+1 binding > On Dec 15, 2015, at 7:51 AM, Colm O hEigeartaigh <cohei...@apache.org> wrote: > > +1 (binding) > > Colm. > > On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 10:56 AM, Jean-Baptiste Onofré <j...@nanthrax.net> > wrote: > >> +1 (binding) >> >> Regards >> JB >> >> >>> On 12/15/2015 09:56 AM, Nick Kew wrote: >>> >>> I should like to call a vote to accept Milagro into >>> the Incubator. The full proposal is available at >>> https://wiki.apache.org/incubator/MilagroProposal >>> as well as below. >>> >>> Note that the project was first discussed here under >>> the name OpenMiracl. The adoption of the Milagro name >>> is a response to that discussion. >>> >>> [ ] +1 Accept Milagro into the Apache Incubator >>> [ ] 0 >>> [ ] -1 Do not accept Milagro into the Apache Incubator ... >>> >>> The vote remains open until at least the end of the week. >>> >>> For myself: >>> [*] +1 Accept Milagro into the Apache Incubator >>> >>> >>> = Project Proposal: Milagro = >>> == Abstract == >>> Milagro is a distributed cryptosystem for cloud computing. Its purpose >>> is to provide an open source alternative to proprietary key management >>> and certificate backed cryptosystems used for secure communication and >>> authentication. The adoption of Milagro will create a secure, free, open >>> source alternative to monolithic certificate authorities and eliminate >>> single points of failure. >>> >>> == Background == >>> The Cloud Computing industry is using 40-year-old cryptographic >>> algorithms and infrastructure, invented for a different era when >>> client-server computing was the dominant paradigm. At the heart of it, >>> is the continued reliance on outdated, and problematic, monolithic >>> cryptographic trust hierarchies such as commercial certificate >>> authorities. >>> >>> A number of factors are aligning to make this the right time to bring >>> forth an alternative to the Internet's continued reliance on PKI. >>> >>> The Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) industry as a whole >>> encounters friction bringing the largest customers in regulated >>> industries onto their platforms because issues of cryptographic trust, >>> data residency, and data governance prevent total adoption among >>> regulated industries. >>> >>> Devops teams tasked with running an IaaS provider's datacenter >>> automation encounter challenges scaling and automating data center >>> operations when confronted with the complexities of running encryption, >>> certificate and key management infrastructures built for a client-server >>> era. >>> >>> Enterprises in regulated industries find challenges to transform >>> entirely into digital businesses because the economics of cloud >>> computing are unavailable to them. >>> >>> Despite the astounding growth of cloud infrastructure as a service >>> platforms over the last few years, full adoption by organizations with >>> stringent data security requirements won’t be achieved until these >>> fundamental capability issues get resolved. >>> >>> Lastly, the Internet as a whole is suffering from an erosion of trust >>> following incidents with commercial certificate authorities industry, >>> i.e., compromised root keys, and failures in due diligence issuing real >>> domain certificates. >>> >>> Indeed, mass surveillance, a lack of easy end-user encryption, a growing >>> demand for key escrow under legal oversight, and general certificate >>> authority security concerns create the question: How appropriate is the >>> continued dependency on PKI when the goal is to advance the benefits of >>> cloud computing across the technology landscape? >>> >>> Netcraft is the industry standard for monitoring Active TLS >>> certificates. In May 2015, they stated that “Although the global [TLS] >>> ecosystem is competitive, it is dominated by a handful of major CAs — >>> three certificate authorities (Symantec, Comodo, Godaddy) account for >>> three-quarters of all issued [TLS] certificates on public-facing web >>> servers.” >>> >>> The Internet Security Research Group's (ISRG) "Let's Encrypt" initiative >>> aims to make Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) >>> certificates available for free in an automated fashion. This a step in >>> the right direction, in that it removes the risk of profit before >>> ethics. The real issue, which is one entity acts as a monolithic trust >>> hierarchy, is not addressed. The monolithic trust hierarchy is a >>> fundamental design flaw within PKI itself. >>> >>> The rate of attacks against