Hi Tiru,
You have resolved many of my concerns.
I raised a number of questions, and in many cases you responded with an
explanation of how you intend for things to work. That is good - in most
cases the answer makes sense to me. But my point in raising the
questions was that I don't think the -11 version is clear and
unambiguous about these points. Your answers to me don't resolve that.
What I am hoping for is that you will make draft revisions that resolve
the ambiguity in the way you intend.
More inline.
On 6/29/15 4:21 AM, Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) wrote:
Hi Paul,
Thanks for the detailed review. Please see inline
-----Original Message-----
From: Paul Kyzivat [mailto:pkyzi...@alum.mit.edu]
Sent: Saturday, June 27, 2015 2:32 AM
To: draft-ietf-pcp-authentication....@tools.ietf.org
Cc: General Area Review Team
Subject: Gen-ART Last Call review of draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-11.txt
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART,
please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Please resolve these comments along with any other comments you may
receive.
This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described in this review.
For the most part my issues are with confusing and/or ambiguous language and
under-specification. This means some clued in implementers will be able to
create functional, interoperable, implementations. But others, working just
from the specification, may build arguably conforming implementations that
fail to interoperate.
I've opted not to split major and minor issues out separately, because I thought
it better to put things in document order. But please take special note of my
comments on sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 that highlight what I believe to be a true
protocol errors. I did note those points I consider nits.
Disclaimer: I do not claim to be a security expert. The authors are vastly more
qualified than I on security matters. So I have not tried to discern if there
are
technical security holes in this specification.
I’ll start with some general comments, and then follow with specific comments
on particular parts of the document.
Thanks,
Paul Kyzivat
* General Comments:
I assume that a reader of this document is reasonably familiar with the RFCs
that specify PCP and EAP. (When I began this review, I was not, so I read them
before starting this review.) I apologize if I have made technical mistakes in
my
understanding of those protocols.
There is a fundamental inconsistency of approach between PCP and EAP.
Both are client/server protocols, but for most of the expected usage a PCP
client will be the EAP server and visa versa. So this draft works hard to
reconcile
this difference. I *think* it has, for the most part, done so *technically*,
but not
so well with the terminology and language. For example, while reading the
draft it was a constant struggle to understand whether a request is a PCP
request containing response pertaining to EAP, or a request pertaining to EAP
contained in a PCP response.
I have another concern about the big picture of the protocol. There is much
material about message level details, but not much about how they all play
together. Some things I had trouble with:
- Once a PA session is initiated, may common PCP messages that are not part of
that session continue to be exchanged ?
No, otherwise PCP messages will not get integrity protection.
My question was whether it was allowed, not whether it was recommended.
I find nothing that forbids it.
Also, if one wanted to establish more than one concurrent SA (if that is
to be allowed) then I think, after establishing one SA, that to create
another it is necessary to send some messages that are not within the
first SA.
My point is simply that whatever behaviors you want to allow and forbid
need to be clarified normatively in the text.
- Is it permissible to have more than one concurrent PA session active between
the same PCP client and server?
Yes, it is possible but typically PCP authentication only happens once for a
host and multiple applications on the host will use same SA.
As noted above, if allowed then there must be some way to establish.
These might be multiple sessions created with
the same credentials, or using different credentials. (E.g.
to support both a "regular" and "superuser" level of privilege.)
No, typically single session will created for a PCP client. PCP client will be
an endpoint and will not have different credentials in the same administrative
domain.
I guess if multiple SAs are allowed, and possible to establish, then
they will be usable to accomplish this kind of usage.
- If multiple sessions are permitted, how to avoid accumulating many active
sessions ?
PCP server rejects session request from the client, error codes like
(USER_EX_QUOTA) are discussed in RFC 6887.
OK. I guess that is probably sufficient.
To address this, I would hope to see some state models and some example
message sequence diagrams that show how this plays out in practice.
(Consider: PCP client starts without credentials. At some point it tries a
request
that requires authentication. It does so using "normal"
credentials. Later, within that PA Session it tries a request that requires
"superuser" authentication. How would this be indicated? How would the new
authentication take place? How would the client know what credentials to use?
