dev_hold(dev); + break; + default: ++ kfree(switchdev_work); + return NOTIFY_DONE; + } + +diff --git a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c +index 03d919a94552..93763d40e3a1 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pci/pci-mt7621.c +@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ + /* MediaTek specific configuration registers */ + #define PCIE_FTS_NUM 0x70c + #define PCIE_FTS_NUM_MASK GENMASK(15, 8) +-#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0(x) ((x) & 0xff << 8) ++#define PCIE_FTS_NUM_L0(x) (((x) & 0xff) << 8) + + /* rt_sysc_membase relative registers */ + #define RALINK_PCIE_CLK_GEN 0x7c +diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c +index a7230c0c7b23..8f5a8ac1b010 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl871x_ioctl_linux.c +@@ -124,10 +124,91 @@ static inline void handle_group_key(struct ieee_param *param, + } + } + +-static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter, +- struct iw_request_info *info, +- struct wlan_network *pnetwork, +- char *start, char *stop) ++static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan_wpa(struct iw_request_info *info, ++ struct wlan_network *pnetwork, ++ struct iw_event *iwe, ++ char *start, char *stop) ++{ ++ /* parsing WPA/WPA2 IE */ ++ u8 buf[MAX_WPA_IE_LEN]; ++ u8 wpa_ie[255], rsn_ie[255]; ++ u16 wpa_len = 0, rsn_len = 0; ++ int n, i; ++ ++ r8712_get_sec_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs, ++ pnetwork->network.IELength, rsn_ie, &rsn_len, ++ wpa_ie, &wpa_len); ++ if (wpa_len > 0) { ++ memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN); ++ n = sprintf(buf, "wpa_ie="); ++ for (i = 0; i < wpa_len; i++) { ++ n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n, ++ "%02x", wpa_ie[i]); ++ if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN) ++ break; ++ } ++ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe)); ++ iwe->cmd = IWEVCUSTOM; ++ iwe->u.data.length = (u16)strlen(buf); ++ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, ++ iwe, buf); ++ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe)); ++ iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE; ++ iwe->u.data.length = (u16)wpa_len; ++ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, ++ iwe, wpa_ie); ++ } ++ if (rsn_len > 0) { ++ memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN); ++ n = sprintf(buf, "rsn_ie="); ++ for (i = 0; i < rsn_len; i++) { ++ n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n, ++ "%02x", rsn_ie[i]); ++ if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN) ++ break; ++ } ++ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe)); ++ iwe->cmd = IWEVCUSTOM; ++ iwe->u.data.length = strlen(buf); ++ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, ++ iwe, buf); ++ memset(iwe, 0, sizeof(*iwe)); ++ iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE; ++ iwe->u.data.length = rsn_len; ++ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, iwe, ++ rsn_ie); ++ } ++ ++ return start; ++} ++ ++static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan_wps(struct iw_request_info *info, ++ struct wlan_network *pnetwork, ++ struct iw_event *iwe, ++ char *start, char *stop) ++{ ++ /* parsing WPS IE */ ++ u8 wps_ie[512]; ++ uint wps_ielen; ++ ++ if (r8712_get_wps_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs, ++ pnetwork->network.IELength, ++ wps_ie, &wps_ielen)) { ++ if (wps_ielen > 2) { ++ iwe->cmd = IWEVGENIE; ++ iwe->u.data.length = (u16)wps_ielen; ++ start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, ++ iwe, wps_ie); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return start; ++} ++ ++static char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter, ++ struct iw_request_info *info, ++ struct wlan_network *pnetwork, ++ char *start, char *stop) + { + struct iw_event iwe; + struct ieee80211_ht_cap *pht_capie; +@@ -240,73 +321,11 @@ static noinline_for_stack char *translate_scan(struct _adapter *padapter, + /* Check if we added any event */ + if ((current_val - start) > iwe_stream_lcp_len(info)) + start = current_val; +- /* parsing WPA/WPA2 IE */ +- { +- u8 buf[MAX_WPA_IE_LEN]; +- u8 wpa_ie[255], rsn_ie[255]; +- u16 wpa_len = 0, rsn_len = 0; +- int n; +- +- r8712_get_sec_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs, +- pnetwork->network.IELength, rsn_ie, &rsn_len, +- wpa_ie, &wpa_len); +- if (wpa_len > 0) { +- memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN); +- n = sprintf(buf, "wpa_ie="); +- for (i = 0; i < wpa_len; i++) { +- n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n, +- "%02x", wpa_ie[i]); +- if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN) +- break; +- } +- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe)); +- iwe.cmd = IWEVCUSTOM; +- iwe.u.data.length = (u16)strlen(buf); +- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, +- &iwe, buf); +- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe)); +- iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE; +- iwe.u.data.length = (u16)wpa_len; +- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, +- &iwe, wpa_ie); +- } +- if (rsn_len > 0) { +- memset(buf, 0, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN); +- n = sprintf(buf, "rsn_ie="); +- for (i = 0; i < rsn_len; i++) { +- n += snprintf(buf + n, MAX_WPA_IE_LEN - n, +- "%02x", rsn_ie[i]); +- if (n >= MAX_WPA_IE_LEN) +- break; +- } +- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe)); +- iwe.cmd = IWEVCUSTOM; +- iwe.u.data.length = strlen(buf); +- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, +- &iwe, buf); +- memset(&iwe, 0, sizeof(iwe)); +- iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE; +- iwe.u.data.length = rsn_len; +- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, &iwe, +- rsn_ie); +- } +- } + +- { /* parsing WPS IE */ +- u8 wps_ie[512]; +- uint wps_ielen; ++ start = translate_scan_wpa(info, pnetwork, &iwe, start, stop); ++ ++ start = translate_scan_wps(info, pnetwork, &iwe, start, stop); + +- if (r8712_get_wps_ie(pnetwork->network.IEs, +- pnetwork->network.IELength, +- wps_ie, &wps_ielen)) { +- if (wps_ielen > 2) { +- iwe.cmd = IWEVGENIE; +- iwe.u.data.length = (u16)wps_ielen; +- start = iwe_stream_add_point(info, start, stop, +- &iwe, wps_ie); +- } +- } +- } + /* Add quality statistics */ + iwe.cmd = IWEVQUAL; + rssi = r8712_signal_scale_mapping(pnetwork->network.Rssi); +diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c +index 68f08dc18da9..5e9187edeef4 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/bcm2835-camera.c +@@ -336,16 +336,13 @@ static void buffer_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance, + return; + } else if (length == 0) { + /* stream ended */ +- if (buf) { +- /* this should only ever happen if the port is +- * disabled and there are buffers still queued ++ if (dev->capture.frame_count) { ++ /* empty buffer whilst capturing - expected to be an ++ * EOS, so grab another frame + */ +- vb2_buffer_done(&buf->vb.vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR); +- pr_debug("Empty buffer"); +- } else if (dev->capture.frame_count) { +- /* grab another frame */ + if (is_capturing(dev)) { +- pr_debug("Grab another frame"); ++ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev, ++ "Grab another frame"); + vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set( + instance, + dev->capture.camera_port, +@@ -353,8 +350,14 @@ static void buffer_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance, + &dev->capture.frame_count, + sizeof(dev->capture.frame_count)); + } ++ if (vchiq_mmal_submit_buffer(instance, port, buf)) ++ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev, ++ "Failed to return EOS buffer"); + } else { +- /* signal frame completion */ ++ /* stopping streaming. ++ * return buffer, and signal frame completion ++ */ ++ vb2_buffer_done(&buf->vb.vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR); + complete(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt); + } + } else { +@@ -576,6 +579,7 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq) + int ret; + unsigned long timeout; + struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev = vb2_get_drv_priv(vq); ++ struct vchiq_mmal_port *port = dev->capture.port; + + v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev, "%s: dev:%p\n", + __func__, dev); +@@ -599,12 +603,6 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq) + &dev->capture.frame_count, + sizeof(dev->capture.frame_count)); + +- /* wait for last frame to complete */ +- timeout = wait_for_completion_timeout(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt, HZ); +- if (timeout == 0) +- v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, +- "timed out waiting for frame completion\n"); +- + v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev, + "disabling connection\n"); + +@@ -619,6 +617,21 @@ static void stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *vq) + ret); + } + ++ /* wait for all buffers to be returned */ ++ while (atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu)) { ++ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev, ++ "%s: Waiting for buffers to be returned - %d outstanding\n", ++ __func__, atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu)); ++ timeout = wait_for_completion_timeout(&dev->capture.frame_cmplt, ++ HZ); ++ if (timeout == 0) { ++ v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "%s: Timeout waiting for buffers to be returned - %d outstanding\n", ++ __func__, ++ atomic_read(&port->buffers_with_vpu)); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ + if (disable_camera(dev) < 0) + v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to disable camera\n"); + } +diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c +index dade79738a29..12ac3ef61fe6 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/controls.c +@@ -603,15 +603,28 @@ static int ctrl_set_bitrate(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev, + struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl, + const struct bm2835_mmal_v4l2_ctrl *mmal_ctrl) + { ++ int ret; + struct vchiq_mmal_port *encoder_out; + + dev->capture.encode_bitrate = ctrl->val; + + encoder_out = &dev->component[MMAL_COMPONENT_VIDEO_ENCODE]->output[0]; + +- return vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(dev->instance, encoder_out, +- mmal_ctrl->mmal_id, &ctrl->val, +- sizeof(ctrl->val)); ++ ret = vchiq_mmal_port_parameter_set(dev->instance, encoder_out, ++ mmal_ctrl->mmal_id, &ctrl->val, ++ sizeof(ctrl->val)); ++ ++ v4l2_dbg(1, bcm2835_v4l2_debug, &dev->v4l2_dev, ++ "%s: After: mmal_ctrl:%p ctrl id:0x%x ctrl val:%d ret %d(%d)\n", ++ __func__, mmal_ctrl, ctrl->id, ctrl->val, ret, ++ (ret == 0 ? 0 : -EINVAL)); ++ ++ /* ++ * Older firmware versions (pre July 2019) have a bug in handling ++ * MMAL_PARAMETER_VIDEO_BIT_RATE that result in the call ++ * returning -MMAL_MSG_STATUS_EINVAL. So ignore errors from this call. ++ */ ++ return 0; + } + + static int ctrl_set_bitrate_mode(struct bm2835_mmal_dev *dev, +diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c +index 16af735af5c3..29761f6c3b55 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.c +@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ struct vchiq_mmal_instance { + void *bulk_scratch; + + struct idr context_map; +- spinlock_t context_map_lock; ++ /* protect accesses to context_map */ ++ struct mutex context_map_lock; + + /* component to use next */ + int component_idx; +@@ -184,10 +185,10 @@ get_msg_context(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance) + * that when we service the VCHI reply, we can look up what + * message is being replied to. + */ +- spin_lock(&instance->context_map_lock); ++ mutex_lock(&instance->context_map_lock); + handle = idr_alloc(&instance->context_map, msg_context, + 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL); +- spin_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock); ++ mutex_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock); + + if (handle < 0) { + kfree(msg_context); +@@ -211,9 +212,9 @@ release_msg_context(struct mmal_msg_context *msg_context) + { + struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance = msg_context->instance; + +- spin_lock(&instance->context_map_lock); ++ mutex_lock(&instance->context_map_lock); + idr_remove(&instance->context_map, msg_context->handle); +- spin_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock); ++ mutex_unlock(&instance->context_map_lock); + kfree(msg_context); + } + +@@ -239,6 +240,8 @@ static void buffer_work_cb(struct work_struct *work) + struct mmal_msg_context *msg_context = + container_of(work, struct mmal_msg_context, u.bulk.work); + ++ atomic_dec(&msg_context->u.bulk.port->buffers_with_vpu); ++ + msg_context->u.bulk.port->buffer_cb(msg_context->u.bulk.instance, + msg_context->u.bulk.port, + msg_context->u.bulk.status, +@@ -287,8 +290,6 @@ static int bulk_receive(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance, + + /* store length */ + msg_context->u.bulk.buffer_used = rd_len; +- msg_context->u.bulk.mmal_flags = +- msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.flags; + msg_context->u.bulk.dts = msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.dts; + msg_context->u.bulk.pts = msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.pts; + +@@ -379,6 +380,8 @@ buffer_from_host(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance, + /* initialise work structure ready to schedule callback */ + INIT_WORK(&msg_context->u.bulk.work, buffer_work_cb); + ++ atomic_inc(&port->buffers_with_vpu); ++ + /* prep the buffer from host message */ + memset(&m, 0xbc, sizeof(m)); /* just to make debug clearer */ + +@@ -447,6 +450,9 @@ static void buffer_to_host_cb(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance, + return; + } + ++ msg_context->u.bulk.mmal_flags = ++ msg->u.buffer_from_host.buffer_header.flags; ++ + if (msg->h.status != MMAL_MSG_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + /* message reception had an error */ + pr_warn("error %d in reply\n", msg->h.status); +@@ -1323,16 +1329,6 @@ static int port_enable(struct vchiq_mmal_instance *instance, + if (port->enabled) + return 0; + +- /* ensure there are enough buffers queued to cover the buffer headers */ +- if (port->buffer_cb) { +- hdr_count = 0; +- list_for_each(buf_head, &port->buffers) { +- hdr_count++; +- } +- if (hdr_count < port->current_buffer.num) +- return -ENOSPC; +- } +- + ret = port_action_port(instance, port, + MMAL_MSG_PORT_ACTION_TYPE_ENABLE); + if (ret) +@@ -1849,7 +1845,7 @@ int vchiq_mmal_init(struct vchiq_mmal_instance **out_instance) + + instance->bulk_scratch = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE); + +- spin_lock_init(&instance->context_map_lock); ++ mutex_init(&instance->context_map_lock); + idr_init_base(&instance->context_map, 1); + + params.callback_param = instance; +diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h +index 22b839ecd5f0..b0ee1716525b 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h ++++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/bcm2835-camera/mmal-vchiq.h +@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ struct vchiq_mmal_port { + struct list_head buffers; + /* lock to serialise adding and removing buffers from list */ + spinlock_t slock; ++ ++ /* Count of buffers the VPU has yet to return */ ++ atomic_t buffers_with_vpu; + /* callback on buffer completion */ + vchiq_mmal_buffer_cb buffer_cb; + /* callback context */ +diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c +index c557c9953724..aa20fcaefa9d 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_2835_arm.c +@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ create_pagelist(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned short type) + (g_cache_line_size - 1)))) { + char *fragments; + +- if (down_killable(&g_free_fragments_sema)) { ++ if (down_interruptible(&g_free_fragments_sema) != 0) { + cleanup_pagelistinfo(pagelistinfo); + return NULL; + } +diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c +index ab7d6a0ce94c..62d8f599e765 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c +@@ -532,7 +532,8 @@ add_completion(VCHIQ_INSTANCE_T instance, VCHIQ_REASON_T reason, + vchiq_log_trace(vchiq_arm_log_level, + "%s - completion queue full", __func__); + DEBUG_COUNT(COMPLETION_QUEUE_FULL_COUNT); +- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&instance->remove_event)) { ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible( ++ &instance->remove_event)) { + vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level, + "service_callback interrupted"); + return VCHIQ_RETRY; +@@ -643,7 +644,7 @@ service_callback(VCHIQ_REASON_T reason, struct vchiq_header *header, + } + + DEBUG_TRACE(SERVICE_CALLBACK_LINE); +- if (wait_for_completion_killable( ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible( + &user_service->remove_event) + != 0) { + vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level, +@@ -978,7 +979,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) + has been closed until the client library calls the + CLOSE_DELIVERED ioctl, signalling close_event. */ + if (user_service->close_pending && +- wait_for_completion_killable( ++ wait_for_completion_interruptible( + &user_service->close_event)) + status = VCHIQ_RETRY; + break; +@@ -1154,7 +1155,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) + + DEBUG_TRACE(AWAIT_COMPLETION_LINE); + mutex_unlock(&instance->completion_mutex); +- rc = wait_for_completion_killable( ++ rc = wait_for_completion_interruptible( + &instance->insert_event); + mutex_lock(&instance->completion_mutex); + if (rc != 0) { +@@ -1324,7 +1325,7 @@ vchiq_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) + do { + spin_unlock(&msg_queue_spinlock); + DEBUG_TRACE(DEQUEUE_MESSAGE_LINE); +- if (wait_for_completion_killable( ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible( + &user_service->insert_event)) { + vchiq_log_info(vchiq_arm_log_level, + "DEQUEUE_MESSAGE interrupted"); +@@ -2328,7 +2329,7 @@ vchiq_keepalive_thread_func(void *v) + while (1) { + long rc = 0, uc = 0; + +- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&arm_state->ka_evt) ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&arm_state->ka_evt) + != 0) { + vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level, + "%s interrupted", __func__); +@@ -2579,7 +2580,7 @@ block_resume(struct vchiq_arm_state *arm_state) + write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock); + vchiq_log_info(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for previously " + "blocked clients", __func__); +- if (wait_for_completion_killable_timeout( ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout( + &arm_state->blocked_blocker, timeout_val) + <= 0) { + vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for " +@@ -2605,7 +2606,7 @@ block_resume(struct vchiq_arm_state *arm_state) + write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock); + vchiq_log_info(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for resume", + __func__); +- if (wait_for_completion_killable_timeout( ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout( + &arm_state->vc_resume_complete, timeout_val) + <= 0) { + vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level, "%s wait for " +@@ -2812,7 +2813,7 @@ vchiq_arm_force_suspend(struct vchiq_state *state) + do { + write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock); + +- rc = wait_for_completion_killable_timeout( ++ rc = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout( + &arm_state->vc_suspend_complete, + msecs_to_jiffies(FORCE_SUSPEND_TIMEOUT_MS)); + +@@ -2908,7 +2909,7 @@ vchiq_arm_allow_resume(struct vchiq_state *state) + write_unlock_bh(&arm_state->susp_res_lock); + + if (resume) { +- if (wait_for_completion_killable( ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible( + &arm_state->vc_resume_complete) < 0) { + vchiq_log_error(vchiq_susp_log_level, + "%s interrupted", __func__); +diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c +index 0c387b6473a5..44bfa890e0e5 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_core.c +@@ -395,13 +395,21 @@ remote_event_create(wait_queue_head_t *wq, struct remote_event *event) + init_waitqueue_head(wq); + } + ++/* ++ * All the event waiting routines in VCHIQ used a custom semaphore ++ * implementation that filtered most signals. This achieved a behaviour similar ++ * to the "killable" family of functions. While cleaning up this code all the ++ * routines where switched to the "interruptible" family of functions, as the ++ * former was deemed unjustified and the use "killable" set all VCHIQ's ++ * threads in D state. ++ */ + static inline int + remote_event_wait(wait_queue_head_t *wq, struct remote_event *event) + { + if (!event->fired) { + event->armed = 1; + dsb(sy); +- if (wait_event_killable(*wq, event->fired)) { ++ if (wait_event_interruptible(*wq, event->fired)) { + event->armed = 0; + return 0; + } +@@ -560,7 +568,7 @@ reserve_space(struct vchiq_state *state, size_t space, int is_blocking) + remote_event_signal(&state->remote->trigger); + + if (!is_blocking || +- (wait_for_completion_killable( ++ (wait_for_completion_interruptible( + &state->slot_available_event))) + return NULL; /* No space available */ + } +@@ -830,7 +838,7 @@ queue_message(struct vchiq_state *state, struct vchiq_service *service, + spin_unlock("a_spinlock); + mutex_unlock(&state->slot_mutex); + +- if (wait_for_completion_killable( ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible( + &state->data_quota_event)) + return VCHIQ_RETRY; + +@@ -861,7 +869,7 @@ queue_message(struct vchiq_state *state, struct vchiq_service *service, + service_quota->slot_use_count); + VCHIQ_SERVICE_STATS_INC(service, quota_stalls); + mutex_unlock(&state->slot_mutex); +- if (wait_for_completion_killable( ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible( + &service_quota->quota_event)) + return VCHIQ_RETRY; + if (service->closing) +@@ -1710,7 +1718,8 @@ parse_rx_slots(struct vchiq_state *state) + &service->bulk_rx : &service->bulk_tx; + + DEBUG_TRACE(PARSE_LINE); +- if (mutex_lock_killable(&service->bulk_mutex)) { ++ if (mutex_lock_killable( ++ &service->bulk_mutex) != 0) { + DEBUG_TRACE(PARSE_LINE); + goto bail_not_ready; + } +@@ -2428,7 +2437,7 @@ vchiq_open_service_internal(struct vchiq_service *service, int client_id) + QMFLAGS_IS_BLOCKING); + if (status == VCHIQ_SUCCESS) { + /* Wait for the ACK/NAK */ +- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) { ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) { + status = VCHIQ_RETRY; + vchiq_release_service_internal(service); + } else if ((service->srvstate != VCHIQ_SRVSTATE_OPEN) && +@@ -2795,7 +2804,7 @@ vchiq_connect_internal(struct vchiq_state *state, VCHIQ_INSTANCE_T instance) + } + + if (state->conn_state == VCHIQ_CONNSTATE_CONNECTING) { +- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&state->connect)) ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&state->connect)) + return VCHIQ_RETRY; + + vchiq_set_conn_state(state, VCHIQ_CONNSTATE_CONNECTED); +@@ -2894,7 +2903,7 @@ vchiq_close_service(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle) + } + + while (1) { +- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) { ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) { + status = VCHIQ_RETRY; + break; + } +@@ -2955,7 +2964,7 @@ vchiq_remove_service(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle) + request_poll(service->state, service, VCHIQ_POLL_REMOVE); + } + while (1) { +- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&service->remove_event)) { ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&service->remove_event)) { + status = VCHIQ_RETRY; + break; + } +@@ -3038,7 +3047,7 @@ VCHIQ_STATUS_T vchiq_bulk_transfer(VCHIQ_SERVICE_HANDLE_T handle, + VCHIQ_SERVICE_STATS_INC(service, bulk_stalls); + do { + mutex_unlock(&service->bulk_mutex); +- if (wait_for_completion_killable( ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible( + &service->bulk_remove_event)) { + status = VCHIQ_RETRY; + goto error_exit; +@@ -3115,7 +3124,7 @@ waiting: + + if (bulk_waiter) { + bulk_waiter->bulk = bulk; +- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&bulk_waiter->event)) ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&bulk_waiter->event)) + status = VCHIQ_RETRY; + else if (bulk_waiter->actual == VCHIQ_BULK_ACTUAL_ABORTED) + status = VCHIQ_ERROR; +diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c +index 6c519d8e48cb..8ee85c5e6f77 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_util.c +@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ void vchiu_queue_push(struct vchiu_queue *queue, struct vchiq_header *header) + return; + + while (queue->write == queue->read + queue->size) { +- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->pop)) ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->pop)) + flush_signals(current); + } + +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ void vchiu_queue_push(struct vchiu_queue *queue, struct vchiq_header *header) + struct vchiq_header *vchiu_queue_peek(struct vchiu_queue *queue) + { + while (queue->write == queue->read) { +- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->push)) ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->push)) + flush_signals(current); + } + +@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ struct vchiq_header *vchiu_queue_pop(struct vchiu_queue *queue) + struct vchiq_header *header; + + while (queue->write == queue->read) { +- if (wait_for_completion_killable(&queue->push)) ++ if (wait_for_completion_interruptible(&queue->push)) + flush_signals(current); + } + +diff --git a/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c b/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c +index ba78c08a17f1..5338d7d2b248 100644 +--- a/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c ++++ b/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c +@@ -530,17 +530,17 @@ static int wilc_wlan_initialize(struct net_device *dev, struct wilc_vif *vif) + goto fail_locks; + } + +- if (wl->gpio_irq && init_irq(dev)) { +- ret = -EIO; +- goto fail_locks; +- } +- + ret = wlan_initialize_threads(dev); + if (ret < 0) { + ret = -EIO; + goto fail_wilc_wlan; + } + ++ if (wl->gpio_irq && init_irq(dev)) { ++ ret = -EIO; ++ goto fail_threads; ++ } ++ + if (!wl->dev_irq_num && + wl->hif_func->enable_interrupt && + wl->hif_func->enable_interrupt(wl)) { +@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ fail_irq_enable: + fail_irq_init: + if (wl->dev_irq_num) + deinit_irq(dev); +- ++fail_threads: + wlan_deinitialize_threads(dev); + fail_wilc_wlan: + wilc_wlan_cleanup(dev); +diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +index d2f3310abe54..682300713be4 100644 +--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c ++++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +@@ -1869,8 +1869,7 @@ int serial8250_handle_irq(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int iir) + + status = serial_port_in(port, UART_LSR); + +- if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI) && +- iir & UART_IIR_RDI) { ++ if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI)) { + if (!up->dma || handle_rx_dma(up, iir)) + status = serial8250_rx_chars(up, status); + } +diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c b/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c +index 8b499d643461..8e41d70fd298 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/dwc2/core.c +@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ int dwc2_core_reset(struct dwc2_hsotg *hsotg, bool skip_wait) + } + + /* Wait for AHB master IDLE state */ +- if (dwc2_hsotg_wait_bit_set(hsotg, GRSTCTL, GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE, 50)) { ++ if (dwc2_hsotg_wait_bit_set(hsotg, GRSTCTL, GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE, 10000)) { + dev_warn(hsotg->dev, "%s: HANG! AHB Idle timeout GRSTCTL GRSTCTL_AHBIDLE\n", + __func__); + return -EBUSY; +diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +index 47be961f1bf3..c7ed90084d1a 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +@@ -997,7 +997,6 @@ static ssize_t ffs_epfile_io(struct file *file, struct ffs_io_data *io_data) + * earlier + */ + gadget = epfile->ffs->gadget; +- io_data->use_sg = gadget->sg_supported && data_len > PAGE_SIZE; + + spin_lock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock); + /* In the meantime, endpoint got disabled or changed. */ +@@ -1012,6 +1011,8 @@ static ssize_t ffs_epfile_io(struct file *file, struct ffs_io_data *io_data) + */ + if (io_data->read) + data_len = usb_ep_align_maybe(gadget, ep->ep, data_len); ++ ++ io_data->use_sg = gadget->sg_supported && data_len > PAGE_SIZE; + spin_unlock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock); + + data = ffs_alloc_buffer(io_data, data_len); +diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c +index 737bd77a575d..2929bb47a618 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c +@@ -186,11 +186,12 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags) + out = dev->port_usb->out_ep; + else + out = NULL; +- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags); + + if (!out) ++ { ++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags); + return -ENOTCONN; +- ++ } + + /* Padding up to RX_EXTRA handles minor disagreements with host. + * Normally we use the USB "terminate on short read" convention; +@@ -214,6 +215,7 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags) + + if (dev->port_usb->is_fixed) + size = max_t(size_t, size, dev->port_usb->fixed_out_len); ++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags); + + skb = __netdev_alloc_skb(dev->net, size + NET_IP_ALIGN, gfp_flags); + if (skb == NULL) { +diff --git a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c +index 39fa2fc1b8b7..6036cbae8c78 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c +@@ -802,9 +802,8 @@ static int __usbhsf_dma_map_ctrl(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int map) + } + + static void usbhsf_dma_complete(void *arg); +-static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) ++static void usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt) + { +- struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work); + struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe; + struct usbhs_fifo *fifo; + struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe); +@@ -812,12 +811,10 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) + struct dma_chan *chan; + struct device *dev = usbhs_priv_to_dev(priv); + enum dma_transfer_direction dir; +- unsigned long flags; + +- usbhs_lock(priv, flags); + fifo = usbhs_pipe_to_fifo(pipe); + if (!fifo) +- goto xfer_work_end; ++ return; + + chan = usbhsf_dma_chan_get(fifo, pkt); + dir = usbhs_pipe_is_dir_in(pipe) ? DMA_DEV_TO_MEM : DMA_MEM_TO_DEV; +@@ -826,7 +823,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) + pkt->trans, dir, + DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK); + if (!desc) +- goto xfer_work_end; ++ return; + + desc->callback = usbhsf_dma_complete; + desc->callback_param = pipe; +@@ -834,7 +831,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) + pkt->cookie = dmaengine_submit(desc); + if (pkt->cookie < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to submit dma descriptor\n"); +- goto xfer_work_end; ++ return; + } + + dev_dbg(dev, " %s %d (%d/ %d)\n", +@@ -845,8 +842,17 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) + dma_async_issue_pending(chan); + usbhsf_dma_start(pipe, fifo); + usbhs_pipe_enable(pipe); ++} ++ ++static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) ++{ ++ struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work); ++ struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe; ++ struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe); ++ unsigned long flags; + +-xfer_work_end: ++ usbhs_lock(priv, flags); ++ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt); + usbhs_unlock(priv, flags); + } + +@@ -899,8 +905,13 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_push(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int *is_done) + pkt->trans = len; + + usbhsf_tx_irq_ctrl(pipe, 0); +- INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work); +- schedule_work(&pkt->work); ++ /* FIXME: Workaound for usb dmac that driver can be used in atomic */ ++ if (usbhs_get_dparam(priv, has_usb_dmac)) { ++ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt); ++ } else { ++ INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work); ++ schedule_work(&pkt->work); ++ } + + return 0; + +@@ -1006,8 +1017,7 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_pop_with_usb_dmac(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, + + pkt->trans = pkt->length; + +- INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work); +- schedule_work(&pkt->work); ++ usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt); + + return 0; + +diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c +index 1d8461ae2c34..23669a584bae 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c +@@ -1029,6 +1029,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = { + { USB_DEVICE(AIRBUS_DS_VID, AIRBUS_DS_P8GR) }, + /* EZPrototypes devices */ + { USB_DEVICE(EZPROTOTYPES_VID, HJELMSLUND_USB485_ISO_PID) }, ++ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NUMBER(UNJO_VID, UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID, 1) }, + { } /* Terminating entry */ + }; + +diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h +index 5755f0df0025..f12d806220b4 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h ++++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h +@@ -1543,3 +1543,9 @@ + #define CHETCO_SEASMART_DISPLAY_PID 0xA5AD /* SeaSmart NMEA2000 Display */ + #define CHETCO_SEASMART_LITE_PID 0xA5AE /* SeaSmart Lite USB Adapter */ + #define CHETCO_SEASMART_ANALOG_PID 0xA5AF /* SeaSmart Analog Adapter */ ++ ++/* ++ * Unjo AB ++ */ ++#define UNJO_VID 0x22B7 ++#define UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID 0x150D +diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +index a0aaf0635359..c1582fbd1150 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +@@ -1343,6 +1343,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { + .driver_info = RSVD(4) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0414, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0417, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) }, ++ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0601, 0xff) }, /* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (RNDIS mode) */ + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0602, 0xff) }, /* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (MBIM mode) */ + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x1008, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff), + .driver_info = RSVD(4) }, +diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c +index c674abe3cf99..a38d1409f15b 100644 +--- a/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c ++++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tps6598x.c +@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ + #define TPS_STATUS_VCONN(s) (!!