Miguel A. Garcia wrote:
I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).
Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
or AD before posting a new version of the draft.
Document: draft-ietf-sieve-managesieve-05.txt
Reviewer: Miguel Garcia <[email protected]>
Review Date: 29 December 2008
IESG Telechat date: 18 December 2008
IETF LC End Date: 30 December 2008
Summary: The document is ready for publication as a proposed standard
RFC.
Major issues: none
Hi Miguel,
Thank you for your review!
Minor issues:
- Section 1.2 could be slightly improved to guide the reader over the
rest of the document by describing, at the very beginning, that "this
is a command-response protocol based on a client/server architecture.
The client emits a command; the server processes the command and
replies with a response" (or something like that). I am also missing a
sentence indicating that "the protocol runs over any
connection-oriented transport protocol, although at the moment, TCP
(and TCP over TLS) are the only defined transport protocols".
Ok, I will think about adding something like this.
- Section 2.1 (towards the end) has a discussion about the STARTTLS
command and the mechanism to protect against a MITM bid-down attack.
The text says:
Once a SASL security layer is established, the server MUST re-issue
the capability results, followed by an OK response. This is
necessary to protect against man-in-the-middle attacks which alter
the capabilities list prior to SASL negotiation. The capability
results MUST include all SASL mechanisms the server was capable of
negotiating with that client. This is done in order to allow the
client to detect active down-negotiation attack.
What I am missing here is some normative text that instructs clients
to do an action (which one would that be?) if such MITM bid-down
attack is detected by the client. Nothing is written so far, and I
suspect that client will not implement any action if it isn't clearly
indicated.
Ok, I've added to my copy of the document:
If a user-oriented client detects such down-negotiation attack, it
SHOULD
either notify the user (it MAY give the user the opportunity to
continue with the ManageSieve session in this case) or close the
transport
connection and indicate that a down-negotiation attack might be in
progress.
If an automated client detects down-negotiation attack, it SHOULD return
or log an error indicating that a possible attack might be in progress
and/or SHOULD close the transport connection.
Nits/editorial comments:
- idnits reveals that references [DIGEST-MD5] and [IANA-GUIDELINES]
are declared in Section 9.2, but never used. There should be an anchor
in the text or the reference should be deleted.
I've removed the latter. The former is used in examples, so I should add
formal references to it.
- idnits reveals that references to RFC 4366 and RFC 3280 are
obsolete. The updated references are RFC 5246 and RFC 5280, respectively.
Updated.
- there are a couple of "anchors" in the text. Just make sure these
are deleted before publication, in particular anchor8, which describes
Chris Newman's thoughts.
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