How to revert back to "normal" privilege?)
PCP client will typically not be using multiple credentials with the PCP
server. PCP server which has PCP authentication enabled will permit MAP/PEER
only after authentication is successful.
OK. I guess that if you don't consider this to be an expected usage
there is no need to discuss how to do it.
Another thing: it appears to me that this document makes a change to the PCP
protocol that was not anticipated as an extension point in RFC6887.
Specifically, it uses part of the "Reserved" portion of the PCP request message.
There should be no technical problem with doing this, but I think this means
that this document should be marked as updating RFC6887. Ideally 6887 would
be revised, splitting off the last 8 bits of the Reserved field as a separate
field
that is available for opcode-specific use. That would eliminate the possibility
that some future revision of 6687 would assign that field for some other use.
This document uses the reserved portion only for the Authentication opcode and
will not impact existing opcodes or future opcodes.
It would be a problem if the base PCP was revised in the future to use
the portion of the response code for something else, that applied to
*all* opcodes.
So this use precludes such a change in the future. My point was to make
this clear to everybody - even those who don't know or care about this
extension to PCP.
Regarding lifetime: All PCP messages carry a lifetime field. But this seems to
differ from the "session lifetime" that is passed in an option.
I find *no* mention of the PCP lifetime in this document. IMO there should be
*some* statement of what to do with that.
ISTM that there are two distinct but
similar things here:
- The lifetime of a PA session (validity of the session ID). Presumably it has
to
become valid upon the first PA message from the PA-Client, and it remains
valid through initial authentication (or until failure of
that) and through any and all re-authentications. The PA-Server can’t send PA
messages to the PA-Client without having this session. So it needs to know how
long it will remain valid. And this lifetime should be bounded so that an
authentication attempt that never completed doesn’t leave a session forever.
This is quite analogous to the lifetime of a mapping, and could conceivably be
managed the same way, using the lifetime field in the PCP messages.
- The lifetime of a PA SA and associated keys. Presumably this begins at the
successful completion of the initial EAP negotiation, and is revised upon a
successful re-authentication. This is needed for authenticating Common PCP
messages within the PA session.
This document is only discussing lifetime of a PA SA and PCP lifetime discussed
in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6887#section-7.2 is the lifetime of the
mapping created on PCP-aware firewall and NAT devices using MAP or PEER opcodes.
Added the following lines to make it clear:
The Requested Lifetime field of PA-Client message and Lifetime field of
PA-Server message are both set to 0 on transmission and ignored on reception.
OK.
Currently these two seem to be conflated. Even if you are happy bundling these
into one concept then still *something* should be said about how the PCP
lifetime field is used.
* Section 2:
Re PCP-Authentication (PA) message:
PCP-Authentication (PA) message: A PCP message containing an
Authentication Opcode. Particularly, a PA message sent from a PCP
server to a PCP client is referred to as a PA-Server, while a PA
message sent from a PCP client to a PCP server is referred to as a
PA-Client. Therefore, a PA-Server is actually a PCP response message
specified in [RFC6887], and a PA-Client is a PCP request message.
This terminology seems odd. It seems to say that the term "PA-Server"
describes a *message*. But a name like that should seemingly describe a type
of server, not a message. I suggest not doing this – instead, use "PA-Client
message" and "PA-Server message" when referring to such messages. Instead,
define and use "PA-Client" and "PA-Server"
analogously to PCP Client and PCP Server.
Updated.
(Could there be cases where the PCP Client also needs to authenticate the PCP
Server, and the EAP method used doesn’t support mutual authentication? I
don’t think the existing text contemplates that possibility, even though
RFC3748 does. Supporting that would require a lot of changes.)
No, the mandatory to implement EAP method (EAP-TTLS) discussed in the draft
does support mutual authentication.
OK.
Re Common PCP message:
Common PCP message: A PCP message which does not contain an
Authentication Opcode. This document specifies an Authentication Tag
Option to provide integrity protection and message origin
authentication for the common PCP messages.
It isn’t clear to me if this term is intended to cover all PCP messages not
containing the Authentication opcode, or only messages that contain the
Authentication Tag Option. The usages in the document seem to make different
assumptions about this. I’ve assumed that it covers messages both with and
without that option unless explicitly qualified. It would be helpful to have
distinct terms for those with and without.