((s) & BIT(7))) + + /* TPS_REG_SYSTEM_CONF bits */ +-#define TPS_SYSCONF_PORTINFO(c) ((c) & 3) ++#define TPS_SYSCONF_PORTINFO(c) ((c) & 7) + + enum { + TPS_PORTINFO_SINK, +@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ tps6598x_block_read(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, void *val, size_t len) + } + + static int tps6598x_block_write(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, +- void *val, size_t len) ++ const void *val, size_t len) + { + u8 data[TPS_MAX_LEN + 1]; + +@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static inline int tps6598x_write64(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, u64 val) + static inline int + tps6598x_write_4cc(struct tps6598x *tps, u8 reg, const char *val) + { +- return tps6598x_block_write(tps, reg, &val, sizeof(u32)); ++ return tps6598x_block_write(tps, reg, val, 4); + } + + static int tps6598x_read_partner_identity(struct tps6598x *tps) +diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c +index d536889ac31b..4941fe8471ce 100644 +--- a/fs/crypto/policy.c ++++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c +@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg) + if (ret == -ENODATA) { + if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) + ret = -ENOTDIR; ++ else if (IS_DEADDIR(inode)) ++ ret = -ENOENT; + else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode)) + ret = -ENOTEMPTY; + else +diff --git a/fs/iomap.c b/fs/iomap.c +index 12654c2e78f8..da961fca3180 100644 +--- a/fs/iomap.c ++++ b/fs/iomap.c +@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ iomap_readpage_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length, void *data, + if (iop) + atomic_inc(&iop->read_count); + +- if (!ctx->bio || !is_contig || bio_full(ctx->bio)) { ++ if (!ctx->bio || !is_contig || bio_full(ctx->bio, plen)) { + gfp_t gfp = mapping_gfp_constraint(page->mapping, GFP_KERNEL); + int nr_vecs = (length + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + +diff --git a/fs/udf/inode.c b/fs/udf/inode.c +index e7276932e433..9bb18311a22f 100644 +--- a/fs/udf/inode.c ++++ b/fs/udf/inode.c +@@ -470,13 +470,15 @@ static struct buffer_head *udf_getblk(struct inode *inode, udf_pblk_t block, + return NULL; + } + +-/* Extend the file by 'blocks' blocks, return the number of extents added */ ++/* Extend the file with new blocks totaling 'new_block_bytes', ++ * return the number of extents added ++ */ + static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode, + struct extent_position *last_pos, + struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext, +- sector_t blocks) ++ loff_t new_block_bytes) + { +- sector_t add; ++ uint32_t add; + int count = 0, fake = !(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK); + struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; + struct kernel_lb_addr prealloc_loc = {}; +@@ -486,7 +488,7 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode, + + /* The previous extent is fake and we should not extend by anything + * - there's nothing to do... */ +- if (!blocks && fake) ++ if (!new_block_bytes && fake) + return 0; + + iinfo = UDF_I(inode); +@@ -517,13 +519,12 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode, + /* Can we merge with the previous extent? */ + if ((last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_FLAG_MASK) == + EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED) { +- add = ((1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize - +- (last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK)) >> +- sb->s_blocksize_bits; +- if (add > blocks) +- add = blocks; +- blocks -= add; +- last_ext->extLength += add << sb->s_blocksize_bits; ++ add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize - ++ (last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK); ++ if (add > new_block_bytes) ++ add = new_block_bytes; ++ new_block_bytes -= add; ++ last_ext->extLength += add; + } + + if (fake) { +@@ -544,28 +545,27 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode, + } + + /* Managed to do everything necessary? */ +- if (!blocks) ++ if (!new_block_bytes) + goto out; + + /* All further extents will be NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED */ + last_ext->extLocation.logicalBlockNum = 0; + last_ext->extLocation.partitionReferenceNum = 0; +- add = (1 << (30-sb->s_blocksize_bits)) - 1; +- last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED | +- (add << sb->s_blocksize_bits); ++ add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize; ++ last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED | add; + + /* Create enough extents to cover the whole hole */ +- while (blocks > add) { +- blocks -= add; ++ while (new_block_bytes > add) { ++ new_block_bytes -= add; + err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation, + last_ext->extLength, 1); + if (err) + return err; + count++; + } +- if (blocks) { ++ if (new_block_bytes) { + last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED | +- (blocks << sb->s_blocksize_bits); ++ new_block_bytes; + err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation, + last_ext->extLength, 1); + if (err) +@@ -596,6 +596,24 @@ out: + return count; + } + ++/* Extend the final block of the file to final_block_len bytes */ ++static void udf_do_extend_final_block(struct inode *inode, ++ struct extent_position *last_pos, ++ struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext, ++ uint32_t final_block_len) ++{ ++ struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; ++ uint32_t added_bytes; ++ ++ added_bytes = final_block_len - ++ (last_ext->extLength & (sb->s_blocksize - 1)); ++ last_ext->extLength += added_bytes; ++ UDF_I(inode)->i_lenExtents += added_bytes; ++ ++ udf_write_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation, ++ last_ext->extLength, 1); ++} ++ + static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize) + { + +@@ -605,10 +623,12 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize) + int8_t etype; + struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; + sector_t first_block = newsize >> sb->s_blocksize_bits, offset; ++ unsigned long partial_final_block; + int adsize; + struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode); + struct kernel_long_ad extent; +- int err; ++ int err = 0; ++ int within_final_block; + + if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT) + adsize = sizeof(struct short_ad); +@@ -618,18 +638,8 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize) + BUG(); + + etype = inode_bmap(inode, first_block, &epos, &eloc, &elen, &offset); ++ within_final_block = (etype != -1); + +- /* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending +- * inside a block)? */ +- if (etype != -1) +- return 0; +- if (newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) +- offset++; +- /* Extended file just to the boundary of the last file block? */ +- if (offset == 0) +- return 0; +- +- /* Truncate is extending the file by 'offset' blocks */ + if ((!epos.bh && epos.offset == udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode)) || + (epos.bh && epos.offset == sizeof(struct allocExtDesc))) { + /* File has no extents at all or has empty last +@@ -643,7 +653,22 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize) + &extent.extLength, 0); + extent.extLength |= etype << 30; + } +- err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, offset); ++ ++ partial_final_block = newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1); ++ ++ /* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending ++ * inside a block)? ++ */ ++ if (within_final_block) { ++ /* Extending file within the last file block */ ++ udf_do_extend_final_block(inode, &epos, &extent, ++ partial_final_block); ++ } else { ++ loff_t add = ((loff_t)offset << sb->s_blocksize_bits) | ++ partial_final_block; ++ err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, add); ++ } ++ + if (err < 0) + goto out; + err = 0; +@@ -745,6 +770,7 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block, + /* Are we beyond EOF? */ + if (etype == -1) { + int ret; ++ loff_t hole_len; + isBeyondEOF = true; + if (count) { + if (c) +@@ -760,7 +786,8 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block, + startnum = (offset > 0); + } + /* Create extents for the hole between EOF and offset */ +- ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, offset); ++ hole_len = (loff_t)offset << inode->i_blkbits; ++ ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, hole_len); + if (ret < 0) { + *err = ret; + newblock = 0; +diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c +index 8da5e6637771..11f703d4a605 100644 +--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c ++++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_aops.c +@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ xfs_add_to_ioend( + atomic_inc(&iop->write_count); + + if (!merged) { +- if (bio_full(wpc->ioend->io_bio)) ++ if (bio_full(wpc->ioend->io_bio, len)) + xfs_chain_bio(wpc->ioend, wbc, bdev, sector); + bio_add_page(wpc->ioend->io_bio, page, len, poff); + } +diff --git a/include/linux/bio.h b/include/linux/bio.h +index f87abaa898f0..e36b8fc1b1c3 100644 +--- a/include/linux/bio.h ++++ b/include/linux/bio.h +@@ -102,9 +102,23 @@ static inline void *bio_data(struct bio *bio) + return NULL; + } + +-static inline bool bio_full(struct bio *bio) ++/** ++ * bio_full - check if the bio is full ++ * @bio: bio to check ++ * @len: length of one segment to be added ++ * ++ * Return true if @bio is full and one segment with @len bytes can't be ++ * added to the bio, otherwise return false ++ */ ++static inline bool bio_full(struct bio *bio, unsigned len) + { +- return bio->bi_vcnt >= bio->bi_max_vecs; ++ if (bio->bi_vcnt >= bio->bi_max_vecs) ++ return true; ++ ++ if (bio->bi_iter.bi_size > UINT_MAX - len) ++ return true; ++ ++ return false; + } + + static inline bool bio_next_segment(const struct bio *bio, +diff --git a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h +index 77ac9c7b9483..762f793e92f6 100644 +--- a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h ++++ b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h +@@ -62,9 +62,18 @@ enum { + + /* + * A single VMCI device has an upper limit of 128MB on the amount of +- * memory that can be used for queue pairs. ++ * memory that can be used for queue pairs. Since each queue pair ++ * consists of at least two pages, the memory limit also dictates the ++ * number of queue pairs a guest can create. + */ + #define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY (128 * 1024 * 1024) ++#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT (VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY / PAGE_SIZE / 2) ++ ++/* ++ * There can be at most PAGE_SIZE doorbells since there is one doorbell ++ * per byte in the doorbell bitmap page. ++ */ ++#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT PAGE_SIZE + + /* + * Queues with pre-mapped data pages must be small, so that we don't pin +diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h b/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h +index ddc5396800aa..76b7c3f6cd0d 100644 +--- a/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h ++++ b/include/uapi/linux/usb/audio.h +@@ -450,6 +450,43 @@ static inline __u8 *uac_processing_unit_specific(struct uac_processing_unit_desc + } + } + ++/* ++ * Extension Unit (XU) has almost compatible layout with Processing Unit, but ++ * on UAC2, it has a different bmControls size (bControlSize); it's 1 byte for ++ * XU while 2 bytes for PU. The last iExtension field is a one-byte index as ++ * well as iProcessing field of PU. ++ */ ++static inline __u8 uac_extension_unit_bControlSize(struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc, ++ int protocol) ++{ ++ switch (protocol) { ++ case UAC_VERSION_1: ++ return desc->baSourceID[desc->bNrInPins + 4]; ++ case UAC_VERSION_2: ++ return 1; /* in UAC2, this value is constant */ ++ case UAC_VERSION_3: ++ return 4; /* in UAC3, this value is constant */ ++ default: ++ return 1; ++ } ++} ++ ++static inline __u8 uac_extension_unit_iExtension(struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc, ++ int protocol) ++{ ++ __u8 control_size = uac_extension_unit_bControlSize(desc, protocol); ++ ++ switch (protocol) { ++ case UAC_VERSION_1: ++ case UAC_VERSION_2: ++ default: ++ return *(uac_processing_unit_bmControls(desc, protocol) ++ + control_size); ++ case UAC_VERSION_3: ++ return 0; /* UAC3 does not have this field */ ++ } ++} ++ + /* 4.5.2 Class-Specific AS Interface Descriptor */ + struct uac1_as_header_descriptor { + __u8 bLength; /* in bytes: 7 */ +diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +index 6f3a35949cdd..f24a757f8239 100644 +--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c ++++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +@@ -3255,6 +3255,7 @@ static void alc256_init(struct hda_codec *codec) + alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x4); /* Hight power */ + alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 1 << 15); /* Clear bit */ + alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 0 << 15); ++ alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/ + } + + static void alc256_shutup(struct hda_codec *codec) +@@ -7825,7 +7826,6 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec *codec) + spec->shutup = alc256_shutup; + spec->init_hook = alc256_init; + spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0; /* ALC256 does not have any loopback mixer path */ +- alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/ + break; + case 0x10ec0257: + spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC257; +diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer.c b/sound/usb/mixer.c +index c703f8534b07..7498b5191b68 100644 +--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c ++++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c +@@ -2303,7 +2303,7 @@ static struct procunit_info extunits[] = { + */ + static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid, + void *raw_desc, struct procunit_info *list, +- char *name) ++ bool extension_unit) + { + struct uac_processing_unit_descriptor *desc = raw_desc; + int num_ins; +@@ -2320,6 +2320,8 @@ static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid, + static struct procunit_info default_info = { + 0, NULL, default_value_info + }; ++ const char *name = extension_unit ? ++ "Extension Unit" : "Processing Unit"; + + if (desc->bLength < 13) { + usb_audio_err(state->chip, "invalid %s descriptor (id %d)\n", name, unitid); +@@ -2433,7 +2435,10 @@ static int