Hi David:

I'm with you. Let's see what Lars recommends here.

Pascal
http://www.xtranormal.com/watch/7011357/


> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Monday, January 24, 2011 6:08 PM
> To: Pascal Thubert (pthubert); [email protected]; [email protected]; gen-
> [email protected]
> Cc: [email protected]; [email protected];
> [email protected]
> Subject: RE: Lars Eggert's Discuss on draft-ietf-6lowpan-hc-13: (with DISCUSS)
> 
> Hi Pascal,.
> 
> > What do you think?
> 
> I think you almost read my mind :-).
> 
> When I wrote the proposed new text that you responded to, I was thinking
> about that sort of implementation issue and dithering between SHOULD and
> MUST for the integrity protection overlap.  I decided to go with MUST to see
> what would happen ;-).
> 
> I think I can live with a SHOULD for the overlap as sufficient warning to
> implementers, perhaps backed up with another sentence or two stating that
> completely unprotected data in device memory is a bad idea.  I would
> definitely like to hear at least Lars's opinion on this, as he's more of an 
> expert
> and is holding a Discuss on this topic.
> 
> Thanks,
> --David
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Pascal Thubert (pthubert) [mailto:[email protected]]
> > Sent: Monday, January 24, 2011 10:47 AM
> > To: Black, David; [email protected]; [email protected];
> > [email protected]
> > Cc: [email protected];
> > [email protected]
> > Subject: RE: Lars Eggert's Discuss on draft-ietf-6lowpan-hc-13: (with
> > DISCUSS)
> >
> > Hi David:
> >
> > For the sake of other readers, the flow we are talking about is when a
> > device in the LLN sends a compressed packet with a destination in the
> > Internet. The forwarder that routes a packet onto uncompressed space
> > has to recompute the checksum that was elided. The question is whether it
> can recompute something different than was intended and what happens if
> so.
> >
> > I understand that an integrity check overlapping is better than having
> > at some point unprotected data in memory. I certainly would prefer it
> > that way. Sadly, that is often impractical. The protection over the
> > Low Power Network(LLN)  will be at commonly L2, and might be multiple
> > hop. In that case, the checksum is elided, and then the L2 MIC is computed.
> If some bug happens between the 2, then the UDP checksum won't help
> figuring it out. So we're not 100 % covered; yet:
> >
> > - we are talking about packets being misdirected, that is the error
> > takes place in either the address or the port. If the packet is not
> > misdirected, then the existing MUST ensure that the receiver has a
> protection in place.
> > - we are talking about a software bug, not a transmission issue. The
> > checksum offers limited protection against bugs and can't be expected to
> be the solution to all bugs in the universe.
> > - A 2 bytes checksum is not so strong a protection anyway. An error
> > might still fall though in any UDP packet today in the Internet.
> >
> > I'd be glad to add some words to recommend something about overlapping
> > on top of my original text, but if we MUST it, the I'm afraid that
> > we'll prevent in practice the packets from being forwarding onto the
> internet until the checksum 0 question is solved at 6MAN.
> >
> > What do you think?
> >
> > Pascal
> > http://www.xtranormal.com/watch/7011357/
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]
> > > Sent: Monday, January 24, 2011 4:20 PM
> > > To: Pascal Thubert (pthubert); [email protected]; [email protected];
> > > gen- [email protected]
> > > Cc: [email protected];
> > > [email protected];
> > > [email protected]
> > > Subject: RE: Lars Eggert's Discuss on draft-ietf-6lowpan-hc-13:
> > > (with DISCUSS)
> > >
> > > Hi Pascal,
> > >
> > > I'd like to add some text on overlapping integrity protection.  I
> > > also don't like "MAY not" (it's bad standardese, IMHO, e.g., MAY NOT
> > > was not defined in RFC 2119).  The new text (with a few more edits)
> would be:
> > >
> > >       If a forwarding node that compresses a packet cannot
> > >         unambiguously derive such authorization, then that node
> > >         MUST NOT elide the UDP checksum when performing 6LoWPAN
> > >       compression. The forwarding node MUST verify the UDP
> > >       checksum in the packet before it is elided, and MUST
> > >         ensure that the other integrity check is in place before
> > >         verifying and eliding the checksum.
> > >
> > >       If an incoming compressed packet has the C bit set, then
> > >         a forwarding node MAY infer authorization for that packet
> > >         if the recomputed checksum is computed on data that was
> > >         integrity-protected via other means across the links
> > >         over which the checksum was elided.  A forwarding node
> > >         MUST NOT infer authorization if the node cannot unambiguously
> > >         determine the presence of this integrity protection across
> > >         the links over which the checksum was elided.
> > >
> > >       The forwarding node that expands a 6LoWPAN
> > >       packet with the C bit on MUST compute the UDP checksum on
> > >       behalf of the source node and place that checksum in the
> > >       restored UDP header as specified in the incumbent standards
> > >       RFC 768, RFC 2460.  After placing that checksum, the forwarding
> > >         node MUST either verify the other integrity check or ensure that
> > >         the other integrity check will be verified by a downstream node.