All PCP messages without Authentication opcode will contain the Authentication
Tag Option.
I don't see that stated anywhere. If that is the intent, then it needs
to be.
Also, it isn't literally true, since those before the first PA message
won't. And I guess if the SA is terminated, then any after that won't.
It might be easier if you had separate terms, such as:
- Unauthenticated PCP messages
- Authenticated PCP messages
Then if you want this restriction, then you could say that when an SA is
in effect that no Unauthenticated PCP messages may be sent.
But note that making this restriction then prevents establishing
multiple SAs with different credentials.
PCP device: This term is not defined in this terminology section, or anywhere
else I can find, in this document or in RFC6887. But it is used frequently.
IIUC it
means "PCP Client or PCP Server" and is closely related to Session Partner.
There ought to be a definition of it, or if appropriate, usages could be
replaced
with Session Partner.
Updated terminology.
* Section 3.1:
... Each PA message is attached with an Authentication Opcode ...
This language is awkward/confusing. I *think* you mean:
... Each PA message MUST contain an Authentication Opcode
Updated.
(Actually, all occurrences of "attached with" deserve a look.)
Then the following:
... The Authentication Opcode consists of two fields: Session ID and
Sequence Number. ...
Again this language seems odd: a PCP opcode doesn’t contain fields like this,
though it may be *accompanied* by such fields. After reading ahead, I guess
you mean:
... The opcode-specific information of each PA message contains
two fields: Session ID and Sequence Number. ...".
Changed.
* Section 3.1.1:
In the following:
When a PCP client intends to proactively initiate a PA session with a
PCP server, it sends a PA-Initiation message (a PA-Client message
with the result code "INITIATION") to the PCP server.
It seems odd to have a "result code" in a *request*. (I would expect it to be
in a
*response*.) It does make *some* sense when what is being sent is a response
to a prior EAP request, but that is not the case here. Here it is serving as a
sub-
opcode.
ISTM that using the PCP result code in PCP requests is confusing, in addition to
being contrary to the definition of the PCP request message.
I suggest refining the terminology and language around this. E.g., define
appropriate new names for these fields and alias them to the PCP fields.
Then:
... From now on, every PCP message within this session
will be attached with this session identifier. ...
Again the language usage is odd, and apparently non-normative. And what
does "within this session" mean? This document defines PA Session, so it could
mean that. Or it could mean PCP Session – except that AFAICT PCP has no
notion of a PCP session.
If it means PA Session, then the statement is odd because it is a truism. If
that
is the intent, then I suggest rewording it as:
... Subsequent PCP messages to be included in this PA Session MUST contain
this session identifier. ...
Yes, updated.
If this is intended to mean that once a PA Session is established then
*all* messages must be within it, then more substantial document changes are
needed.
Then:
... If the PCP client intends to simplify the
authentication process, it MAY append an EAP Identity Response
message within the PA-Initiation message so as to inform the PCP
server that it would like to perform EAP authentication and skip the
step of waiting for the EAP Identity Request.
I don’t understand how this can work. IIUC the intent is to tunnel EAP within
PCP, not to change EAP. AFAICT EAP has no provision for sending an EAP
response message without having first received a corresponding request. The
response message will have to contain an EAP Identifier, which is normally
assigned by the Authenticator. In this case that wouldn’t be available, so the
PCP client would have to make up a value.
The authenticator won’t be expecting a response for this identifier. (Or worse,
it may have just happened to send a request using this identifier.)
If this behavior is desired, then I think an extension to EAP is needed to allow
an EAP peer to preemptively provide identity. (I apologize if I have
misunderstood EAP on this point.)
Yes, it is mentioned as "MAY" in case if EAP supports this mechanism in future.
As the statement is worded it implies that this is valid usage. If you
are simply future proofing for an anticipated EAP extension then IMO it
would be wise to explain that is what you are doing, and that you are
not encouraging invalid usage.
Then, regarding the message sequence diagram:
(nit): the message sequence diagram uses "EAP request" and "EAP response"
while the text uses "EAP identity request" and "EAP identity response".