build_audio_procunit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid, + } else if (info->name) { + strlcpy(kctl->id.name, info->name, sizeof(kctl->id.name)); + } else { +- nameid = uac_processing_unit_iProcessing(desc, state->mixer->protocol); ++ if (extension_unit) ++ nameid = uac_extension_unit_iExtension(desc, state->mixer->protocol); ++ else ++ nameid = uac_processing_unit_iProcessing(desc, state->mixer->protocol); + len = 0; + if (nameid) + len = snd_usb_copy_string_desc(state->chip, +@@ -2466,10 +2471,10 @@ static int parse_audio_processing_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid, + case UAC_VERSION_2: + default: + return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc, +- procunits, "Processing Unit"); ++ procunits, false); + case UAC_VERSION_3: + return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc, +- uac3_procunits, "Processing Unit"); ++ uac3_procunits, false); + } + } + +@@ -2480,8 +2485,7 @@ static int parse_audio_extension_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid, + * Note that we parse extension units with processing unit descriptors. + * That's ok as the layout is the same. + */ +- return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc, +- extunits, "Extension Unit"); ++ return build_audio_procunit(state, unitid, raw_desc, extunits, true); + } + + /* +diff --git a/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt b/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt +index 115eaacc455f..60d99e5e7921 100644 +--- a/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt ++++ b/tools/perf/Documentation/intel-pt.txt +@@ -88,16 +88,16 @@ smaller. + + To represent software control flow, "branches" samples are produced. By default + a branch sample is synthesized for every single branch. To get an idea what +-data is available you can use the 'perf script' tool with no parameters, which +-will list all the samples. ++data is available you can use the 'perf script' tool with all itrace sampling ++options, which will list all the samples. + + perf record -e intel_pt//u ls +- perf script ++ perf script --itrace=ibxwpe + + An interesting field that is not printed by default is 'flags' which can be + displayed as follows: + +- perf script -Fcomm,tid,pid,time,cpu,event,trace,ip,sym,dso,addr,symoff,flags ++ perf script --itrace=ibxwpe -F+flags + + The flags are "bcrosyiABEx" which stand for branch, call, return, conditional, + system, asynchronous, interrupt, transaction abort, trace begin, trace end, and +@@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ Having no option is the same as + + which, in turn, is the same as + +- --itrace=ibxwpe ++ --itrace=cepwx + + The letters are: + +diff --git a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c +index 66e82bd0683e..cfdbf65f1e02 100644 +--- a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c ++++ b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c +@@ -1001,7 +1001,8 @@ int itrace_parse_synth_opts(const struct option *opt, const char *str, + } + + if (!str) { +- itrace_synth_opts__set_default(synth_opts, false); ++ itrace_synth_opts__set_default(synth_opts, ++ synth_opts->default_no_sample); + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/tools/perf/util/header.c b/tools/perf/util/header.c +index 847ae51a524b..fb0aa661644b 100644 +--- a/tools/perf/util/header.c ++++ b/tools/perf/util/header.c +@@ -3602,6 +3602,7 @@ int perf_event__synthesize_features(struct perf_tool *tool, + return -ENOMEM; + + ff.size = sz - sz_hdr; ++ ff.ph = &session->header; + + for_each_set_bit(feat, header->adds_features, HEADER_FEAT_BITS) { + if (!feat_ops[feat].synthesize) { +diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c +index d6f1b2a03f9b..f7dd4657535d 100644 +--- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c ++++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c +@@ -2579,7 +2579,8 @@ int intel_pt_process_auxtrace_info(union perf_event *event, + } else { + itrace_synth_opts__set_default(&pt->synth_opts, + session->itrace_synth_opts->default_no_sample); +- if (use_browser != -1) { ++ if (!session->itrace_synth_opts->default_no_sample && ++ !session->itrace_synth_opts->inject) { + pt->synth_opts.branches = false; + pt->synth_opts.callchain = true; + } +diff --git a/tools/perf/util/pmu.c b/tools/perf/util/pmu.c +index e0429f4ef335..faa8eb231e1b 100644 +--- a/tools/perf/util/pmu.c ++++ b/tools/perf/util/pmu.c +@@ -709,9 +709,7 @@ static void pmu_add_cpu_aliases(struct list_head *head, struct perf_pmu *pmu) + { + int i; + struct pmu_events_map *map; +- struct pmu_event *pe; + const char *name = pmu->name; +- const char *pname; + + map = perf_pmu__find_map(pmu); + if (!map) +@@ -722,28 +720,26 @@ static void pmu_add_cpu_aliases(struct list_head *head, struct perf_pmu *pmu) + */ + i = 0; + while (1) { ++ const char *cpu_name = is_arm_pmu_core(name) ? name : "cpu"; ++ struct pmu_event *pe = &map->table[i++]; ++ const char *pname = pe->pmu ? pe->pmu : cpu_name; + +- pe = &map->table[i++]; + if (!pe->name) { + if (pe->metric_group || pe->metric_name) + continue; + break; + } + +- if (!is_arm_pmu_core(name)) { +- pname = pe->pmu ? pe->pmu : "cpu"; +- +- /* +- * uncore alias may be from different PMU +- * with common prefix +- */ +- if (pmu_is_uncore(name) && +- !strncmp(pname, name, strlen(pname))) +- goto new_alias; ++ /* ++ * uncore alias may be from different PMU ++ * with common prefix ++ */ ++ if (pmu_is_uncore(name) && ++ !strncmp(pname, name, strlen(pname))) ++ goto new_alias; + +- if (strcmp(pname, name)) +- continue; +- } ++ if (strcmp(pname, name)) ++ continue; + + new_alias: + /* need type casts to override 'const' */ +diff --git a/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c b/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c +index 4ba9e866b076..60c9d955c4d7 100644 +--- a/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c ++++ b/tools/perf/util/thread-stack.c +@@ -616,6 +616,23 @@ static int thread_stack__bottom(struct thread_stack *ts, + true, false); + } + ++static int thread_stack__pop_ks(struct thread *thread, struct thread_stack *ts, ++ struct perf_sample *sample, u64 ref) ++{ ++ u64 tm = sample->time; ++ int err; ++ ++ /* Return to userspace, so pop all kernel addresses */ ++ while (thread_stack__in_kernel(ts)) { ++ err = thread_stack__call_return(thread, ts, --ts->cnt, ++ tm, ref, true); ++ if (err) ++ return err; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + static int thread_stack__no_call_return(struct thread *thread, + struct thread_stack *ts, + struct perf_sample *sample, +@@ -896,7 +913,18 @@ int thread_stack__process(struct thread *thread, struct comm *comm, + ts->rstate = X86_RETPOLINE_DETECTED; + + } else if (sample->flags & PERF_IP_FLAG_RETURN) { +- if (!sample->ip || !sample->addr) ++ if (!sample->addr) { ++ u32 return_from_kernel = PERF_IP_FLAG_SYSCALLRET | ++ PERF_IP_FLAG_INTERRUPT; ++ ++ if (!(sample->flags & return_from_kernel)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ /* Pop kernel stack */ ++ return thread_stack__pop_ks(thread, ts, sample, ref); ++ } ++ ++ if (!sample->ip) + return 0; + + /* x86 retpoline 'return' doesn't match the stack */