certificate authorities seems to be >>> [increasing](http://wiki.cacert.org/Risk/History) as the obvious single >>> point of compromise design inherent to PKI is becoming a more popular >>> route to carry out attacks. >>> >>> == Proposal == >>> Milagro is an open source, pairing-based cryptographic platform to solve >>> key management, secure communications, data governance and compliance >>> issues that are challenging Cloud Providers and their customers. >>> >>> It does this without the need for certificate authorities, putting into >>> place a new category of service providers called Distributed Trust >>> Authorities (D-TA's). >>> >>> The M-Pin protocol, and its existing open-source MIRACL implementation >>> on which Milagro will build, are already in use by Experian, NTT, Odin, >>> Gov.UK and are being rolled out at scale for zero password multi-factor >>> authentication and certificate-less HTTPS / secure channel. >>> >>> It is proposed that Milagro enter incubation at Apache. At the same >>> time, a draft standard for M-Pin has been prepared and recently >>> submitted to IETF. The standards process at IETF and the platform >>> implementation at Apache will run in parallel. >>> >>> === Why Pairing-Based Cryptography, why now? === >>> Over the last decade, pairings on elliptic curves have been a very >>> active area of research in cryptography. Pairings map pairs of points on >>> an elliptic curve into the multiplicative group of a finite field. Their >>> unique properties have enabled many new cryptographic protocols that had >>> not previously been feasible. >>> >>> Standards bodies have already begun standardizing various pairing-based >>> schemes. These include the IEEE, ISO, and IETF. Besides identity-based >>> encryption (IBE), the standardized schemes include identity-based >>> signatures, identity-based signcryption, identity-based key >>> establishment mechanisms, and identity-based key distribution for use in >>> multimedia. >>> >>> NIST has also recommended the standardization and adoption of >>> pairing-based cryptographic systems __for government agencies__. In the >>> NIST "Report on Pairing-based Cryptography" issued in February 2015, >>> they state: >>> >>> "It has been a decade since the first IBE schemes were proposed. These >>> schemes have received sufficient attention from the cryptographic >>> community and no weakness has been identified. IBE is being used >>> commercially, primarily by Voltage Security and Trend Micro. Intel’s >>> EPID scheme is another example of pairings being used commercially. > As >>> a result of our study, we believe there is a good case for allowing >>> government agencies to use pairings. Pairings have been shown to have >>> numerous applications, helping to solve problems that are impossible, >>> difficult, or inefficient with traditional public-key cryptography or >>> symmetric encryption." >>> >>> The biggest beneficiary of these new pairing-based cryptographic >>> protocols will be the Cloud Infrastructure as a Service industry. >>> Pairing-based cryptography can provide real world solutions, right now, >>> to the outstanding issues of cryptographic trust, data security, >>> governance and compliance that create roadblocks to adoption of the >>> Cloud by the industries that can most benefit from it. >>> >>> Pairing cryptography also makes possible the world in which a fleet of >>> geographically distributed and organizationally independent Distributed >>> Trust Authorities act as multiple private-key generators (PKGs) where >>> trust need not reside in a single entity. >>> >>> The difference between this new world of Distributed Trust Authorities >>> and the current PKI system will be a landscape that provides secure >>> ease-of-use encryption and authentication, does not rely upon a single >>> trusted third party, and yet allows for limited key escrow subject to an >>> end customer's requirement. >>> >>> === Milagro === >>> The Milagro libraries and tools consist of: >>> >>> * Distributed Key Management Service API >>> * Distributed Key Management CLI >>> * Software Defined Distributed Security Module (SD-DSM) build platform >>> * Distributed Key Management Endpoints (software) >>> * Crypto Apps, consisting of: >>> * M-Pin Authentication Platform (delivering password-less 2FA) >>> * M-Pin Secure Channel (delivering certificate-less TLS-PSK) >>> * M-Pin-in-Mobile Client Libraries for iOS, Android and Windows Phone >>> * M-Pin-in-Javascript Libraries for Browsers >>> * Cloud Encryption Gateway (under nascent development) >>> * Distributed Trust Authority Crypto App >>> * Generic library for IoT cryptographic library >>> >>> The startingpoint for these is the existing MIRACL library and tools at >>> http://github.com/Certivox/ >>> >>> === Distributed Trust Authorities === >>> The Milagro project introduces a service concept called a Distributed >>> Trust Authority, to replace either single-authority certificates or >>> public key infrastructure. >>> >>> The D-TA splits the functions of a pairing-based key generation server >>> into three services issuing thirds of private keys to distinct >>> identities. The shares of the private keys, received by Crypto App >>> clients or Distributed Key Management Endpoints, become the only >>> entities that possess any knowledge of the whole key created from the >>> shares. >>> >>> To effect anything resembling a root key compromise that can occur in a >>> traditional PKI or commercial certificate authority, ***ALL*** >>> Distributed Trust Authority servers must be compromised. >>> Cryptographically, one compromise of a Distributed Trust Authority does >>> not yield an attacker any advantage, all Distributed Trust Authority >>> master secrets inside each D-TA providing shares must be compromised. >>> Note that all 3 D-TA's operate independently and are under separate >>> organizational control. >>> >>> For the following examples, envision a Distributed Trust Authority model >>> consisting of Cloud Provider (D-TA 1), Cloud Provider end customer (D-TA >>> 2) and neutral third party (D-TA 3). >>> >>> Under this three participant model, where each member is responsible for >>> the security of their D-TA, the Cloud Provider can not subvert the >>> security of the end customer, even with the collusion of the neutral >>> third party. The end customer will not suffer an internal insider attack >>> unless the Cloud Provider and neutral third party also collude. >>> >>> === Distributed Key Management API, CLI, Endpoints === >>> The core infrastructure that consumes these thirds of private keys and >>> is responsible for their distribution is a message bus and API (D-KMS >>> API), a command line interface (CLI) and software (D-KMS Endpoints) >>> which builds the Crypto Applications from source. >>> >>> Any entity can run any mix or combination of components with other >>> entities, but there is no restriction on configuration. One party may >>> operate all three D-TAs, Endpoints and APIs if they wish. >>> >>> The D-KMS CLI communicates securely with the API. The API is responsible >>> for either creating cryptographic keys and secrets or protecting >>> existing keys and secrets through cryptographic encapsulation, via a >>> choice of pairing-based protocols. In either case, the API encapsulates >>> the keys and secrets for the identity of particular D-KMS Endpoints. >>> >>> The D-KMS Endpoints are server operating systems with D-KMS Endpoint >>> software installed. The D-KMS Endpoint software, in conjunction with the >>> D-KMS CLI, has the appropriate pairing-based cryptographic keys to be >>> able to de-encapsulate secrets and keys received from the D-KMS API. >>> These de-encapsulated secrets and keys can be stored, distributed or >>> used in Crypto Applications, such as M-Pin Authentication, Secure >>> Channel or Encryption Gateway. >>> >>> === SD-DSM / Crypto Applications === >>> Software Defined Distributed Security Modules, otherwise known as Crypto >>> Applications "Crypto Apps" get compiled from source files on-demand. >>> Crypto App source files will be hosted on major public repositories such >>> as Github and Apache. >>> >>> Crypto Applications are scaled across the datacenter through the D-KMS >>> API in conjunction with orchestration tools such as Apache Mesos and >>> consume the de-encapsulated secrets and keys. >>> >>> ==== M-Pin Authentication and Secure Channel ==== >>> M-Pin is already deployed by such organizations as NTT and Experian in a >>> two node Distributed Trust Authority model, where MIRACL and its >>> customer each host a D-TA node. In Experian's case, M-Pin was selected >>> to provide authentication for Experian's identity assurance platform, >>> contracted to the UK Government, for secure authentication of online >>> citizens into UK government websites, including HMRC (tax office). M-Pin >>> was selected based on its security efficacy and ability to scale to an >>> Internet scale user population (UK online citizenry). >>> >>> The M-Pin Authentication Platform serves as an example of what