Consistent terminology should be used.
Updated.
* Section 3.1.2:
I have been studying the message sequence diagram in this section along with
RFC6887. As best I can understand, this is not a valid sequence.
I see the PCP client sending a Common PCP request, but I see no matching PCP
response message for that. (This should trigger retransmission of the request.)
Instead, I see the PCP server sending a PA-Server message.
That will have a different opcode, and so can’t be considered a response to the
Common PCP message. If the PCP client has not previously sent a PA message
(the case here) it is supposed to ignore this message.
No, PCP allows server to send unsolicited response. For example refer to the
usage of ANNOUNCE explained in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6887#section-14.1.3
I just reviewed 6887 again on this point. I agree that it does
explicitly allow sending of unsolicited *ANNOUNCE* responses. It
certainly appears to be a very narrow exception. OTOH, I guess it does
establish a precedent that such exceptions are possible, so I will grant
that you can declare the usage in this draft to be another exception.
BUT, that doesn't make the PA response serve as a response to the Common
PCP request that triggered it. That request still needs a response of
its own. And I don't see that mentioned anywhere. I can't even guess
what is intended. Do you intend that the response is simply deferred
until after the SA is negotiated? Or is the client intended to *retry*
that request after the SA is established?
Deferring the response seems problematic. The normal processing of that
request by the client will trigger resending it periodically. And if the
SA negotiation takes long enough the retry process may time out.
ISTM that the obvious conclusion is that that request needs an error
response. Potentially the session ID could be carried in an option on
that response. In that case an unsolicited PA response wouldn't be needed.
I was *expecting* to see the PCP server send a PCP response to the Common
PCP message, with result AUTHENTICATION-REQUIRED. Then, the PCP client to
send a PA-Client message to initiate the PA session. That could be exactly like
the sequence in 3.1.1, or it might be optimized somehow.
(I defer commenting on the text in this section pending clarification of these
issues.)
* Section 3.1.3:
IIUC, PCP requires that the PCP client send a PA-client message before the PCP
server can send any PA-server messages. Once that has been done the PCP
server is allowed to send an arbitrary number of "responses" to that, enabling
the exchange of EAP messages. The server messages must "match" the client
message by opcode and opcode-specific data according to opcode-specific
rules. (I think the intent for PA messages is that they must match on the
session
ID.)
If I’m right about this, it would be good to explain that before the content of
this section. (It took me a lot of reading before I figured this out.)
Then:
... If a PCP device receives a PA message from its partner and
cannot generate an EAP response immediately due to certain reasons
(e.g., waiting for human input to construct a EAP message or waiting
for the additional PA messages in order to construct a complete EAP
message), the PCP device MUST reply with a PA-Acknowledgement message
(PA message with a Received Packet Option) ...
The use of "PCP device" suggests this is intended to apply to both the PCP
client
and server. But the use of "generate an EAP response" implies that this must be
the PA-Client, since only it sends EAP responses. And that is consistent with
sending a PA-Acknowledgement (request) message.
If I’m right about this, then perhaps the following would be a clearer wording
of the above:
... If a PA-Client receives a PA message containing an EAP request
and cannot generate an EAP response immediately due to certain
reasons (e.g., waiting for human input to construct a EAP message
or waiting for the additional PA messages in order to construct a
complete EAP message), the PA-Client MUST send a PA-Acknowledgement
message (PA message with a Received Packet Option) ...
Updated.
Then:
In this approach, it is mandated for a PCP client and a PCP server to
perform a key-generating EAP method in authentication. Particularly,
a PCP authentication implementation MUST support EAP-TTLS [RFC5281]
and SHOULD support TEAP [RFC7170]. Therefore, after a successful
authentication procedure, a Master Session Key (MSK) will be
generated. If the PCP client and the PCP server want to generate a
transport key using the MSK, they need to agree upon a Pseudo-Random
Function (PRF) for the transport key derivation and a MAC algorithm
to provide data origin authentication for subsequent PCP messages.
In order to do this, the PCP server needs to append a set of PRF
Options and MAC Algorithm Options to the initial PA-Server message.
