On Tue, 15 Aug 2023, David Edelsohn wrote:
> > Making users responsible for verifying that sources are "safe" is not okay > > (we cannot teach them how to do that since there's no general method). > > Making users responsible for sandboxing the compiler is fine (there's > > a range of sandboxing solutions, from which they can choose according > > to their requirements and threat model). Sorry about the ambiguity. > > > > Alex. > > The compiler should faithfully implement the algorithms described by the > programmer. The compiler is responsible if it generates incorrect code for > a well-defined, language-conforming program. The compiler cannot be > responsible for security issues inherent in the user code, whether that > causes the compiler to function in a manner that deteriorates adversely > affects the system or generates code that behaves in a manner that > adversely affects the system. > > If "safe" is the wrong word. What word would you suggest? I think "safe" is the right word here. We also used "trusted" in a similar sense. I believe we were on the same page about that. > > For both 1) and 2), GCC is not engineered to respect such properties > > during optimization and code generation, so it's not appropriate for such > > tasks (a possible solution is to isolate such sensitive functions to > > separate files, compile to assembly, inspect the assembly to check that it > > still has the required properties, and use the inspected asm in subsequent > > builds instead of the original high-level source). > > > > At some point the system tools need to respect the programmer or operator. > There is a difference between writing "Hello, World" and writing > performance critical or safety critical code. That is the responsibility > of the programmer and the development team to choose the right software > engineers and right tools. And to have the development environment and > checks in place to ensure that the results are meeting the requirements. > > It is not the role of GCC or its security policy to tell people how to do > their job or hobby. This isn't a safety tag required to be attached to a > new mattress. Yes (though I'm afraid the analogy with the mattress is a bit lost on me). Those examples were meant to illustrate the point I tried to make earlier, not as additions proposed for the Security Policy. Specific examples where we can tell people in advance that compiler output needs to be verified, because the compiler is not engineered to preserve those security-relevant properties from the source code (and we would not accept such accidents as security bugs). Granted, it is a bit of a stretch since the notion of timing-safety is not really well-defined for C source code, but I didn't come up with better examples. Alexander