is >>> possible exploiting a pairing based protocol. M-Pin is capable of >>> running in a native browser mode, delivering two-factor authentication. >>> M-Pin binds to any identity (as long as it is worldly unique) and >>> improves the user authentication experience as it can be visualized in a >>> familiar ATM-style pin pad. >>> >>> It's most unique trait is the exploitation of zero knowledge proof >>> authentication. The M-Pin Client proves to the M-Pin Server it possesses >>> its cryptographic authentication key without revealing it to the server. >>> As a result, the M-Pin Server stores no authentication credentials, >>> eliminating the possibility of credential (i.e., password) smash n' grab >>> attacks. >>> >>> M-Pin Secure Channel extends the protocol to include authenticated key >>> agreement between server and client and mutual client-server >>> authentication. The 'agreed key' is unique for each session, possessing >>> perfect forward secrecy. >>> >>> M-Pin Secure Channel takes the agreed key and injects the key into a >>> TLS-PSK session between client and server, providing mutual >>> authentication and perfect forward secrecy without the need for PKI. >>> This cryptographic underpinning can be extended to create secure VPN >>> sessions over various protocols. >>> >>> In an M-Pin client and server context, clients and servers receive their >>> shares of their private keys from all three Distributed Trust >>> Authorities. In the previously mentioned example, this could be Cloud >>> Provider, end customer and neutral third party or any combination >>> thereof. >>> >>> M-Pin Client and Server code are already open source, having been >>> previously released under BSD-Clause-3. >>> >>> The next iteration and revision will be licensed under the Apache >>> License. >>> >>> ==== Cloud Encryption Gateway ==== >>> Many proprietary solutions have appeared on the information security >>> market to solve data governance issues about securing data in the cloud >>> with encryption keys managed by an end customer. To date, most of these >>> solutions involve purchasing hardware or virtualized appliances to run >>> in an end customer's datacenter, with nothing more delivered than a >>> single encryption key under control of the end customer, performing >>> sub-optimum deterministic encryption on data sent to the cloud. >>> >>> The Milagro Cloud Encryption Gateway will be a virtualized or container >>> based software, deployed in an end customer's environment. This CEG will >>> exploit pairing-based capabilities such as attribute-based encryption >>> (anyone in possession of the correct set of attributes can decrypt) and, >>> more generally, predicate-based encryption (anyone in possession of the >>> right set of attributes and a decryption key corresponding to a >>> particular predicate can decrypt). >>> >>> Doing so increases the flexibility of the solution by being enabled to >>> address data residency and governance requirements such as geo-location >>> while allowing key management and rotation protocols to be enforced. >>> >>> == Rationale == >>> The benefits of a strong authentication, secure channel and cloud >>> encryption via an identity framework for people and things are >>> self-evident, and the plethora of homebrew proprietary solutions and >>> password nightmares seen today is clear evidence of a need for better >>> solutions. >>> >>> Milagro's distributed trust model is particularly attractive, by virtue >>> of dispensing with need for (and potential for abuse of) any central >>> trust authority without requiring sophistication - such as understanding >>> a Web of Trust - from end users. >>> >>> A move to incubation at Apache will help the community to grow and take >>> on new members in an environment that guarantees open development and >>> protection of participants. >>> >>> This is particularly relevant right now as a second corporate team, NTT >>> Data, with its own culture joins as core developers. For the outside >>> world, it offers the strong promise of openness. >>> >>> == Initial Goals == >>> Milagro will seek to integrate the existing projects at Certivox (now >>> MIRACL) and NTT, and will invite participation from a nascent broader >>> community evidenced by the core MIRACL library's 65 watchers and 29 >>> forks at Github. >>> >>> As well as looking to broaden direct participation, it will seek >>> synergies with relevant Apache projects, for example by providing >>> Milagro plugins for HTTPD and Trafficserver. >>> >>> The initial