Each PRF Option contains a PRF that the PCP server supports, and each
MAC Algorithm Option contains a MAC (Message Authentication Code)
algorithm that the PCP server supports. Moreover, in the first PA-
Server message, the server MAY also attach an ID Indicator Option
defined in Section 5.11 to direct the client to choose correct
credentials. After receiving the options, the PCP client selects the
PRF and the MAC algorithm which it would like to use, and then adds
the associated PRF and MAC Algorithm Options to the next PA-Client
message.
In the above there appears to be quite a bit of normative behavior that has no
2119 language. (E.g., "it is mandated", "will be generated", "the PCP client
selects ... then adds".) IMO this should be tightened up with
2119 language.
Thanks, fixed.
The last two paragraphs of this section explain, in part, the use of messages
with result codes AUTHENTICATION-SUCCEEDED, AUTHENTICATION-FAILED,
and DOWGRADE-ATTACK-DETECTED. Section 3.1.1 explains the use of
AUTHENTICATION-REQUIRED. Elsewhere is explanation of SESSION-
TERMINATED. Of those, it appears that only AUTHENTICATION-REQUIRED is
used with messages carrying EAP messages, and then I only see mention of it
being used with the *first* EAP message.
Is AUTHENTICATION-REQUIRED to be used with all PA messages that contain
EAP messages?
Yes.
NEW:
The result code for PA-Sever message carrying EAP Identity request will be set
to AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED.
What about the other EAP messages? What PCP result code should be used
for them? Someplace should specify that.
If so, that should be specified. If not, then what should be used
with the others?
Those two paragraphs also say to "terminate the session" in some error cases.
Then the following section 3.2 talks about Session Termination. I
*guess* that in the error cases you mean that local session state is dropped
without sending a SESSION-TERMINATED request. It would be good to be clear
about that.
* Section 3.2:
This says that upon receiving a SESSION-TERMINATED from a partner one must
also send a SESSION-TERMINATED. Why? That could lead to an infinite
exchange of messages. Also, once the PA SA is removed, any subsequently
received PA message won’t match any session and so will presumably be
dropped. More clarity here would help.
It was added because PCP messages are exchanged over UDP and the PCP device
needs to know if it's partner has received the termination-indicating PA
message or not.
OK. But in what cases is that needed?
If the PCP Client is the first to send SESSION-TERMINATED, then I
presume a response is to be expected, and it will be retried until a
response is received. So that doesn't require a special rule.
The case where it matters is when the PCP Server is the first to send an
unsolicited response with SESSION-TERMINATED. In that case it may indeed
be lost. So that is the case when sending one the other way makes sense.
Here is a possible rewording:
A PA session can be explicitly terminated by either session partner.
A PCP Server may explicitly request termination of the session by
sending an unsolicited termination-indicating PA response (a PA
response with a result code "SESSION-TERMINATED"). Upon receiving
a termination-indicating request, the PCP Server MUST send a
response to the request, and SHOULD then remove the associated PA
SA. A PCP Client may explicitly request termination of the session by
sending a termination-indicating PA request (a PA request with a
result code "SESSION-TERMINATED"). It MUST then remove the
associated PA SA upon receiving any response to that request.
This results in the minimal number of messages, and ensures that the SA
will remain long enough to process those messages.
* Section 3.3:
A session partner may select to perform EAP re-authentication if it
would like to update the PCP SA without initiating a new PA session.
A re-authentication procedure could be triggered for the following
reasons:
o The session lifetime needs to be extended.
o The sequence number is going to reach the maximum value.
Specifically, when the sequence number reaches 2**32 - 2**16, the
session partner MUST trigger re-authentication.
(nit): IMO this would read better if you replace "select" with "elect".
Also, it is unclear (to me) whether the stated reasons are intended to be
exhaustive, or are simply examples. I *guess* that these are examples, and that
re-authentication can also be requested at whim.
Would be good to be more explicit about this.
Okay, mentioned those are only examples.
Also, what happens if re-authentication is not attempted and the session
lifetime is reached? Is there a requirement to silently terminate the session ?
Yes, server must attempt re-authentication. This is to handle the case where
PCP client could have left the network without terminating the session. In this
case re-authentication fails and server has to silently terminate the session.