> > >
> > > Does that work?
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > --David
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Pascal Thubert (pthubert) [mailto:[email protected]]
> > > > Sent: Friday, January 21, 2011 6:24 AM
> > > > To: Black, David; [email protected]; [email protected];
> > > > [email protected]
> > > > Cc: [email protected];
> > > > [email protected]
> > > > Subject: RE: Lars Eggert's Discuss on draft-ietf-6lowpan-hc-13:
> > > > (with
> > > > DISCUSS)
> > > >
> > > > Hi David
> > > >
> > > > Thanks a lot for this; the text for the forwarding node becomes:
> > > >
> > > >      A forwarding node that compresses a packet that
> > > >     cannot unambiguously derive such authorization MUST NOT
> > > >     elide the UDP checksum when performing 6LoWPAN
> > > >     compression. The forwarding node MUST verify the UDP
> > > >     checksum in the packet before it is elided.
> > > >
> > > >     A forwarding node MAY only infer authorization from an
> > > >     incoming compressed packet if the C bit is set and
> > > >     the recomputed checksum is computed on data that
> > > >     was integrity-protected via other means
> > > >     across the links over which the checksum was elided.
> > > >
> > > >     The forwarding node that expands a 6LoWPAN
> > > >     packet with the C bit on MUST compute the UDP checksum on
> > > >     behalf of the source node and place that checksum in the
> > > >     restored UDP header as specified in the incumbent standards
> > > >     RFC 768, RFC 2460.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > This looks a lot better to me now. What do others think?
> > > >
> > > > Pascal
> > > > http://www.xtranormal.com/watch/7011357/
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]
> > > > > Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2011 3:06 AM
> > > > > To: Pascal Thubert (pthubert); [email protected];
> > > > > [email protected];
> > > > > gen- [email protected]
> > > > > Cc: [email protected];
> > > > > [email protected];
> > > > > [email protected]
> > > > > Subject: RE: Lars Eggert's Discuss on draft-ietf-6lowpan-hc-13:
> > > > > (with DISCUSS)
> > > > >
> > > > > I think the new text is much better.
> > > > >
> > > > > I think the open question on checksum recomputation is whether
> > > > > there are enough "MUST" and "MUST NOT" requirements in the new
> > > > > text to sufficiently ensure that any recomputed checksum is
> > > > > computed on data that was integrity-protected via other means
> > > > > across the links over which the checksum was elided.  If so, the
> > > > > result is concatenated protection, where the "other means" spans
> > > > > integrity protection of the packet across the gap created by
> > > > > eliding the checksum.  This approach requires assurance that the
> > > > > integrity domains overlap - an important example is that if the
> > > > > other integrity check is applied in the same node that elides
> > > > > the UDP checksum, that node MUST be implemented so that there's
> > > > > no gap in the node between checking the UDP checksum and
> > > > > application of the other integrity check where an
> > > internal corruption would be unprotected.
> > > > > Rechecking the received UDP checksum after applying the other
> > > > > integrity check is among the ways to achieve this).
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > --David
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > From: Pascal Thubert (pthubert) [mailto:[email protected]]
> > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2011 1:42 PM
> > > > > > To: Lars Eggert; The IESG; Black, David; [email protected]
> > > > > > Cc: [email protected];
> > > > > > [email protected]
> > > > > > Subject: RE: Lars Eggert's Discuss on draft-ietf-6lowpan-hc-13:
> > > > > > (with
> > > > > > DISCUSS)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Hi Lars and David:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > After the first round, the text would now look like this:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > "
> > > > > > 4.3.2.  Compressing UDP checksum
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    The UDP checksum operation is mandatory with IPv6 [RFC2460] for
> all
> > > > > >    packets.  For that reason [RFC4944] disallows the compression of
> the
> > > > > >    UDP checksum.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    With this specification, a compressor in the source transport
> > > > > >    endpoint MAY elide the UDP checksum if it is authorized by the
> Upper
> > > > > >    Layer.  The compressor MUST NOT set the C bit unless it has
> received
> > > > > >    such authorization.  The Upper Layer MAY only provide the
> > > > > >    authorization in the following cases:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    Tunneling:  In this case, 6LoWPAN is deployed as a wireless
> pseudo-
> > > > > >       fieldbus by tunneling existing field protocols over UDP.  If 
> > > > > > the
> > > > > >       tunneled PDU possesses its own addressing, security and
> integrity
> > > > > >       check, the tunneling mechanism MAY authorize to elide the UDP
> > > > > >       checksum in order to save on the encapsulation overhead.