software products will be the current standing M-Pin Core >>> platform, client libraries and the SD-DSM and Distributed Key Management >>> API and client CLI (as noted above). >>> >>> == Current Status == >>> Certivox (now MIRACL) has developed open source software at Github since >>> 2014, though the core MIRACL library goes back much further. Projects >>> currently at Github include the M-Pin Authentication Platform and the >>> MIRACL cryptographic libraries under BSD-Clause-3 and AGPL licenses. >>> >>> These have attracted both community and corporate interest taking them >>> beyond the realm of a single-company project, with NTT being the second >>> corporate team to take a substantial part in development. The project >>> now seeks to transition smoothly to a full Open Development model. >>> >>> The core team at Certivox (now MIRACL) is geographically dispersed and >>> developers are well-accustomed to using online infrastructure and tools >>> for their everyday work. The team at NTTi3 and NTT DATA and other >>> contributing developers are included amongst the initial committers. >>> >>> In addition to MIRACL operating a community D-TA, NTT, Experian and >>> Dimension Data have all agreed to host no-charge community D-TAs. Other >>> cloud providers are considering and have been engaged. An open source >>> platform from which to offer these services is a necessary component to >>> finalizing and launching community D-TA's. >>> >>> == Meritocracy and Community == >>> The project is moving from a single (startup) company open source >>> project seeking a wider community, to embrace a second corporate >>> development team and third-party developers. The project is committed >>> to broadening the community through meritocracy, and expects to welcome >>> contributions and recognize contributors. >>> >>> It is hoped that incubation at Apache will help with this broadening, by >>> providing a widely-recognised and well-understood framework for working >>> collaboratively, growing communities, and protecting contributors. >>> >>> == Core Developers == >>> Dr. Michael Scott, Chief Cryptographer at Certivox (now MIRACL), has >>> been a major open source and standards contributor to the field of >>> elliptic curve cryptography for over twenty-five years. >>> >>> Others include >>> >>> === Existing team at Certivox/MIRACL: === >>> . Patrick Hilt - CTO >>> . Kealan Mccusker - Cryptographer >>> . Stanislav Mihaylov - Architect >>> . Simeon Aladhem - Developer >>> >>> === Existing team at NTT: === >>> . Go Yamamoto - Cryptographer >>> . Kenji Takahishi - Developer >>> >>> === Existing ASF Member: === >>> . Nick Kew - Developer >>> >>> == Alignment: == >>> Whereas Milagro has no track record of its own, the Certivox (now >>> MIRACL) team have been working on related projects at Github. Being >>> geographically diverse, the team is well-accustomed to day-to-day >>> working in a similar environment to Apache and with similar tools and >>> processes. The anticipated role of Apache is to help the community to >>> grow without fragmentation of communities, code, or intellectual >>> property. >>> >>> We are not aware of any link with existing Apache projects. However, it >>> is likely that several Apache projects may be interested in working with >>> Milagro to provide distributed identity services. Plugins for HTTPD and >>> Trafficserver are already anticipated. >>> >>> == Known Risks == >>> === Orphaned products === >>> Milagro, as successor to the existing MIRACL and M-Pin software at >>> github, is at the core of Certivox (now MIRACL)'s business and important >>> to NTT, Experian, and other platform adopters who are in the process of >>> coming online. >>> >>> Interest, and with it both developer and user communities, are expected >>> to grow strongly. There is little risk of the project losing momentum >>> in the foreseeable future. >>> >>> === Experience with Open Source === >>> The software has a history as open source, developed until recently by a >>> geographically distributed team within a single company. Github activity >>> shows some evidence of a wider community. The major new development >>> that leads the proposers to seek incubation at Apache is the coming of >>> new corporate interest: while both corporate teams have open-source >>> experience, their cultures and backgrounds differ. >>> >>> We hope that incubation at Apache may help the teams collaborate in an >>> environment of mutual benefit, as well as attract independent developers >>> to play a