The text doesn't require this. It says "A session partner *may* select
to perform EAP re-authentication".
And of course it may be that a partner might not be able to do so. (May
not be able to send *any* more messages.) So ISTM that it would best to
specify what does happen if the reauthentication is not attempted. (I
think the right thing is that the SA is silently terminated.)
Do the PA messages containing RE-AUTHENTICATION contain EAP messages ?
No.
Would be good to say that.
Or do they trigger sending EAP messages within PA messages having some
other reason code ?
No, otherwise it will complicate the mechanism.
I'm confused. This must trigger sending EAP messages *somehow*. If not
in the RE-AUTHENTICATION message, then it must be some other. I presume
it should be the same as is done for the initial authentication. But it
should be specified.
What if "glare" occurs? (Both client and server decide to send RE-
AUTHENTICATION at the same time ?)
I guess then one of the partners can back-off (preferably PCP client) and let
PCP server proceed with re-authentication.
I think it is better if the implementer doesn't have to guess. :-)
There needs to be some specification of the required behavior.
* Section 4:
At the beginning of a PA session, a session SHOULD generate a PA SA
to maintain its state information during the session. The parameters
of a PA SA are listed as follows:
Why SHOULD rather than MUST? How can any of this work if the SHOULD is
violated? ISTM the only case would be if the PA-Server refuses the initial PA
request.
Updated to MUST.
And I'll restate something I mentioned above: is it permissible for a PCP
session
to have more than one concurrently active PA sessions? If so, each will have its
own state.
Included in the listed state are *four* sequence numbers. But there is little
mention of these elsewhere in the document. Many places simply say things
like: "A sequence number needs to be incremented", "The sequence number of
the last received PCP message". (Sections 6.4 and 6.5 are more explicit.) It
would be helpful for the places that are vague about this to be more explicit.
Please mention the places where you find it is vague.
At least sections 5.2, 5.4, and 5.10.
* Section 5.1:
I'll restate that it seems confusing to define "response codes" that are not
identifying *responses*.
I guess that because the PA messages containing EAP messages invert the roles
of client and server (wrt Common PCP messages), it might make sense to have
response codes in PCP request messages that happen to be EAP response
messages. But then it is wrong terminology for PCP response messages that
contain EAP requests.
I'm not quite sure how to recommend clarifying this. The whole situation is set
up for confusion of roles, so it does require considerable care to make clear.
(*I* would be inclined to use separate fields for PCP response codes, EAP
response codes, and for "sub-opcodes" of PCP opcodes. But you have thought
about it more than I have.)
* Section 5.2:
The section title is inappropriate – the section is not about the Authentication
Opcode, it is about information that is specific and common to all messages
(requests and responses) containing the Authentication opcode. I suggest
retitling this "Opcode-specific information of PCP Auth Messages".
Updated.
Also, it says:
... A
sequence number needs to be incremented on every new (non-
retransmission) outgoing message in order to provide an ordering
guarantee for PCP messages.
This could be clearer – stating that the sequence number to use is different for
requests and responses. (And name which ones.)
It is discussed in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-11#section-6.4
Yes it does. I was eventually able to figure it out. But it took me two
readings before I understood it. It isn't essential to fix, but it would
be nice to help out the first time reader.
* Section 5.3:
Is the following intended to be normative?
If the PA-Server message does not carry the correct nonce,
the message will be discarded silently.
If so it should use 2119 language. Perhaps this section isn’t the proper place
for
that normative language, but I don’t find it anywhere else.
Okay, updated.
NEW:
If the PA-Server message does not carry the correct nonce, the message MUST be
discarded silently.
OK.
* Section 5.4:
As in section 5.2, this would benefit from describing which sequence numbers
are to be used.
Outgoing and incoming message have their respective sequence numbers and it's
usage is explained in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pcp-authentication-11#section-6.5
My earlier comment applies.
* Section 5.11:
... The two indicator
strings are to be considered equivalent by the client if they are
an exact octet-for-octet match.
Is this intended to mean "if *and only if* they are an exact match"? Or is the
client being given the option of accepting a looser match if it wishes? Right
now that seems ambiguous, so it would be good to tighten up the language to
be explicit about what you mean.