> > > > > >    Upper Layer Message Integrity Check:  In this case, there is some
> > > > > >       other form of integrity check in the UDP payload that covers 
> > > > > > at
> > > > > >       least the same information as the UDP checksum (pseudo-
> header,
> > > > > >       data) and has at least the same strength.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    A forwarding node MAY infer authorization from an incoming
> packet if
> > > > > >    the C bit is set.  A forwarding node that cannot unambiguously
> derive
> > > > > >    such authorization MUST NOT elide the UDP checksum when
> > > performing
> > > > > >    6LoWPAN compression.  The forwarding node that expands a
> > > 6LoWPAN
> > > > > >    packet with the C bit on MUST compute the UDP checksum on
> > > > > > behalf
> > > of
> > > > > >    the source node and place that checksum in the restored UDP
> > > > > > header
> > > as
> > > > > >    specified in the incumbent standards [RFC0768], [RFC2460].
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    If a 6LoWPAN termination is also the transport endpoint and it
> > > > > >    receives a compressed packet with the C bit set, then it MUST
> drop
> > > > > >    the drop the packet unless it is explicitly authorized by the 
> > > > > > Upper
> > > > > >    Layer to accept packets with a zero checksum on that UDP port.  
> > > > > > If
> it
> > > > > >    has such authorization then it is entitled to ignore the UDP
> checksum
> > > > > >    process completely.  If the C bit is not set, the packet might 
> > > > > > have
> > > > > >    been forwarded by an edge router, so this is not an indication 
> > > > > > that
> > > > > >    the MIC is not present.  If the terminating node knows that the
> > > > > >    message integrity will be validated by the upper layer by some
> state
> > > > > >    associated to the Service Access Point, it is entitled to ignore 
> > > > > > the
> > > > > >    checksum operation as if the C bit was set.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > "
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I'm still unhappy since the text allows a middle point to
> > > > > > recomputed the checksum which then might be delivered
> > > > > > erroneously to the wrong IP
> > > > > or port.
> > > > > > This was done to ensure that a packet that flows on the
> > > > > > Internet would 'look right' to middle boxes and end points.
> > > > > >  It  is probably OK for most 802.15.4 cases since L2 security
> > > > > > is almost always on and protects the frames a lot better than
> > > > > > 2 octets of
> > > > > checksum.
> > > > > > But if there's no security at work, it would probably be
> > > > > > better to let the packet go with a zero checksum and add some
> > > > > > text on authorizing that
> > > > > an arbitrary end point.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > What do you think?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Pascal
> > > > > > http://www.xtranormal.com/watch/7011357/
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > > From: Lars Eggert [mailto:[email protected]]
> > > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2011 8:57 AM
> > > > > > > To: The IESG
> > > > > > > Cc: [email protected];
> > > > > > >[email protected]
> > > > > > >g Subject: Lars Eggert's Discuss on draft-ietf-6lowpan-hc-13:
> > > > > > >(with
> > > > > > >DISCUSS)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Lars Eggert has entered the following ballot position for
> > > > > > > draft-ietf-6lowpan-hc-13: Discuss
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and
> > > > > > > reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC
> > > > > > > lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph,
> > > > > > > however.)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Please refer to
> > > > > > > http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> > > > > > > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT
> positions.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > > > ----
> > > > > > > ----
> > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > DISCUSS:
> > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > > > ----
> > > > > > > ----
> > > > > > > --
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > [Edited to include David Black's gen-art review, since I'm
> > > > > > > already holding a discuss on part of the issues he has
> > > > > > > raised.]
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Section 4.3.2., paragraph 1:
> > > > > > > >    The UDP checksum operation is mandatory with IPv6
> > > > > > > > [RFC2460] for
> > > all
> > > > > > > >    packets.  For that reason [RFC4944] disallows the
> > > > > > > > compression of
> > > the
> > > > > > > >    UDP checksum.
> > > > > > > >    With this specification, a compressor in the source transport
> > > > > > > >    endpoint MAY elide the UDP checksum if it is authorized
> > > > > > > > by the
> > > Upper
> > > > > > > >    Layer.  The compressor SHOULD NOT set the C bit unless it has
> > > > > > > >    received such authorization.  The Upper Layer SHOULD
> > > > > > > > only provide
> > > > > the
> > > > > > > >    authorization in the following cases:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >   DISCUSS: First, I think you want to use "MUST NOT" and "MAY
> only"
> > > > > > >   here. Second, there are additional issues here (see
> > > > > > >   draft-ietf-6man-udpzero). For example, even if there is an
> > > > > > > upper
> > > layer
> > > > > > >   integrity check present for a given app, if the port number 
> > > > > > > field
> gets
> > > > > > >   corrupted and a message gets mis-delivered to an incorrect
> > > application
> > > > > > >   (port), *that* application may not have an upper layer
> > > > > > > integrity
> > > check
> > > > > > >   implemented to protect it. And so on. Have you run this part of
> the
> > > > > > >   spec by 6MAN?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Also, from David Black:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >  A forwarding node MAY imply authorization from an
> > > > > > > > incoming packet if the C bit is set.  A forwarding node
> > > > > > > > that cannot unambiguously derive such authorization SHOULD
> > > > > > > > NOT elide the UDP checksum when performing 6LoWPAN
> compression.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > This needs to be a MUST NOT.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >

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