full part. >>> >>> === Homogenous Developers. === >>> The established corporate teams are dispersed across several European >>> countries and Japan. Prospective developers (whose companies are >>> interested in Milagro) are located in other countries, and we anticipate >>> a global community. >>> >>> === Reliance on Salaried Developers === >>> Most of the initial committers are salaried developers from the core >>> corporate teams. Github activity, including 29 forks of the Miracl >>> library, indicates wider community interest, and it is hoped that the >>> developer community will grow substantially at Apache. >>> >>> === Apache Brand === >>> The Apache brand is of course seen as an advantage. However, the >>> project is more directly concerned with the Apache platform and >>> environment to unite diverse teams. >>> >>> == Relationships with Other Apache Products == >>> See Alignment above. >>> >>> == Documentation == >>> Milagro derives from Certivox's existing M-Pin, MIRACL and associated >>> tools at github.com/Certivox/ Documentation at http://docs.certivox.com/ >>> may also inform and feed into the Milagro project. >>> >>> == Initial Source and Intellectual Property == >>> As soon as Milagro is accepted into the Incubator, Certivox (now MIRACL) >>> will transfer the source code and trademark to the ASF with a Software >>> Grant, and licensed under the Apache License 2.0. Certivox/MIRACL >>> retains rights to its existing MIRACL mark. >>> >>> == External Dependencies == >>> There are no external dependencies and all software is under the sole >>> ownership of Certivox/MIRACL. >>> >>> == Cryptography == >>> This is advanced cryptographic software, and as such may be subject to >>> government interest and red tape in some countries. However, the >>> architecture by which SD-DSM / Crypto Apps are distributed, via open >>> source freely available code repositories, is intentional to exploit the >>> near universal interpretation of the Wassenar agreement to permit export >>> of open source cryptography without restriction (in most cases). >>> >>> == Required Resources == >>> Mailinglists: >>> >>> * private >>> * dev >>> * users >>> >>> Git repository (to mirror existing github repo) >>> >>> * https://git-wip-us.apache.org/repos/asf/incubator-milagro.git >>> >>> Issue Tracking >>> >>> * JIRA repository to be requested >>> >>> ==== Trust Authority Service ==== >>> The podling would like to request a VM at >>> "ta.milagro[.incubator].apache.org" with which to run a Community Trust >>> Authority. It is anticipated that this will serve as a test facility >>> for developers and may become a Trust Authority for the community of ASF >>> committers. >>> >>> == Initial Committers == >>> * Akira Nagai (NTT) >>> * Brian Spector (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Fuji Hitoshi (NTT) >>> * Genoveffa Pagano (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Go Yamamoto (NTT) >>> * Jordan Katserov (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Kealan Mccusker (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Kenji Takahishi (NTT) >>> * Michael Scott (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Milen Rangelove (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Mitko Yugovski (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Michael Scott (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Nick Kew (Apache) >>> * Nick Pateman (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Patrick Hilt (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Simeon Aladhem (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Stanislav Mihaylov (Certivox/MIRACL) >>> * Tetsutaro Kobayashi (NTT) >>> >>> == Sponsors == >>> === Champion === >>> . Nick Kew >>> >>> === Mentors === >>> * Sterling Hughes >>> * Jan Willem Janssen >>> * Nick Kew >>> >>> === Sponsoring Entity === >>> . The Apache Incubator >>> >>> >>> >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> To unsubscribe, e-mail: general-unsubscr...@incubator.apache.org >>> For additional commands, e-mail: general-h...@incubator.apache.org >> -- >> Jean-Baptiste Onofré >> jbono...@apache.org >> http://blog.nanthrax.net >> Talend - http://www.talend.com >> >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> To unsubscribe, e-mail: general-unsubscr...@incubator.apache.org >> For additional commands, e-mail: general-h...@incubator.apache.org > > > -- > Colm O hEigeartaigh > > Talend Community Coder > http://coders.talend.com
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