Fixed. NEW:
The two indicator strings are to be considered equivalent by the client if and
only if they are an exact octet-for-octet match.
* Section 6.1:
In this section there are separate bullets for PA messages and Common PCP
messages. Both talk about appending an "Authentication Tag Option".
But there are different options for PA messages and common messages.
ISTM the text here should reiterate that.
Yup, updated section to make it clear.
* Section 6.6:
This says that EAP lower layers indicate to EAP methods the MTU of the lower
layer. But doesn’t *this* protocol provide the "lower layer" that EAP is running
over? So isn’t this protocol responsible for determining the MTU of the layer
*it* runs over, adjust that for the overhead it adds, and providing that to the
EAP layer ?
No, PCP does not determine the path MTU.
It is a small point, and I won't pursue it. But I don't see how this
works. To determine when to fragment, the EAP lower layers need to know
both the path MTU and the overhead of any intervening layers that are
using up part of that packet size, including the PCP layer.
* Section 7:
All opcodes, result codes, and options currently registered with IANA have
names formatted as upper case tokens that are legal C-language identifiers.
(Using underscore rather than dash.) For consistency the new ones defined in
this document ought to follow that form. The new response codes are close,
but use dashes. The others are currently phrases. The new option names read
more like descriptions. (Those may be appropriate in the Purpose field.) If this
change is made, then the mnemonics can be used throughout the text. That
would be clearer.
Yes, updated draft.
All of the options registered here are to be allocated in the mandatory-to-
process range. Yet I *guess* that everything in this draft is optional for PCP.
I
guess that there is a backward compatibility requirement – that
implementations PCP with this extension interoperate with basic 6887
implementations. Doesn’t that mean that all the things registered here should
be optional to process by PCP (though still mandatory to process for those
implementing this specification.)
No, mandatory-to-process means that PCP server returns UNSUPP_OPTION if the
option is unrecognized, unimplemented, or disabled. For more info please refer
to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6887#section-7.3. For PCP authentication to
work all the new PCP options introduced in the document are mandatory for PCP
client and server to implement.
Do you mean that you intend for this extension to be mandatory for *all*
implementations of PCP? And that old implementations that don't support
it are not to interwork with new ones that do? I am guessing that is not
the case. So lets call PCP implementations that support it
Authenticating PCP clients/servers, and those that don't
Unauthenticating PCP clients/servers. And then consider the cases:
1) Authenticating client, Authenticating Server
In this cae you want both to process all the new options
2) Unauthenticating client, Unauthenticating server
The options won't be used here so it doesn't matter
3) Authenticating client, Unauthenticating server
This will be like (2), except in case where the client sends a
PA-Initiation request. While this has options, presumably the opcode
will be rejected and so the processing of options is irrelevant. A smart
client will decide that the failure of the PA-Initiation should be ignored.
4) Unauthenticating client, Authenticating server
This case is entangled with my concerns about section 3.1.2 of the
draft. The first issue will be when the client receives a PA-response to
one of its Common PCP requests. The client can be expected to ignore it.
It will be left retrying the request repeatedly until giving up, and
will think the server is broken.
The consequences depend a bit on how the server is using authentication.
If it unconditionally requires authentication, then it doesn't matter
much, because it will never be able to work with an unauthenticating client.
But if it only requires authentication for certain sorts of requests,
while permitting others without authentication, then this could be a
problem. But it isn't really a problem with *options*.
However this depends on if/how you end up dealing with the issues I have
earlier raised on this. If you sent a response to the message requiring
authentication, and it had an option containing the session id, then it
matters, because the client should deal with the response code (as one
it can't deal with) and not get upset if it can't process a mandatory
option it doesn't know.
Having gone through all these cases, I guess it having these be
mandatory doesn't hurt much.
Thanks,
Paul
It would be good to have numbered subsections for each distinct registry, and
maybe for each distinct value, so that they show up in the TOC. It would also be
nice to format these so that it is clear where one element ends and the next
one starts. (Right now it is very hard to read.)
Sure, added sub-sections.
Cheers,
-Tiru
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