On 10/19/15 9:34 PM, Dongjie (Jimmy) wrote:
Hi Robert,
Thanks a lot for your review and comments. Please see my replies inline:
-----Original Message-----
From: ietf [mailto:ietf-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Robert Sparks
Sent: Saturday, October 17, 2015 5:31 AM
To: General Area Review Team; i...@ietf.org; p...@ietf.org;
draft-ietf-pals-redundance-spe....@ietf.org
Subject: Gen-art LC review: draft-ietf-pals-redundancy-spe-02
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Document: draft-ietf-pals-redundancy-spe-02
Reviewer: Robert Sparks
Review Date: 16 Oct 2015
IETF LC End Date: 19 Oct 2015
IESG Telechat date: 22 Oct 2015
Summary: Almost ready for publication as PS but with issues that need to be
discussed/addressed
This document is hard to read. It is more acronym-laden than it needs to be.
We will expand the acronyms on first use in next revision.
That won't change how hard this is to read.
Expanding the acronyms on first use won't make the prose later in the
document any different.
The use of acronyms for the elements involved in almost all of the prose
is unnecessary. The words for them are short enough.
-----
There is a process issue that the IESG should pay attention to.
The shepherd writeup says this:
"There is one IPR declaration (1911) raised in November 2012 against
an early version of the draft. There was no discussion in the WG
related to this."
That happens sometimes, but it's much better to have a real indication that the
group considered the disclosure and explicitly decided not to change directions.
-----
I hope Andy and Deborah have solved your concern on this.
The last sentence of the 2nd paragraph (declaring multi-homing on both sides of
an S-PE out of scope) should be moved earlier in the document.
The introduction and perhaps even the abstract can be clearer about what _is_
in scope.
Agreed, will move it to the introduction of the document.
Thanks.
It needs to be clearer where the normative description of behavior is.
I think you're intending it to be the first part of section 3. I have not worked
through the references enough to ensure that it is complete.
Yes, the first part of section 3 defines the operation of S-PE.
The third paragraph starts off "In general, ...". Are there any specific cases
where the requirements that follow do not hold? If so, there needs to be more
description. If not, please delete "In general,".
We will remove "in general" in next revision.
Are sections 3.1 and 3.2 supposed to be only examples? Would the specification
of the protocol be complete if they were deleted? If not, something needs to be
moved up into the main part of section 3.
For instance, is the SHOULD at the end of 3.1 a requirement placed by this
document, or is it restating a requirement from somewhere else?
Similarly, please inspect the SHOULD in the second paragraph of 3.2.
I also suggest moving 3.1 and 3.2 into their own section, clearly labeling them
as examples.
Good question. The last sentence of section 3.1 and 3.2 can be moved up into
the main part.
Since section 3.1 and 3.2 specifies the typical scenarios, my feeling is they
are more than examples. May be better to keep them in section 3?
No, I don't think so.
If they can't be removed, then there is some part of this addition to
the protocol suite that you are specifying by example, rather then
specifying the behavior explicitly. That usually means you're
under-specifying, and hoping people will infer (guess) the right thing
to do in the unspecified cases. You will end up with better
interoperability by being explicit.
Is it worth more explanation in the document why you've added the MUST NOT
in the first paragraph of section 3?
Because if S-PE Bypass Mode is used, the S-PE will not receive the PW status
message originated by T-PEs. We will add some explanation about this.
Thanks again.
The security considerations section only points off to other documents.
Most of those just point to each other. Chasing it back, there's some meat in
the
security considerations section of 4447, and some in 5085, but it's a real chase
to find what's relevant. Please consider calling out what an implementer
needs to consider explicitly here.
Since this document is mainly about reusing the redundancy mechanisms of
RFC6870 on the S-PE nodes, we think the security considerations of these
referenced documents could suffice.
That misses the point - whatever is important in those considerations
for what this document is talking about is buried.
Why didn't you just copy the security considerations section of 6870
into this document? (I'm not suggesting you do that - your use of
"mainly" above says that wouldn't be enough. _Why_ it's not enough is
worth capturing in this document.)
Isn't there something to new to say here about failure cases? You
essentially have some new actors that (if they were to misbehave, or if
someone could pretend to be them) could _cause_ at least the S-PE to
believe there was a failure. Is that already discussed somewhere?
And for an implementer IMO there is nothing new to be considered.
Best regards,
Jie
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