On Sat, 2008-09-20 at 10:08 +0100, Robert Burrell Donkin wrote: > On Fri, Sep 19, 2008 at 6:11 PM, Justin Erenkrantz > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 19, 2008 at 6:12 AM, Hiram Chirino <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> How about we include the signatures in the source distros? That way > >> if you trust your source, then you can trust the dependencies it > >> downloads. > > > > Eww. That'd be a giant gaping security hole. > > not necessarily, depends how it's done > > signing works through trusting the people who own the keys. given > sufficient signaturees (to prevent small conspiracies), where the > signatures are downloaded from shouldn't matter.
Hiram suggested to put the signatures into the source, which in turn is also distributed from the repo. If you compromise the repo and change the artifact, it is trivial to update the source artifact to contain a matching signature. This is a security hole. And I don't really care for some of the proposed "high nineties" security solutions. Either a solution is secure or it is not. Everything else is just FUD. The problem with the central repo is that you need an easy accessible web of trust if you want validation. The Apache web of trust is distributed and an overlay to the GPG web of trust. But if you live in Juneau, Alaska, it is hard for you to access it and get a trust relationship to it. There is a (bit rusty) proposal on how to improve this at http://people.apache.org/~henkp/trust/ Ciao Henning --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
