Hi Dan,

Looks good to me.  -06 is good to go from my perspective.

--Martin

On 30 January 2012 13:37, Daniel King <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Dear Martin,
>
> Thank you for your review of draft-ietf-mpls-tp-mib-management-overview-05. 
> We have endeavoured to address your comments in our new version (06 
> attached). The comments that had specific actions or required updates are 
> summarised below. If you can email me (us) back to let us know you are happy 
> or unhappy with our updates it would be appreciated.
>
> MT – Comment 1: It's probably OK for an audience of MPLS & network management 
> experts, but this document relies heavily on assumed knowledge.  I found this 
> draft to be nigh on indecipherable.  I have no technical comments for that 
> reason.
>
> DK: Ok.
>
> MT –  Comment 2: Reading through the introduction and gap analysis, it seemed 
> like the intent of the draft is to outline requirements for MPLS-TP MIBs, not 
> to describe the additions.  It was a little surprising to see Section 6 
> launch straight into a definition of new branches, almost as if they already 
> exist.
>
> DK: This OID structure is proposed in draft-ietf-mpls-tp-te-mib-01. We have 
> clarified the text for Section 6 to include “The MPLS-TP MIB OID tree as 
> proposed in [MPLS-TP-TE-MIB] has the following structure:”
>
> MT – Comment 3:  If this is simply an initial outline, or a plan, or agreed 
> requirements, then that could be made clearer.  As it is, it reads as though 
> it were a done deal.  Later parts are clearer about this ("a new MIB module 
> will be...").  Making this more consistently stated as requirements, promises 
> or plans there is less confusion about existence, and fewer problems if the 
> plan changes.
>
> DK: Absolutely, where relevant the text now reads “where additional MIB 
> modules are necessary” and/or “A new MIB module is required to”, or 
> equivalent.
>
> MT – Comment 4: If the first paragraph of the security considerations is 
> true, then this would be great.  And that paragraph is then all that is 
> necessary.  The later paragraphs don't really add any value.  Truisms (new 
> MIBs will include security considerations), appeal for SNMPv3, and a 
> description of access control best practice are not really needed.  Do these 
> new objects change the dynamics in a way that requires new operational 
> practices?  I suspect not.
>
> DK: We kept the SNMP boilerplate security code for best practice. We felt the 
> existing Security text did not further edits.
>
> MT – Comment 5: This document has a very high density of acronyms, as well as 
> other symbols.  Providing expansions of acronyms on first use (e.g. FEC) and 
> providing some context for less frequently used symbols would help casual 
> readers.  With such a high density, it might even be easier to use expansions 
> by default for less commonly used labels.
>
> DK: Agreed, we expanded on some of the lesser known acronyms (FEC, OID, et 
> al.), but still avoiding expanding the well-known candidates (MPLS, etc.)
>
> MT – Comment 6: Bullet 5 Section 4.2.6 contains a number of strange, 
> one-bullet lists.  Try <list style="none"> if the intent is to indent these 
> notes.  If the intent is that these items are part of a larger list, then try 
> sub-sections.
>
> DK: Fixed.
>
> MT – Comment 7: The diagram in Section 4.2.10 didn't help me understand the 
> relationships at all.  The text was much easier to follow.
>
> DK: Ah, we like it and had positive comments from others so we kept the 
> figure. It is busy but adds value by showing the directional interrelations, 
> the text does enhance. Hopefully once you read the text the figure becomes 
> more useful.
>
> MT – Comment 8: Some references (RFC6370) need to be updated.
>
> DK: Fixed.
>
> Again, thanks for your time and review. Once you send me an echo-response to 
> confirm you are happy with these updates to address the relevant comments, we 
> will format, check against submission tool and then upload the new version.
>
> Br, Dan.
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